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I. INTRODUCTION
This Year in Review is intended to provide practicing attorneys
with a brief summary of every decision published by the Alaska
Supreme Court in 1989. Due to the sheer volume of cases, space does
not permit a thorough discussion and critique of each decision.
Rather, we have attempted to highlight those decisions which repre-
sent a departure from prior law or resolve issues of first impression.
Other cases are necessarily discussed in a more cursory fashion.
For easy reference, the opinions have been grouped according to
the general subject matter of their holding rather than the nature of
the underlying claim. There are twelve categories: administrative law,
Alaska Native law, business law, constitutional law, criminal law, em-
ployment law, family law, fish and game law, procedure, property, tax
law and torts. Within each of these categories, to the extent practica-
ble, the cases have been subdivided into more specific legal areas.
Please note that while we attempt to provide a thorough picture
of the state of the law in a particular field at the time of the court's
decisions, it is possible that some holdings may have become partially
obsolete by the date of this note's publication due to subsequent rul-
ings or legislative action. The primary purpose of this note is to in-
form the practitioner which cases were decided in 1989, which
substantive areas of law were addressed, which statutes or prior com-
mon law principles were interpreted and what was the essence of each
of the holdings. Attorneys are advised not to use the information con-
tained in this note without further reference to the cases cited.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In the area of administrative law, the court decided nine cases
challenging agency actions or regulations on a variety of procedural,
statutory and constitutional grounds. Two of the cases are tax related
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and are presented in the tax section.1 In deciding these cases, the
court continued to show deference to the state's rule-making authority
except in cases involving extreme constitutional infringement.
A case which involved such an infirmity was Thorne v. Depart-
ment of Public Safety,2 which arose when the state erased the video-
tapes of Thorne's field sobriety tests prior to an administrative review
of the revocation of his license for driving while intoxicated. The
court remanded the case to the hearing officer with directions to pre-
sume that the videotape would have been favorable to Thorne. In
reaching this decision, the court analyzed two primary issues.
First, the court held that Thorne's due process rights at the revo-
cation hearing were violated by the state's failure to preserve the
videotape. The court stated that "the same procedural safeguards ap-
ply in civil driver's license revocation proceedings for driving while
intoxicated as apply in criminal prosecutions for that offense."' 3 Be-
cause Thorne would have been entitled to have the videotape available
to him in a criminal trial had he been charged with the crime of driv-
ing while intoxicated, he was entitled to have the tape in an adminis-
trative hearing.4 The court noted that considerations of fundamental
fairness dictate that where the burden of preservation is so slight, evi-
dence which is potentially relevant to an issue of central importance at
the revocation proceeding should be preserved. 5
Second, the court rejected Thorne's argument that his right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses was violated by the state's fail-
ure to preserve the videotape. 6 Although it acknowledged the ac-
cused's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in a license
revocation hearing,7 the court held that this right was not violated
because the officer testifying against Thorne did not base his testimony
upon the results of the videotaped tests.8
In Messerli v. Department of Natural Resources,9 the court upheld
the conditions imposed on a preference right in land which had been
granted by the Alaska Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") to
Messerli in settlement of his claim that the state had wrongfully taken
land from him. Messerli argued that the grant was invalid because the
DNR Policy and Procedures Manual, which allegedly influenced the
1. See infra notes 815-26 and accompanying text.
2. 774 P.2d 1326 (Alaska 1989).
3. Id. at 1329 (citing Barcott v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 741 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska
1987)).
4. Id. at 1,330.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1332-33.
7. Id. at 1332.
8. Id. at 1332-33.
9. 768 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1989).
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DNR's disposition of the case, constitutes a regulation which was not
promulgated in accordance with the Alaska Administrative Procedure
Act ("AAPA"). ° ,The court disagreed, concluding that the Manual
falls within the scope of the "internal management exception" to the
AAPA since it merely lists statutory procedures for the adjudicator to
follow.' The court further held that the DNR had not exceeded its
discretion by limiting the preference right to certain Alaska lands for
two reasons. First, the limitations were in accordance with the intent
of the preference right statute to allow fair compensation consistent
with the best interests of the state.12 Second, because Messerli was
able to locate, within the assigned lands, a parcel of "equal value" to
the original tract of land when he first took possession of it under the
federal homestead law, he could not claim any loss. 13
In Malone v. Anchorage Amateur Radio Club, 14 the court consid-
ered a decision of the Commissioner of Revenue which prohibited the
operation of coin-activated computerized bingo games under charita-
ble gambling statutes. Applying the standard of North Slope Borough
v. LeResche, 15 the court upheld the decision because it was not "arbi-
trary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion."' 16 The court based its
holding on findings that the computerized number generator used in
the games did not comport with the statutory requirements that num-
bered objects be "drawn from a receptacle,"' 7 and that bingo games be
conducted substantially as they were before January 1, 1959.18
The next two decisions in the field of administrative law have nar-
rower implications and are largely confined to their facts. In Miners
Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion, 19 the supreme court considered the validity of a 0.2 milliliter/liter
settleable solids standard imposed by the Alaska Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation in certifying a group of National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits issued to placer
10. Id. at 1117. Administrative Procedures Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.010-
44.62.650 (1989).
11. Messerli, 768 P.2d at 1118. The statutory "internal management exception"
provides that a rule adopted by a state agency which relates to the internal manage-
ment of the agency is not a regulation under the AAPA. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.640
(1989).
12. Messerli, 768 P.2d at 1119-20 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.035(e) (1989)).
13. Id. at 1119-21.
14. 781 P.2d 576 (Alaska 1989).
15. 581 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1978).
16. Malone, 781 P.2d at 578 (citing LeResche, 581 P.2d at 1115).
17. ALASKA STAT. § 05.15.210(3) (1989)..
18. ALASKA STAT. § 05.15.180(b) (1989).
19. 778 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1989), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990).
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gold miners by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. 20
In considering the validity of the permits, the court examined whether
the 0.2 milliliter/liter standard "reasonably assured" compliance with
Alaska's water quality standard for settleable solids. 2' The court ruled
that the certification was invalid as to those permit holders who had
utilized most or all of the flow of streams in which their mining opera-
tion would take place, since the record did not support the finding that
a settleable solids effluent limit of 0.2 milliliter/liter would "reason-
ably assure" that the mining operations would comply with state
water quality standards. 22 The certification of permits issued to min-
ers who had not utilized most or all of the flow of their streams, how-
ever, was deemed valid because the record contained substantial
evidence that dilution and other factors would assure compliance with
Alaska's water quality standard.23
In Tachick Freight Lines, Inc. v. Department of Labor,24 the court
upheld a decision of the Commissioner of Labor that certain individu-
als performing services for Tachick were employees rather than in-
dependent contractors, and that Tachick was therefore liable for
unemployment insurance premiums. The court held that the Commis-
sioner had not abused his broad discretion in deciding that an employ-
ment relationship existed, because Tachick did not produce clear
evidence meeting the independent contractor exception to the statu-
tory definition of employment. 25
20. Under federal regulations implementing the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1986), states must include within a draft NPDES certification "a state-
ment that there is a reasonable assurance that the activity will be conducted in a
manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards." 40 C.F.R.
§ 121.2(a)(3).
21. Miners. 778 P.2d at 1131-34. There shall be "no increase in concentrations of
sediment, including settleable solids, above natural conditions." ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 18, § 70.020 (Oct. 1988).
22. Miners. 778 P.2d at 1136-38 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1986)).
23. Id. at 1136.
24. 773 P.2d 451 (Alaska 1989).
25. Id. at 453-54. The independent contractor exception to the statutory defini-
tion of employment is delineated in section 23.20.525 of the Alaska Statutes, which
states:
Employment defined. (a) In this chapter, unless the context otherwise re-
quires, "employment" means . . . (10) service performed by an individual
[Vol. 7:87
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The court decided two cases in the field of municipal law in 1989.
Finkelstein v. Stout, 26 an appeal from an election recount brought pur-
suant to section 15.20.510(2) of the Alaska Statutes, 27 required the
court to consider the validity of several Special Masters' recommenda-
tions concerning disputed ballots. The court held, inter alia, 28 that an
absentee ballot witnessed by two non-official witnesses on different
dates was invalid under Alaska's statutory election scheme.29 In
reaching this decision, the court noted that the objective of the provi-
sion which allows two non-officials to witness a ballot, like the objec-
tive of the provision allowing one official witness to witness a ballot, is
to insure that the voter marks his or her own ballot and that the vote is
uncoerced. 30 "Because the requirements of [Alaska Statute section]
15.20.081(d) serve both to protect the essence of free and intelligent
voting and to safeguard the integrity of the ballot process, the require-
ments should be regarded as mandatory. ' 31 The fact that ambiguous
whether or not the common-law relationship of master and servant exists,
unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the department that
(A) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control
and direction in connection with the performance of the service, both under
the individual's contract for the performance and in fact;
(B) the service is performed either outside the usual course of the busi-
ness for which the service is performed or is performed outside of all the
places of business of the enterprise for which the service is performed; and
(C) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that
involved in the service performed.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.525(a)(10) (1984).
26. 774 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1989).
27. ALASKA STAT. § 15.020.510(2) (1988).
28. The court also considered the validity of the following classes of disputed bal-
lots: absentee ballots enclosed in envelopes that suggested no permanent Alaska resi-
dence; absentee ballots lacking witness signatures; absentee ballots with undated
witness signatures; absentee ballots with incomplete voter signatures; absentee ballots
without postmarks received after the election; absentee ballots of unregistered voters;
ballots of voters who had signed post-election affidavits demonstrating non-residency;
ballots of voters who had listed military post office boxes as their residences; and bal-
lots containing punchmarks in the box for each candidate.
29. The pertinent statute provides, in part:
Upon receipt of an absentee ballot by mail, the voter, in the presence of [an
official] ... may proceed to mark the ballot in secret, to place the ballot in
the small envelope, to place the small envelope in the larger envelope, and to
sign the voter's certificate on the back of the larger envelope in the presence
of an official listed in this subsection who shall sign as attesting official and
shall date the signature. If none of the officials listed in this subsection is
reasonably accessible, an absentee voter shall have the ballot witnessed by
two persons over the age of 18 years ....
ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.081(d) (1988).
30. Finkelstein, 774 P.2d at 789. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.081(d) (1988).
31. Finkelstein, 774 P.2d at 791.
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voting instructions may have contributed to the voters' failure to prop-
erly cast these ballots was deemed inconsequential. Despite the fact
that other courts have generally recognized the importance of count-
ing "illegal" votes when the source of the defect lies with election offi-
cials, the court reasoned that the public has a "supervening public
interest" in fundamentally sound elections in cases where "the vote
violates provisions designed to insure the integrity of the electoral
process."'32
In dissent, Justices Rabinowitz and Moore argued that the Spe-
cial Master was correct in counting these ballots, as the voters and
witnesses had been given unclear instructions concerning the witness
certificate. Citing Fischer v. Stout, 33 they argued that the fundamental
right to vote should not be denied where defective ballots are the result
of the error of election officials. 34
Anchorage School District v. Anchorage Daily News, 35 the second
municipal law case decided in 1989, arose when the Daily News
brought an action against a school district seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief granting access to settlement documents in a case in
which the school district was a party. In spite of the fact that the
settlement agreement contained a confidentiality provision,36 the court
held that Alaska's public records disclosure statutes37 required disclo-
sure: "The people of this state, through their elected representatives,
have stated in the clearest of terms that it is more important that they
have access to this type of information than that it remain
confidential." 38
The court also rejected the school district's argument that a fed-
eral district court order deprived the court of jurisdiction over the
Daily News' disclosure claim.39 The court held that the superior court
had personal and subject matter jurisdiction because the Daily News
was not a party to the federal litigation, and because the federal court
had not addressed the confidentiality issue when the superior court
entered its judgment.4°
32. Id. at 791-92.
33. 741 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1987).
34. Finkelstein, 774 P.2d at 794 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
35. 779 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1989).
36. Id. at 1192.
37. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.110, 09.25.120 (1983).
38. Anchorage School Dist., 779 P.2d at 1193.
39. Id. at 1193-95.
40. Id. at 1194.
[Vol. 7:87
YEAR IN REVIEW
III. ALASKA NATIVE LAW
While the court decided only one case involving Alaska Native
law in 1989, this case addressed an important issue pertaining to the
Indian Reorganization Act ("the Act").41 In re Delinquent Property
Taxes Owed to Nome42 arose when the city filed a general foreclosure
proceeding against two lots owned by a group of Eskimos for its fail-
ure to pay property taxes. The court rejected the city's attempted
foreclosure, holding that the broad terms of section 16 of the Act re-
quire tribal consent before a city can foreclose on land owned by
Alaska Natives organized under the Act.43
Justice Rabinowitz argued in dissent that the majority's broad
construction of section 16 was incorrect in view of the legislative his-
tory of that section:44 "[I]n enacting section 16 Congress entertained a
specific, narrow purpose - to stop the then prevalent Indian Service
practice of appropriating tribal lands or selling tribal assets to pay the
Indian Service's routine administrative costs."'45
IV. BUSINEss LAW
The area of business law was a busy one for the court in 1989.
The decisions fall into four categories: insurance, secured transac-
tions, contracts and general business.
A. Insurance
Litigation involving insurance companies is typically fact-specific
and frequently results in holdings limited to the terms of the particular
policy involved. The issues addressed by the court this year relate pri-
marily to the scope of insurance policies, the assignment of liability
among multiple insurers, the duty of insurers to settle claims, indem-
nity and automobile insurance. 46
With respect to the scope of insurance policies, the court gener-
ally views insurance policies as contracts of adhesion.47 It recognizes
41. 25 U.S.C. §§ 471-479 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
42. 780 P.2d 363 (Alaska 1989).
43. Id. at 367. Section 16 of the Act empowers groups organized under the In-
dian Reorganization Act "to prevent the sale, disposition, lease or encumbrance of
tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe."
25 U.S.C. § 476(e) (1983 & Supp. 1989).
44. In re Delinquent Property Taxes Owed to Nome, 780 P.2d 368-70 (Rabino-
witz, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 369.
46. See infra notes 681-90 and accompanying text for discussion of another case
involving, inter alia, an automobile insurance issue.
47. Whispering Creek Condominium Owners Ass'n v. Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co., 774
P.2d 176, 177 (Alaska 1989).
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the fact that. insurance companies dictate the terms of the policies. 4
As a result, the court construes insurance policies "so as to provide
that coverage which a layperson would have reasonably expected from
a lay interpretation of the policy terms."'49 This frequently results in
the court upholding the claims of the insured party in construing the
terms of the policy.
In Estes v. Alaska Insurance Guaranty Association, 50 the court ad-
dressed the validity of a suit brought by an insured party who had
failed to comply with a policy provision requiring that any suit on the
policy be commenced within one year after the loss occurs. Relying
upon Weaver Bros. v. Chappel,51 the majority held that time limit
clauses like the one at issue should be reviewed on the basis of whether
their application in a particular case advances the purpose for which
they were included in the policy. 52 Arguing that the provision had
been included to prevent prejudice to the insurer and that a material
question of fact existed as to whether the insurer would be prejudiced
by non-enforcement of the time limit clause, the court decided that
summary judgment in favor of the defendant was improper. 53 Justice
Moore took issue with this holding in a strongly worded dissent, argu-
ing that courts should uphold time limit clauses because they prevent
the revival of stale claims, help to prevent the loss of evidence, en-
courage plaintiffs to use diligence in enforcing their rights and prevent
fraud. 54
In Whispering Creek Condominium Owners Association v. Alaska
National Insurance Co. 55 the court considered whether a badly rotted,
yet still standing, building had "collapsed" under the terms of an in-
surance policy. In view of undisputed evidence that the condominium
involved was in a life-threatening condition and in imminent danger of
collapse, the court concluded that "the damage producing this less
than total collapse is covered under the collapse provision of the pol-
icy."' 56 The court found the policy's exclusion of loss caused by "wet
or dry rot" was inapplicable because the policy's coverage explicitly
extended to collapse caused by hidden decay.57
48. Estes v. Alaska Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 774 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Alaska 1989).
49. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979).
50. 774 P.2d 1315 (Alaska 1989).
51. 684 P.2d 123, 125 (Alaska 1984) ("In the absence of prejudice,.., there is no
justification for excusing the insurer from its obligation under the policy. We recog-
nize the strong societal interest in preserving insurance coverage for accident victims
so long as the preservation is equitable for all parties involved.").
52. Estes, 774 P.2d at 1318.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1322 (Moore, J., dissenting).
55. 774 P.2d 176 (Alaska 1989).




In State v. Oriental Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 58 the court was
required to decide whether the state was a third-party insured under a
policy issued to Korean Air Lines ("KAL") in the context of a KAL
jet crash at the Anchorage International Airport. Construing the pol-
icy's language very narrowly, the court concluded that the policy's
reference to KAL's terminal space lease agreement effectively limited
coverage to the state's interests relating to the lease of terminal space.
Therefore coverage did not extend to losses associated with KAL's use
of the airport's runways and taxiways 59 Consequently, the court held
that Oriental's waiver of subrogation in the policy did not prevent Ori-
ental from suing the state for alleged negligence in the design and op-
eration of the airport which may have contributed to the crash.60
Two of the court's 1989 decisions concern the assignment of lia-
bility among multiple insurers. Providence Washington Insurance Co.
ofAlaska v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies61 involved a dispute
between a primary insurer and a secondary insurer over liability for
post-judgment interest. A "supplementary payments" clause included
in the policy of Providence Washington, the primary insurer, provided
that the company would pay "all interest on the entire amount of any
judgment... which accrues after entry of the judgment and before the
company has paid or tendered ... that part of the judgment which
does not exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon." 62 Af-
firming the lower court's decision, the court held that Providence
Washington was obligated to pay post-judgment interest on the entire
judgment.63 The court also found that Providence Washington had
not "tendered" its payment by stating that it was in a position to pay
its portion of the judgment, holding that "tender" means giving up
control of the payment by making a deposit into the settlement trust
fund. 4
Another case involving the assignment of liability among multiple
insurers, Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Colonial Penn Insurance
Co., 65 arose when two policies covering a woman involved in an auto
accident provided for conflicting methods of payment. A Colonial
Penn policy issued to the woman's parents provided coverage for any
person using the car, but limited it to a pro rata share of the loss when
58. 776 P.2d 776 (Alaska 1989). See infra notes 79-83, 618-28 and accompanying
text for discussion of two cases arising from the same airport accident.
59. Id. at 778-80.
60. Id. at 780.
61. 778 P.2d 200 (Alaska 1989).
62. Id. at 201.
63. Id. at 203.
64. Id. at 204.
65. 777 P.2d 1162 (Alaska 1989).
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other insurance is available to cover the loss. 66 The Horace Mann pol-
icy, issued to the woman herself, also provided for pro rata coverage,
but stated that such coverage was to be considered excess coverage
when applied to non-owned automobiles for which there is other in-
surance available to cover the loss. 67 A conflict therefore arose: Colo-
nial Penn's policy required proration between the two companies,
while Horace Mann's policy required that Colonial Penn pay all of the
claim because the Horace Mann policy was not "available insurance"
but "excess coverage. '68 Relying upon Werly v. United Services Auto-
mobile Association, 69 the court disregarded the "other insurance" pro-
visions of both policies, and prorated the loss between the two
insurance companies. 70
The issue of whether a first party insured can recover punitive
damages for the insurer's breach of the duty to act in good faith when
settling a claim was addressed by the court for the first time in State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson.71 The court held that such
actions sound in tort, and that consequently punitive damages are
available. 72 Statutory remedies provided by the Alaska Insurance
Code73 do not preempt common law punitive damages awards, be-
cause the language of the statutes as well as the limited damages allow-
able under the statutes indicate that the legislature did not intend to
change the common law. 74 The Nicholson court also held that an in-
surer could be required to pay prejudgment interest on a compensa-
tory damages award in an action based on the insurer's alleged bad
faith failure to settle the insured's claim, absent a showing that such
interest payment constitutes double recovery. 75
66. Id. at 1163.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1164.
69. 498 P.2d 112, 117 (Alaska 1972) (adopting the rule promulgated by the Ore-
gon Supreme Court in Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 219
Or. 110, 341 P.2d 110 (Or. 1959), that conflicting "other insurance" clauses should be
rejected in toto, causing losses to be "prorated between the insurers up to the respec-
tive policy limits").
70. Horace Mann, 777 P.2d at 1164-65.
71. 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska 1989).
72. Id. at 1156-57.
73. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.03.060, 21.36.320, 21.90.020 (1984). See ALASKA
STAT. § 21.36.125 (1984) (delineating what are unfair claim settlement practices); and
see ALASKA STAT. § 21.90.020 (1984) which provides:
General Penalty. A person determined by the director, following an appro-
priate hearing as provided in [sections] 21.06.170-21.06.230 [of the Alaska
Statutes], to have violated a provision of this title or a regulation adopted
under it, for which violation if greater penalty is not provided in this title, is
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $2,500.
74. Nicholson, 777 P.2d at 1157-58.
75. Id. at 1158.
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Two insurance cases decided in 1989 involve indemnification
agreements. Duty Free Shoppers Group Ltd. v. State76 arose when the
state, as a lessor under an airport concession lease, sued the lessee for
indemnification of the state's cost of settling the personal injury claims
of the lessee's employee. In affirming the superior court's holding that
the state was entitled to indemnification, the court rejected the lessee's
argument that indemnification is inappropriate where the lessee rea-
sonably expected that the state would seek indemnity from the occu-
pant upon whose premises the accident occurred.77 "The fact that an
indemnity plaintiff is entitled to indemnity from a third party is simply
not a defense to an indemnity claim."78
The court addressed the issue of whether an indemnification
clause may provide an affirmative defense to negligence in State v. Ko-
rean Air Lines Co. 79 The case arose when the airline sued the state for
negligence that allegedly caused an airplane accident, and the state
raised its rights under an indemnification clause of the airline's airport
lease as an affirmative defense.80 Relying upon the explicit legislative
recognition of the importance of providing safe air travel to the pub-
lic, 81 the court held that the indemnity agreement fell within the "pub-
lic duty exception" to the general rule that an agreement which
indemnifies a party for its own negligence does not violate public pol-
icy.8 2 The indemnity agreement was therefore held inapplicable to the
case.
83
The final two cases presented here involve automobile insurance
policies, a more personal aspect of insurance law. Ironically, this is
the one area where the court has been more disposed toward a narrow
construction of the policy in issue in favor of the insurance company.
In the first case, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Jin Ku Chung,84
the court examined whether uninsured motorists' coverage may be
construed as providing coverage against underinsured motorists as
well. By a bare majority, the court decided in favor of the insurer,
holding that an insured could reasonably expect coverage under an
76. 777 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1989).
77. Id. at 653.
78. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. H.C. Price Co., 694 P.2d 782, 787-88
(Alaska 1985)).
79. 776 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989).
80. Id. at 315-16.
81. Id. at 319 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 02.15.010, 02.15.090(a) (1988)).
82. Id. at 317-19 (quoting Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska
1976) ("There are, however, instances when a court will not give effect to a contrac-
tual provision indemnifying the indemnitee's own negligence. These are cases where
the indemnity clause tends to promote breach of a duty owing to the public at
large.")).
83. Id. at 319-21.
84. 778 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1989).
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uninsured motorist policy only if there was no other applicable insur-
ance to compensate him for injuries suffered in an accident. 85 In dis-
sent, Chief Justice Matthews argued that the reasonable expectation of
one who purchases uninsured motorist coverage is instead that there
will be insurance available at least equal to the amount of the stated
coverage, regardless of whether the other motorist is underinsured.8 6
In National Indemnity Co. v. Sherman, 87 the court was asked to
decide whether the terms of a certificate of insurance or the underlying
insurance policy governed which vehicles are covered under the pol-
icy. National Insurance had issued a certificate of insurance to Sher-
man, which was filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles in
compliance with the Alaska Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
("MVSRA"). 88 The certificate indicated that the coverage extended to
both currently owned vehicles and any "replacement" vehicles; the in-
surance policy, however, covered only listed vehicles. The issue was
whether damage to Sherman's "replacement" vehicle was covered
under the terms of the policy.89 Citing Paulson v. National Indemnity
Co.,90 the court held that the insurance policy, and not the certifica-
tion required by MVSRA, defines the scope of coverage of the pol-
icy.91 The court acknowledged that this rule fails to ensure that
drivers offering proof of financial responsibility under the MVSRA
will be properly insured, but asserted that the language of the MVSRA
precludes any other interpretation. 92
Also addressed in Sherman was Sherman's claim that National
Indemnity should be estopped from denying coverage because it had
not notified the state of previous changes of vehicles insured under the
policy. On this issue, the court held that an insurer is not obligated to
85. Id. at 589.
86. Id. at 589-90 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting).
87. 777 P.2d 663 (Alaska 1989).
88. ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.410 (1989) provides:
Proof of financial responsibility for the future may be furnished by filing
with the department the written certificate of an insurance carrier authorized
to do business in this state certifying that there is in effect a motor vehicle
liability policy for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of finan-
cial responsibility. The certificate must give the effective date of the motor
vehicle liability policy, which must be the same as the effective date of the
certificate, and must designate by description or appropriate reference all
vehicles covered by it, unless the policy is issued to a person who is not the
owner of a motor vehicle.
89. National Indemnity Co., 777 P.2d at 665.
90. 498 P.2d 731, 735 (Alaska 1972) ("the Safety Responsibility Act specifically
provides that the certificate of insurance shall designate by description or appropriate
reference all of [the vehicles] covered" by the insurance policy).
91. Sherman, 777 P.2d at 667.
92. Id. at 667-68.
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notify the state of changes of vehicles originally covered by an insur-
ance policy and listed on the certificate of insurance filed with the
state. 93 Because the insurer had no duty to notify the state, Sherman's
estoppel argument necessarily failed.
B. Secured Transactions
Although the supreme court was faced with only one case in 1989
dominated by questions involving secured transactions, 94 the court ad-
dressed several legal theories in resolving that case. In Northern Com-
mercial Co. v. Cobb, 95 a secured creditor brought an action to recover
its collateral, a tractor, which the debtor had sold to a third party.
The court considered three different arguments before reversing the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the third party.
First, the court considered whether the secured creditor had con-
sented to the sale of collateral to the third party, thus destroying its
security interest in the collateral.96 Reversing the lower court, the
court held that the creditor had not consented to the sale.97 The court
determined that a provision in the filed financing statement, which re-
tained a security interest in the proceeds of any sale of the collateral,
did not in itself constitute an authorization of the sale.98 Similarly, the
court held that the mere absence of a restriction on sale in the security
agreement did not constitute an implied authorization to sell, because
Alaska law places no burden on a secured party to restrict resale in the
security agreement. 99 The court held that the creditor's explicit con-
sent to the sale upon the debtor's promise to pay the proceeds to the
creditor did not constitute "authorization" under the Alaska
statute. 100
The court then examined whether the third party was a buyer in
the ordinary course of business, and therefore protected from the se-
curity interest created by the debtor. 101 Holding that a material ques-
tion of fact still existed as to whether the debtor was in fact a dealer in
93. Id. at 667.
94. See infra notes 737-45 and accompanying text for discussion of another case
involving, inter alia, secured transaction issues.
95. 778 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1989).
96. Id. at 207-08.
97. Id. at 207-09.
98. Id. at 207-08.
99. Id. at 208.
100. Id. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.306(b) (1986).
101. Northern Commercial, 778 P.2d at 209 (interpreting ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.01.201(9) (1986), which defines a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" as
one who "in good faith, and without knowledge that the sale to that person is in
violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods, buys
in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind").
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heavy equipment, the court concluded that summary judgment was
inappropriate on this issue.102
Finally, the court considered whether the creditor's sale of the
tractor to itself after it had repossessed the tractor qualified as a com-
mercially unreasonable sale. 103 Because used tractors are not custom-
arily sold in a recognized market with standard price quotations, the
court held that the creditor's private sale of the tractor was prohibited
as commercially unreasonable. 104 The court remanded this issue to
give the creditor an opportunity to rebut the resulting presumption
that the true value of the tractor equals the amount of the outstanding
debt. 105
C. Contracts
During 1989, the court responded to numerous challenges to de-
cisions in the area of contract law. The non-insurance contract issues
addressed by the court this year relate to the parol evidence rule, the
incorporation of contract terms by reference to other documents, bid
abstracts, damages, good faith and ratification.
In Alaska Diversified Contractors, Inc. v. Lower Kuskokwim
School District, 10 6 the supreme court refused to reconsider its prior
decision in Lower Kuskokwim School District v. Alaska Diversified
Contractors, Inc. 107 that the contracts involved were integrated and
therefore not subject to variation by prior agreements under the parol
evidence rule. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the parol
evidence rule has become a "dead letter" in Alaska, 08 citing its recent
explicit recognition of the effectiveness of the parol evidence rule in
Alaska Northern v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. '0 9 The court also de-
nied admission of the parol evidence to show an enforceable promise
supported by detrimental reliance, concluding that the parol evidence
rule discharges prior agreements based on detrimental reliance just as
it discharges prior agreements based on consideration." 10
102. Id. at 210.
103. Id. at 210-11. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.504(c) (1986) (authorizing a se-
cured party to purchase collateral at a private sale, so long as the goods are of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market or of a type which is the subject of widely
distributed standard price quotations).
104. Northern Commercial, 778 P.2d at 211.
105. Id.
106. 778 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1989).
107. 734 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1987).
108. Alaska Diversified Contractors, 778 P.2d at 583.
109. 666 P.2d 33, 37-40 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
110. Alaska Diversified Contractors, 778 P.2d at 585-86 (citing Peoples Nat'l Bank
v. Bryant, 774 F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 1985); Ansam Assoc., Inc. v. Cola Petroleum,
Ltd., 760 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1985); Philadelphia Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gulf
Forge Co., 555 F. Supp. 519, 522 (S.D. Tex. 1982)).
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Two cases decided by the court concerned the effect of references,
in an underlying contract, to collateral documents. In Prichard v.
Clay, "' the court held that the mere reference in a contract to another
document does not incorporate the terms of the document unless the
contract clearly says so and, then, only to the extent indicated.' 12
Prichard entered into a purchase agreement with Clay whereby Clay
would assign his leasehold in return for Prichard's agreement to as-
sume the existing mortgage on the building and the financial obliga-
tions of Clay's land lease. The purchase agreement noted that
Prichard had reviewed the terms of the land lease, but did not explic-
itly assume any provisions of the lease beyond those pertaining to fi-
nancial obligations. 113 Since the lease terms were not incorporated,
the court found that the lower court erred in ruling that the parol
evidence rule precluded extrinsic evidence of the intentions underlying
the references to the lease in the purchase agreement.114
The court then addressed the question of whether obtaining a les-
sor's consent to assignment is a condition precedent to a contract as-
signing the lease. Since the purchase agreement specifically called for
Clay to obtain the lessor's consent to the assignment and the terms of
Clay's leasehold did not permit its assignment without the consent of
his lessor, the court held that obtaining this consent was a condition
precedent to the purchase agreement between Clay and Prichard."15
Even though it was Clay's duty under the agreement to procure the
lessor's consent, the court remanded the case for a determination as to
whether Prichard's actions were the cause of Clay's inability to gain
the lessor's consent." 16
Where two contracts do not conflict directly, and the second is
silent on an issue addressed by the first, the first contract will con-
trol. 117 In Jackson v. Barbero, 118 two parties had agreed in a property
lease that the prevailing party in any legal dispute relating to the prop-
erty should be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. The parties later
signed an agreement to purchase the property, the terms of which va-
ried materially from the original lease and did not address attorney's
111. 780 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1989).
112. Id. at 360.
113. Id. at 361-62.
114. Id. at 362.
115. Id. at 362-63 ("Construing Clay's obligation as a condition precedent is the
only construction which implements the clear intentions of the parties, for neither side
reasonably could have contemplated consummation of the deal without the lease
assignment.").
116. Id.
117. Jackson v. Barbero, 776 P.2d 786, 788 (Alaska 1989).
118. 776 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1989).
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fees.1 19 Stating that "the plain meaning of a contract provision
prevails over any limitation otherwise imposed by [Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure] 82,"120 the court held that since the two contracts
"were not directly contradictory" and the subsequent agreement did
not address the matter of attorney's fees, the terms of the lease pertain-
ing to attorney's fees would be enforced. The court remanded for de-
termination of a reasonable amount of attorney's fees. 121
Municipality of Anchorage v. Tatco 122 dealt with the rights of
third party suppliers under a contract between the municipality and
Tatco. Tatco had contracted to supply clean fill to the municipal land-
fill. When Tatco failed to pay its suppliers, they brought suit against
the municipality as third party beneficiaries to the contract under two
alternative theories of liability.
First, the suppliers claimed that the contract incorporated, by ref-
erence, municipal contracting guidelines that would have required
Tatco to post a payment bond to protect the suppliers. Because
Anchorage failed to enforce the bond requirement, the suppliers con-
tended that the municipality should bear responsibility for their
losses.123 The court dismissed this argument on the grounds that the
terms of the contract specifically waived the payment bond require-
ment.'124 Any conflict between the contract terms and the terms of a
document incorporated by reference must be resolved in favor of the
contract terms because they best represent the reasonable expectations
of the parties.125
Next, the suppliers argued that the contract was subject to the
Little-Miller Act, 126 which requires the posting of a payment bond.
The court dismissed this argument, holding that the contract was not
covered by the Act. It was merely a supply contract and not a con-
tract "for the construction, alteration, or repair of a public building or
public work."' 27
Two cases discussed the bidding process for public contracts.
The normal procedure is for the state to solicit bids and then to notify
119. Id. at 7 87.
120. Id. at 788 (citing Ursin Seafoods, Inc. v. Keener Packing Co., 741 P.2d 1175,
1180-81 (Alaska 1987)).
121. Id. at 788.
122. 774 P.2d 207 (Alaska 1989).
123. Id. at 209-11.
124. Id. at 210.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 209. See ALASKA STAT. § 36.25.010 (1989) (The Little-Miller Act's
bonding provisions provided some protection from non-payment to the suppliers of
government contractors where the contract is "for the construction, alteration, or re-
pair of a public building or public work.").
127. Tatco, 774 P.2d at 211; see ALASKA STAT. § 36.25.010 (1989).
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the apparent successful bidder by means of a bid abstract. The bid
abstract also serves as a conditional acceptance of the bid until a for-
mal contract is executed.
In State v. Johnson, 1 28 the court addressed the issue of when ac-
ceptance occurs in public contract bidding. After soliciting bids for a
contract to supply diesel fuel to the state's ferry fleet, the state sent a
bid abstract to all bidders showing Texaco as the apparent low bidder
and stating that the other bidders had five days to appeal. 129 Texaco's
bid was later deemed nonresponsive, leaving Alaska Petroleum
("AP") as the next lowest bidder.130 However, before a bid abstract
was issued in AP's favor, the state determined to rebid the contract
because current fuel prices were lower than AP's bid.1 3 1 AP later filed
suit, claiming that two letters it had previously received from state
officials constituted acceptance of its bid.132
Reversing the lower court, the court held that no contract existed
between the state and AP for several reasons. First, the statute then in
effect, 133 which regulated the award of public contracts, allowed the
state to cancel solicitations of bids prior to the issuing of a binding bid
abstract if it was found to be in the state's best interest. Furthermore,
the abstract showing Texaco as the lowest bidder explicitly reserved
the right to amend the award and instructed the low bidder not to
proceed until a contract document was executed.134 Finally, the court
held that both letters referred to future actions required by the state
before the award would be final. 135 Because a bid abstract had never
been issued in AP's favor, AP could not reasonably believe that a final
award had been granted. 136
The court faced a similar issue regarding bid abstracts in Dick
Fischer Development No. 2, Inc. v. Department of Administration. 137
The state had solicited bids for the construction of an office complex in
Anchorage. Dick Fischer Development No. 2, Inc. ("Fischer") was
128. 779 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1989).
129. Id. at 778-79.
130. Id. at 779.
131. Id.
132. Id. The first letter stated that AP was the apparent low bidder and that upon
AP's furnishing of proof of insurance, which was needed for the state to determine
AP's responsibility as a bidder, "a final notice of award of contract [would] be issued."
Id. The second letter stated that AP was the next lowest bidder and that AP would be
contacted by the Division of General Services and Supply "to make the contract
award." Id.
133. ALASKA STAT. § 37.05.240(a) (repealed 1986); see Johnson, 779 P.2d at 780
n.3.
134. Johnson, 779 P.2d at 781 n.4.
135. Id. at 782.
136. Id.
137. 778 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1989).
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deemed the lowest bidder and the bid abstract sent to Fischer stated
that it served as final notice of the award provided no appeals were
filed within five days. 138 Timely bid protests were filed and the project
was cancelled prior to the resolution of the protests. 139 Fischer
claimed that a binding contract existed and sought damages for breach
of contract.
The court held that no contract had been formed because the bid
abstract created a condition of acceptance: any bid protests must be
resolved prior to the final awarding of the contract. 140 Since the pro-
ject was cancelled prior to the adjudication of the bid protests, the
condition of acceptance was not satisfied. 141
In Clark v. Greater Anchorage, Inc., 142 Clark had entered into a
contract with Greater Anchorage, Inc. ("GAI") whereby Clark
agreed to provide a fireworks display for a festival sponsored by GAL.
The agreement required Clark to purchase insurance and to name
GAI as a covered entity. 143 Clark purchased the policy, but did not
list GAI as a covered entity. When a spectator injured during the
display brought suit against GAI, GAI sought indemnification from
Clark.144 Clark argued that the insurance clause in the contract was
not an indemnity agreement and was also unenforceable because it was
indefinite. 145
The court held that although the contract was not an indemnity
agreement, it was a valid contract for the procurement of insurance
which had been breached by Clark. 146 The contract did not fail for
indefiniteness because all the necessary elements could be inferred
from "the past dealings of the parties, their conversations, and busi-
ness custom."' 147
138. Id. at 1155.
139. Id. at 1.154-55.
140. Id.
141. Id. (The court did not determine whether the condition was a condition prece-
dent or a condition subsequent. In either case, the state was not liable for damages
because the former constituted nonfulfillment of a condition precedent and the latter
constituted fulfillment of a condition subsequent, rendering acceptance incomplete.).
142. 780 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1989).
143. Id. at 1033.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1034. The insurance clause in the contract read, "API [Clark] agrees to
provide insurance for the event and to provide a certificate of insurance naming GAI
as a covered entity." Id. at 1035.
146. Id. at 1034. "The rather cryptic agreement 'to provide insurance for the event
and to provide a certificate of insurance naming GAI as a covered entity' does not
clearly and unequivocally express the requisite intent for an indemnity agreement."
Id.
147. Id. at 1035 (citing Howarth v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 596 P.2d 1164,
1168 (Alaska 1979)). Howarth provided the requisite elements of a contract for the
procurement of insurance, which are: showing (1) the subject matter of the contract,
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The more notable holding in the case pertained to the appropriate
measure of damages. The court held, sua sponte, that if further pro-
ceedings in the superior court showed that GAI would have been cov-
ered under Clark's liability policy had GAI been named as a covered
entity, then Clark would be liable for any damages which GAI and its
insurer had to pay. 148 The court chose not to follow other jurisdic-
tions, which hold that in situations where a promisor breaches a prom-
ise to purchase insurance, causing a loss to the promisee who is
covered by another insurer, there is no damage to the promisee since
his loss is fully reimbursed by his own insurer. 149
The final issue before the court in Clark was whether the trial
court had improperly amended the jury verdict by increasing the dam-
age award in response to GAI's motion for a new trial. 150 The prac-
tice of increasing an inadequate jury damage award when the
defendant consents to the increase or where the damages are undis-
puted as an alternative to granting a motion for new trial is called
"additur."' 151 In situations where additur denies a party's seventh
amendment right to a jury trial, it has been held unconstitutional in
federal courts.152 However, since the seventh amendment does not ex-
tend to the states,153 the court was free to proceed with an analyis
under the Alaska Constitution.1 54 The court held that when there is
no dispute as to damages, as was the case here, a jury trial solely on
the issue of damages would be a mere formality.1 55 Under these cir-
cumstances, additur does not violate a party's right to jury trial and is
therefore not unconstitutional.1 56
In Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v. First National Bank of
Anchorage, 157 the court held, as a matter of first impression, that the
duty of good faith between contracting parties requires that a client,
who has signed a contingent fee agreement with an attorney, exercise
his control over the outcome of the dispute in a manner consistent
(2) the risk insured against, (3) the amount of coverage, (4) the duration of the cover-
age and (5) the premiums to be paid. Howarth, 596 P.2d at 1167-68.
148. Clark 780 P.2d at 1035-36.
149. Id. at 1036 n.8.
150. Id. at 1036.
151. Id. at 1036, 1037 n.11.
152. Id. at 1036.
153. Id. n.10.
154. Id. at 1037. The court noted that even in jurisdictions where additur is un-
constitutional in some situations, it "does not contravene a party's right to trial by
jury when there is no genuine issue of fact as to damages." Id. (citing 6A J. MOORE,
W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.08[8] at 59-217
(1989)).
155. Clark 780 P.2d at 1037.
156. Id.
157. 783 P.2d 1164 (Alaska 1989).
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with the reasonable expectations of the parties. 158 A client's decision
not to accept a settlement offer, the court held, does not breach a con-
tingent fee agreement unless the decision was made with the intention
of taking advantage of the attorney.1 59 Where the client refuses to
accept a settlement offer unless the attorney reduces his fee, the client
breaches the duty of good faith where he would have accepted the
offer absent the desire to renegotiate the attorney's fee.160
The remaining two decisions in the field of contracts are largely
confined to their facts. In Apex Control Systems v. Alaska Mechani-
cal 161 the court upheld the trial court's interpretations of two con-
tracts between a contractor and a subcontractor after determining that
neither interpretation was clearly erroneous.162 With respect to the
first contract, the court found ample testimony to support an industry-
recognized distinction between "chiller controls" and "chilled water
system controls" in a subcontract to provide refrigeration systems.163
In the second contract, the court found it reasonable to conclude that
approval by a contractor's foreman of "extra work" invoices entitled
the subcontractor who performed the work to additional compensa-
tion.' 64 The court also affirmed the trial court's designation of Alaska
Mechanical as the prevailing party at trial for purposes of awarding
attorney's fees, despite the fact that Apex Control Systems received
some affirmative recovery, because Alaska Mechanical prevailed on
the main issue at trial.' 65
In Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc.,166 the court
examined whether a corporation should be held liable for the unau-
thorized signature of the corporation's president. Relying upon the
doctrine of ratification by silence, the court affirmed the trial court's
decision binding the corporation. 167 The doctrine of ratification by si-
lence, articulated in Bruton v. Automatic Welding Supply Corp., ' 6s
holds that a principal is liable for the acts of a second party purporting
to act for the principal when the principal manifests an intent to be
158. Id. at 1167 (citing Carrico v. Delp, 141 Ill. App. 3d 684, 689, 490 N.E.2d 972,
976 (Ct. App. 1986)).
159. Id. at 1168.
160. Id.
161. 776 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1989).
162. Id. at 311-14.
163. Id. at 313.
164. Id. at 314.
165. Id. (citing Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 63 (Alaska 1976) (holding
that a litigant may be the prevailing party if successful with regard to the main issue,
even if the other party receives some affirmative recovery)).
166. Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc., No. 3537 (Alaska Dec. 8,
1989).
167. Id. slip op. at 14-20.
168. 513 P.2d 1122, 1126-28 (Alaska 1973).
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bound by the acts of the second party. 169 Because the corporation was
aware of the unauthorized signature at issue, and did not inform the
third party of its intent not to be bound, the court stated that the "ap-
parent authority" of the president bound the corporation under the
doctrine of ratification by silence. 170
D. General Business
Four additional cases decided by the supreme court in 1989 do
not fit readily into more specific areas of business law. The first of
these, Robson v. Smith, 171 involved the rights of a corporation's un-
secured creditors. In Robson, unsecured creditors challenged a deci-
sion by the directors of the corporation to prefer a secured creditor,
who was also an officer and shareholder of the corporation, over the
unsecured creditors. 72 The court held that the officer's secured debt
had valid priority over the debt of unsecured creditors because the
officer had made loans in good faith to a solvent corporation. 173 The
state statute requiring directors to make provision for all known debts
before distributing assets to shareholders during the liquidation of a
corporation was found inapplicabie' 74 because the corporation in-
volved had been neither de jure nor de facto liquidated. 75
Land Title Co. of Alaska v. Anchorage Printing, Inc. 176 arose
when an escrow agent failed to secure a copy of a corporate resolution
authorizing a transfer of real estate prior to transferring the prop-
erty. 17 7 The trial court had found the escrow agent jointly and sever-
ally liable for the corporation's costs in setting aside the unauthorized
transaction, holding that the agent had been negligent in failing to seek
169. Sea Lion, No. 3537, slip op. at 15-19 (Alaska Dec. 8, 1989) ("In Bruton, this
court outlined two requirements for an otherwise unauthorized act to be ratified by
the principal's silence. The first is that the act sought to be ratified, as with any theory
of ratification, must be done by someone who held himself out to the third party as an
agent for the principal .... Second, the principal must then have failed to act in
response under circumstances which 'according to the ordinary experience and habits
of men, one would naturally be expected to speak if he did not consent.' ")(citations
omitted)).'
170. Id. slip op. at 21-22.
171. 777 P.2d 659 (Alaska 1989).
172. Id. at 660.
173. Id. at 661-63. The court set forth the following factors to consider in judging
the validity of loans to insiders: (1) the essentiality of the loans made, (2) whether the
loans benefit the corporation and help preserve assets, (3) the extent to which loans
were for basic corporate business, (4) the good faith nature of the loans and (5) the
solvency of the corporation. Id. at 662 (citing Foster v. Arata, 74 Nev. 143, 153, 325
P.2d 759, 764 (1958)).
174. Id. at 662. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.216(c) (repealed 1988).
175. Robson, 777 P.2d at 662-63.
176. 783 P.2d 767 (Alaska 1989).
177. Id. at 768.
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the corporate resolution of authorization before transferring the
land.178 The Alaska Supreme Court overturned this decision, finding
that there was insufficient evidence that the escrow agent had actually
agreed to obtain the corporate resolution in addition to performing
those contractual duties specifically "found in the escrow instructions
of the buyer and seller." 179 Since the court did not find that the es-
crow agent had undertaken this additional obligation, it was unneces-
sary for the court to address the underlying theory of liability relied
upon by the trial court. The court declined to decide whether a third
party could be "liable in tort for economic losses for its failure to per-
form a gratuitous undertaking made in addition to its contractual
duties."1 80
In Bibo v. Jeffrey's Restaurant, 181 a minority shareholder brought
an action against controlling shareholders, alleging that they had
caused the corporation to engage in various transactions which
benefitted the controlling shareholders to the prejudice of the corpora-
tion and the minority shareholder. Overruling the trial court's sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, the court held that there existed a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the controlling sharehold-
ers' actions constituted a breach of a fiduciary duty;18 2 and it held that
the claims were not barred by laches even though the suit was brought
five years after events giving rise to the claims, because the defendants
did not suffer prejudice as a result of the delay.' 83 The court also held
that the claims were not barred by the two-year statute of limitations
for tort claims,184 because actions against corporate directors for
breach of fiduciary duty sound in contract, and are therefore governed
by the six-year statute of limitations for contract claims. 18 5
Finally, in a decision governed by Hawaiian partnership law,
Alaska Continental Bank v. Anchorage Commercial Land Associ-
ates, 186 the court held that a limited partnership may implicitly ratify
an unauthorized transaction of the general partner, and therefore may
be bound by the general partner's action.' 87 Such implied ratification
178. Id.
179. Id. at '769.
180. Id.
181. 770 P.2d 290 (Alaska 1989).
182. Id. at 294.
183. Id. at 293-95.
184. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983).
185. Bibo, 770 P.2d at 295-96; ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983). See Hughes v.
Reed, 46 F.2d 435, 440 (10th Cir. 1931) (holding that a suit by a corporation against
directors for breach of their fiduciary duties is governed by the statute of limitations
pertaining to implied contracts).
186. 781 P.2d 562 (Alaska 1989).
187. Id. at 565.
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occurs when a limited partnership "accepts the benefits of the unau-
thorized acts of the partner, with actual or constructive knowledge of
all the material facts .... ,,88
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In 1989, the court was faced with eight cases dominated by ques-
tions of law under the federal and Alaska constitutions.1 89 The court
generally adopted a conservative view of the constitutional provision
involved in six of these cases, holding against the plaintiff and finding
the challenged action or statute to be constitutional. Both cases which
invalidated the challenged laws were accompanied by strong dissent-
ing opinions.
One of the most controversial and far-reaching decisions was
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling. 190 This case arose when two for-
mer employees charged their employer with violating their right to
privacy by discharging them for their refusal to submit to urinalysis
screening for drug use. The court upheld the validity of the drug tests,
finding that summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate for
several reasons.
First and most importantly, the court held that the employer's
drug testing program did not violate the employees' right to privacy
under the Alaska Constitution' 9' because the constitutional right to
privacy was not intended to reach the actions of private parties.' 92
Second, the court held that the employer's actions had not
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 93 Rec-
ognizing the strong public policy supporting the protection of em-
ployee privacy, the court found for the first time that it is possible for
an employer to breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by violating the privacy of an employee. 94 In this case, how-
ever, the court concluded that the competing public concern for em-
ployee safety precluded a holding that the employer's actions
188. Id. (citing In re WPMK Corp., 59 Bankr. 991, 997 (D. Haw. 1986)).
189. See infra notes 779-91 and accompanying text for discussion of a case involv-
ing the constitutionality of a state tax law.
190. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
191. The Alaska Constitution provides:
Right of Privacy. The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.
ALASKA CONsT. art I, § 22.
192. Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1130 ("Absent a history demonstrating that the amend-
ment was intended to proscribe private action, or a proscription of private action in
the language of the amendment itself, we decline to extend the constitutional right to
privacy to the actions of private individuals.").




constituted such a breach.195 The court noted that if the employer had
not conducted the tests at a time reasonably contemporaneous with
the employees' work times, or if the employer had failed to notify the
employees of the adoption of the drug testing program, a finding of a
breach of the implied covenant might have been appropriate.
196
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the drug tests
gave rise to a common law cause of action for invasion of privacy,
holding as a matter of first impression that the tests were not unwar-
ranted, and therefore did not constitute an "offensive intrusion" under
Alaska law. 197
In Barber v. Municipality ofAnchorage, 198 the court examined the
validity of an Anchorage sign ordinance under the federal Constitu-
tion. Barber charged that the ordinance, which prohibits off-premises
advertising signs, portable signs and roof signs, 199 violated, inter alia,
his constitutional right to free speech.2°° The court disagreed, finding
that the ordinance directly furthered the municipality's substantial
aesthetic concerns in the least restrictive manner possible.20' Further-
more, the court held that the ordinance did not violate Barber's equal
protection rights, for the ordinance was rationally related to legitimate
municipal interests in aesthetics and traffic safety.202 The municipal-
ity's admittedly selective enforcement of the ordinance against porta-
ble signs was similarly held not to constitute a violation of equal
protection, for there was no showing that the municipality had en-
forced the ordinance in a discriminatory manner.20 3
Another case that limited an individual's freedom of expression
was Johnson v. Tait. 204 Johnson arose because the plaintiff was forced
to leave an Anchorage tavern for wearing the "colors" of his club, the
Hells Angels. In reversing the superior court's decision, the court held
195. Id. at 1130, 1133-37.
196. Id. at 1136-37.
197. Id. at 1137-38 (citing Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 247-48 (9th Cir.
1971); Sistok v. Northwestern Tel. Sys., Inc., 189 Mont. 82, 92-93, 615 P.2d 176, 182
(1980)).
198. 776 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1989).
199. Id. at 1036 (citing ANCHORAGE MUNICIPAL CODE § 21.45.160).
200. Barber, 776 P.2d at 1036.
201. Barber, 776 P.2d at 1036-39.
202. Id. at 1039-40. In holding that the ordinance did not violate the plaintiff's
first amendment rights, the court noted that the ordinance was not invalid merely
because it might have gone further than it did. Id. at 1039 (citing Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966)).
203. Id. at 1040 (citing State v. Reefer King Co., Inc., 559 P.2d 56, 64 (Alaska
1976), modified on reh'g, 562 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1977) ("Selective enforcement of a
statute violates the equal protection clause only if it is part of a deliberate and inten-
tional plan to discriminate based on an arbitrary or unjustifiable classification.")).
204. 774 P.2d 185 (Alaska 1989).
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that the plaintiff's right to freedom of expression had not been vio-
lated, because the Alaska Constitution's freedom of expression provi-
sion 20 5 does not apply to private establishments such as taverns.20 6
In Property Owners Association v. City of Ketchikan,207 the court
held, inter alia, that special assessments levies imposed by the city
against taxpayers who benefitted from a local improvement district did
not violate the taxpayers' federal right to due process. 20 8 In reaching
this conclusion, the court determined that the city council's decision
to impose the assessments was "legislative" and not "adjudicative," 209
and that the council's provision of notice and an opportunity to be
heard therefore satisfied due process concerns.210
The Alaska Constitution requires the state legislature to "adjourn
from regular session no later than one hundred twenty consecutive
calendar days from the date it convenes. 2 11 In Alaska Christian Bible
Institute v. State,212 the plaintiff claimed that in both 1986 and 1987,
the legislative session extended into the morning hours of the 121st
day,2 1 3 in violation of the Alaska Constitution. The court held that
the length of the legislative session was not unconstitutional, for the
language of the constitution results in a 121-day durational limit for
legislative sessions.2 14
The year's most divisive case was McDowell v. State,215 which
yielded two concurrences and one dissent. The court held the state's
205. The Alaska Constitution, in relevant part, provides:
Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of that right.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5.
206. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 190.
207. 781 P.2d 567 (Alaska 1989).
208. Id. at 572. The opinion also held that the Council was not estopped from
charging interest on deferred assessment installments at rates higher than the eight
percent rate fixed by statute, because alleged statements made concerning fixed inter-
est rates amounted to "salesmanship," and because it would be unjust to force the
city's population at large to subsidize the purchasers of lots in the local improvement
district. Id. at 573.
209. Id. at 572.
210. Id. at 571-72 ("Where an act is deemed to be legislative, trial-type procedures
need not be afforded to affected members of the public. The contrary is true where an
act is deemed to be 'adjudicatory' [citations omitted].").
211. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 8.
212. 772 P.2d 1079 (Alaska 1989).
213. Id. at 1079-80.
214. Id. at 1080-81. The court stated that the proper method of calculating the
period in question is to exclude the first day; thus, day two of the session is the first
day for the purposes of this provision. Id. at 1081.
215. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
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rural preference provision 16 for subsistence fishermen and hunters un-
constitutional under the Alaska Constitution. 17
One purpose of the rural preference provision was to determine
priority of use of the state's fish and game populations and to give a
preference to rural residents over non-rural residents.218 This prefer-
ence gives subsistence uses a priority over other consumptive uses2 19 if
the "harvestable portion of any stock or population is not sufficient to
accommodate all consumptive uses."220 Another purpose of this law
was to ensure state compliance with the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA").22 Section 3114 of ANILCA
requires that subsistence uses are to be given priority over the taking
of fish and game on federal public lands in Alaska. ANILCA pro-
vides, however, that only rural Alaska residents be entitled to subsis-
tence user status.22 2 ANILCA requires federal management of these
public lands in Alaska if these priority criteria are not followed,
although it does allow for state management of the lands if the state
"enacts and implements subsistence laws 'which are consistent with,
and which provide for the definition, preference, and participation
specified in' ANILCA. z22 3
216. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.05.258(c), 16.05.940 (1987).
217. Specifically, the rural preference provision was found unconstitutional under
Alaska Constitution art. VIII, § 3 (the common use clause), art. VIII, § 15 (no exclu-
sive right of fishery clause) and art. VIII, § 17 (the uniform application clause). Mc-
Dowell, 785 P.2d at 1. The provision was also challenged under the state and federal
due process and equal protection clauses. Id.
218. Id. at 4.
219. Subsistence uses are defined as "the noncommercial, customary and tradi-
tional uses of wild, renewable resources by a resident domiciled in a rural area of the
state for direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or
transportation, for the making and selling of handicraft articles out of non-edible by-
products of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or family consumption, and
for the customary trade, barter, or sharing for personal or family consumption." Id.
at 1 (emphasis added) (citing ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.940(30) (1987)). Consumptive
uses include sport, personal and commercial, as well as subsistence uses. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 2 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(c) (1987)).
221. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3233 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989). The Secretary of the
Interior notified the state that, following the court's holding in Madison v. Alaska
Department of Fish and Game, 696 P.2d 168 (Alaska 1985), which struck down a
rural residency requirement for subsistence users as inconsistent with state statute,
state law was rio longer consistent with ANILCA requirements and that federal man-
agement would begin if the state did not adopt laws that were consistent. With the
passage of 52 SLA 1986 and its rural preference for subsistence uses, the Department
of the Interior once again held that Alaska was in compliance with ANILCA. Mc-
Dowell, 785 P.2d at 3.
222. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 3 n.3 (citing 16 U.S.C.A. § 3114 (West 1985)).
223. Id. at 3 (citing 16 U.S.C.A. § 3115(d) (West 1985)).
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The court struck down the rural residency requirement on two
independent grounds. The first was based on constitutional interpreta-
tion. The court found a common theme running through article VIII
sections 3, 15 and 17 of the Alaska Constitution - "exclusive or spe-
cial privileges to take fish and wildlife are prohibited.122 4 While not-
ing that section 15 addresses fisheries only, the court stated that "the
prevention of grants of exclusive or special privileges with respect to
fish and game is also one purpose of the common use and the uniform
application clauses. It follows that the grant of special privileges with
respect to game based on one's residence is also prohibited. '225
The court's other ground for declaring the law unconstitutional
was that it violated the equal access clauses of article VIII.226 The
court found that "ensur[ing] that those Alaskans who need to engage
in subsistence hunting and fishing in order to provide for their basic
necessities are able to do so" was an "important" state interest.227
However, the court found the rural preference provision, as a means of
implementation, to be "extremely crude" and not sufficiently tailored
to its purpose.228 Specifically, the court held that the rural/urban dis-
tinction was both overinclusive and underinclusive.229 The court
found it overinclusive because it includes "numerous rural residents
who have not engaged in subsistence hunting and fishing" 230 and un-
derinclusive because it "unfairly excludes some urban residents who
have lived a subsistence lifestyle and desire to continue to do so."'231
Because the means used to implement an important state purpose were
not the least restrictive, the court held that the rural residency require-
ment violated the equal access clauses of article VIII. The court com-
mented that a preference system based on individual characteristics
was much more likely to meet the equal access requirement of article
224. Id. at 6. The court commented, however, that while section 15 does prohibit
the granting of fishing monopolies, it does not "prohibit some differential treatment of
diverse user groups as commercial, sport, and subsistence fishermen." Id. at 8.
225. Id. at 9.
226. Id. at 10. "In reviewing legislation which burdens the equal access clauses of
article VIII, the purpose of the burden must be at least important. The means used to
accomplish the purpose must be designed for the least possible infringement on article
VIII's open access values." Id. (citing State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1191 (Alaska
1983); Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 758 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Alaska
1988)).
227. Id. The court also examined the state's purpose of complying with ANILCA
in order to retain state control over fish and game on federal lands. The court found
this purpose not to be sufficiently important so as to withstand scrutiny under article
VIII, stating that "[s]tate control merely for the sake of control is a questionable goal
when the terms infringe upon the open access values of article VIII." Id. at 10 n.20.
228. Id. at 10.
229. Id. at 10-11.




VIII while still accomplishing the statute's purpose.232 The court then
remanded the case to the superior court for further action.
Justice Compton concurred with the court's conclusion that the
rural preference scheme violated the exclusivity prohibition in sections
3, 15 and 17 of article VIII.233 He expressed no opinion, however, as
to whether the equal access clauses of article VIII were also violated,
stating that the court's analysis of that issue was "superfluous to the
decision. '234 Justice Moore concurred with the court's decision as to
the equal access issue, but disagreed with the court's analysis of the
exclusivity issue.235 Justice Moore characterized this case as an equal
protection case. He believed that the challenged statute should receive
close scrutiny, arguing that it "at least must be closely related to an
important state interest. ' 236 He found that "ensuring that persons
who are dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing have access
to wildlife" is a "compelling" state interest, but he stated that the rural
preference provision at issue was "only loosely related to that pur-
pose. '237 Therefore, Justice Moore found that the provision violated
the Alaska Constitution's equal protection and uniform application
clauses, although he agreed with the court that a law tailored to indi-
vidual characteristics would pass constitutional muster.238 He dis-
agreed with the implications of the plurality's exclusivity analysis
because, in his opinion, not all preferences, especially those dealing
with subsistence, would necessarily violate sections 3 and 15 of article
VIII. Moreover, Justice Moore believed that it was impossible to find
a violation of section 17 "without a full equal protection analysis. '239
Justice Rabinowitz dissented, stating that, in his view, the state
subsistence laws did not violate sections 3, 15 or 17 of article VIII of
the Alaska Constitution. 24° He also disagreed with the court's equal
protection analysis, stating that the majority erroneously applied strict
232. Id. at 11.
233. Id. at 12 (Compton, J., concurring).
234. Id. (Compton, J., concurring).
235. Id. (Moore, J., concurring).
236. Justice Moore considered "access to wildlife for subsistence purposes... [to
be] a species of the important right to engage in economic endeavor." McDowell, 785
P.2d at 13. State v. Enserch Alaska Constr. Co., 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989) (holding
a statutory local hiring preference for public works projects unconstitutional under
Alaska's equal protection clause). See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Enserch.
237. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 12. "There is only a modest correlation between the
set of people who reside in areas designated as rural under the Act and the set of
people who are dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing." Id. at 13.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 14 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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scrutiny and the least restrictive alternative standards.241 Justice Ra-
binowitz would have applied a lesser standard of scrutiny and found
that the subsistence legislation was substantially related to the legiti-
mate legislative goal of ensuring the welfare of subsistence users, and
that the fit between this goal and the rural preference provision was
sufficiently close to withstand equal protection scrutiny under Alaska
law.
2 4 2
In Robison v. Francis, 243 the court reaffirmed its holding in State
v. Green244 that the state is not a "person" under the Civil Rights
Act 245 and therefore dismissed a claim brought against the state under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.246 The court also denied the plaintiff's claim for
Bivens-type damages247 resulting from the state legislature's passage of
legislation that was unconstitutional under the United States Constitu-
tion,248 affirming its decision in Vest v. Schafer249 that the state may
not be held liable for damages arising from the passage of unconstitu-
tional legislation. 250
In State v. Enserch Alaska Construction, Inc.,251 the court held
unconstitutional an Alaska statute which provided a hiring preference
to residents of economically distressed zones for certain employment
on public works projects. Relying upon the "sliding scale" method of
analyzing equal protection claims articulated in Alaska Pacific Insur-
ance Co. v. Brown,252 the court held the statute invalid because its pur-
pose, "disparate treatment of unemployed workers in one region in
order to confer an economic benefit on similarly-situated workers in
another region," was not a legitimate legislative goal.253 The court
held that the plaintiff could not recover from the state damages it suf-
fered on account of the statute, however, arguing that if a state were
241. Id. (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 14-15 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
243. 777 P.2d 202 (Alaska 1989).
244. 633 P.2d 1381 (Alaska 1981).
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (1981).
246. Francis, 777 P.2d at 203 (citing State v. Green, 633 P.2d at 1382). See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
247. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), the Court held that a violation of the fourth amendment by federal officials
may result in the availability of money damages for any injuries suffered. A plaintiff is
not limited to equitable remedies. Id. at 397.
248. Francis, 777 P.2d at 204.
249. 757 P.2d 588 (Alaska 1988).
250. Francis, 777 P.2d at 204 & n.3.
251. State v. Enserch Alaska Constr. Co., 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989).
252. 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984).
253. Enserch, 787 P.2d at 634.
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liable for unconstitutional legislation "'[1]egislators would become re-
luctant to legislate.' "254
In dissent, Justices Compton and Rabinowitz argued that the ma-
jority mischaracterized the state's purpose in enacting the preference
law as intending to confer an economic benefit on workers in certain
regions.2 55 Instead, they argued, the statute was enacted for the legiti-
mate purpose of reducing alcoholism, child abuse, domestic violence
and other related social ills in certain regions of Alaska.256 Because
the law required a" 'reasonable relationship between the danger repre-
sented by non-citizens, as a class, and the.., discrimination practiced
upon them,' " Justice Compton argued, the statute did not violate the
plaintiffs' rights to equal protection. 257
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court decided only three cases this year in
the area of criminal law. As has been its custom, the court tended to
adopt positions in all three cases which served to expand the power of
the state rather than to expand the rights of criminal defendants. This
was particularly evident in Vaden v. State,258 a case addressing the
criminal liability of two hunting guides for violations of fish and game
law. The defendants in Vaden had flown undercover agents into the
bush where the defendants and the agents allegedly violated numerous
fish and game laws. Despite the questionable actions of the under-
cover agents, which allegedly included killing caribou, a divided court
affirmed the numerous superior court convictions for three reasons.
First, the court held that the justification defenses available to the
agents did not preclude the defendants' accomplice liability because
Alaska's statutory scheme does not require that a principal be found
guilty or even prosecuted in order for an accomplice to be con-
victed.259 Second, the court rejected the entrapment defenses asserted,
holding that the defendants had failed to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the police employed tactics of "persuasion or in-
ducement such as would be effective to persuade the average person
... to commit the offense."' 260
254. Id. at 635 (quoting Vest v. Schafer, 757 P.2d 588 (Alaska 1988)).
255. Id. at 638-39 (Compton, J., dissenting), id. at 641-42 (Rabinowitz, J.,
dissenting).
256. Id. at 639 (Compton, J., dissenting), id. at 641 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 638-39 (Compton, J., dissenting) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 399 (1947)).
258. 768 P.2d 1102 (Alaska 1989).
259. Id. at 1106 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.420 (1988)).
260. Id. at 1107-08 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (1988)).
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Finally, the court held that the conduct of the agents was not so
outrageous as to warrant dismissal of the defendants' convictions on
due process grounds.261 Adopting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Williams,262 the court held that an undercover
agent's actions are so outrageous so as to bar prosecution only when
the agent "engineer[s] and direct[s] the criminal enterprise from start
to finish."'263
In dissent, Justices Burke and Moore vigorously argued that the
undercover agents had exceeded permissible limits of police involve-
ment by committing criminal acts in order to charge others as accesso-
ries to those same acts. 264 The dissenters also argued that the
accomplice liability charges were inappropriate because the acts of a
feigned accomplice may never be imputed to the targeted defendant.2 65
Both of the remaining criminal law cases decided by the court in
1989 concerned the revocation of a driver's license for driving while
intoxicated. In Sather v. State, 266 the court affirmed both the superior
court's revocation of the defendant's license and the duration of the
revocation. The court first held that the trooper's forced entry into
defendant's vehicle while the defendant was slumped over the steering
wheel did not violate the defendant's right to privacy under the Alaska
Constitution because the defendant's "right to privacy was minimal
when weighed against the important social interest of ensuring that
the driver did not pose a public danger or need immediate medical
attention. '2 67 The court also held that a hearing officer can use the
certified record of a driver's previous convictions in another state for
purposes of enhancing the period of license revocation.2 6s
In Williamson v. State,269 the court had to decide whether to
overturn the hearing officer's imposition of two consecutive, rather
than concurrent, ten-year license revocation periods for a drunk driver
261. Vaden, 768 P.2d at 1107 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432
(1973), where the Supreme Court indicated in dictum that at some point government
involvement in detecting criminal activity could rise to a level of outrageousness
"shocking to the universal sense of justice").
262. 791 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom., Sears v. United States,
479 U.S. 869 (1986).
263. Vaden, 768 P.2d at 1108.
264. Id. at 1109-10 (Burke, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 1110-12 (Burke, J., dissenting).
266. 776 P.2d 1055 (Alaska 1989).
267. Id. at 1056. Article I, § 22 of the Alaska Constitution provides, "[t]he right of
the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."
268. Sather, 776 P.2d at 1056-57.
269. 779 P.2d 1238 (Alaska 1989).
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with two previous convictions.270 Citing the defendant's apparent in-
ability to conform his conduct to the law and the danger which that
conduct posed to the public, the court concluded that the hearing of-
ficer's imposition of two consecutive license revocation periods was
not an abuse of discretion.271
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
The court decided numerous cases in the field of employment law
this past year. Those cases have been separated into three subcatego-
ries: wrongful discharge, workers' compensation and miscellaneous is-
sues such as vicarious liability and the duty to bargain collectively.
A. Wrongful Discharge
All three wrongful discharge cases decided by the Alaska
Supreme Court in 1989 preserved or expanded the rights of employees
discharged from their employment. 272
Perhaps the most significant development in the field of wrongful
discharge involved the court's decision in Jones v. Central Peninsula
General Hospital, which examined the impact of employee policy
manuals upon at-will employment agreements. 273 The court held, in-
ter alia, that a policy manual issued by an employer may be incorpo-
rated into an employment agreement, thus bringing Alaska law in line
with authority in the vast majority of other states.274 The court sup-
ported its decision by citing other courts which have held that the
provisions of policy manuals constitute an offer of a unilateral con-
tract, and that an employee's retention of employment constitutes an
270. Id. at 1239-40 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.181(c)(3)(A) (1989), which pro-
vides that if a person is convicted of driving while intoxicated three times within ten
years, the revocation period shall be at least ten years).
271. Id. at 1240.
272. For more in-depth analyses of the state of the law on wrongful dicharge and
employment-at-will in Alaska, see Perspective, Employment At Will in Alaska: The
Question of Public Policy Torts, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 269 (1989); Perspective, Shelter
from the Storm: The Need for Wrongful Discharge Legislation in Alaska, 6 ALASKA L.
REV. 321 (1989).
273. 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989). The opinion also presents a helpful discussion of
the circumstances in which supervisors are entitled to a conditional privilege to the
defamation claims of employees, and of the actions which constitute abuse of that
conditional privilege. Id. at 789-91.
274. Id. at 785-88. Among the jurisdictions recognizing that a policy manual may
be incorporated into an employment agreement are Alabama, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington and
Wisconsin. Id. at 785-86.
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acceptance of that offer.275 In cases such as Jones, which involve an
at-will employment agreement and a policy manual providing that em-
ployees may be terminated only for good cause, the effect of this hold-
ing will be to protect employees from firings not made for good cause.
The court similarly broadened employees' protection in Thorsten-
son v. ARCO Alaska, Inc.276 Thorstenson arose when a terminated em-
ployee, after signing an agreement with his former employer not to file
a wrongful termination claim in return for a monetary allowance,
brought a wrongful termination action against his former employer.277
Relying upon the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the court held
that summary judgment for the employer was inappropriate because
there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether
Thorstenson "was fully aware of the facts surrounding his termination
at the time he allegedly ratified his termination. ' 27s The court noted
that Thorstenson's failure to "tender back" the monetary allowance
prior to his suit for rescission of the agreement did not prevent his
suit.279 The "tender back rule" was created to protect the defendant
in an action for rescission. 2 0 The court argued that the employer
would be adequately protected if Thorstenson was later required to
"tender back" his termination allowance with interest.28'
275. Id. at 786 (citing, inter alia, Pine River State Bank v. Mettile, 333 N.W.2d
622, 626 (Minn. 1983)).
276. 780 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1989).
277. Id. at 372-74.
278. Id. at 375. The court relied upon sections 380(2) and 381(2) of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts (1981).
(2) The power of a party to avoid a contract for mistake or misrepresenta-
tion is lost if after he knows or has reason to know of the mistake or of the
misrepresentation if it is non-fraudulent or knows of the misrepresentation if
it is fraudulent, he manifests to the other party his intention to affirm it or
acts with respect to anything that he has received in a manner inconsistent
with disaffirmance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 380(2) (1981).
(2) The power of a party to avoid a contract for misrepresentation or mis-
take is lost if after he knows of a fraudulent misrepresentation or knows or
has reason to know of a non-fraudulent misrepresentation or mistake he does
not within a reasonable time manifest to the other party his intention to
avoid it. The power of a party to avoid a contract for non-fraudulent mis-
representation or mistake is also lost if the contract has been so far per-
formed or the circumstances have otherwise so changed that avoidance
would be inequitable and if damages will be adequate compensation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 381(2) (1981).
279. Thorstenson, 780 P.2d at 375.
280. "'Tender of the benefits received under an agreement is ordinarily a prerequi-
site to an action at law for rescission of the agreement.'" Id. (quoting Knaebel v.
Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 554 (Alaska 1983)).
281. Id.
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
In Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage,282 the court held that
Alaska's "whistle blowing" statute, which prohibits retaliatory dis-
charge in some instances, 283 does not create a private cause of action
for individuals discharged in retaliation for complaining about viola-
tions of health and safety standards. 284 The court held, however, that
the employee still retains the common law right to sue for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because the statute
does not show legislative intent to preclude an employee from suing on
his own behalf.28 5
B. Workers' Compensation
The court addressed many workers' compensation cases in 1989.
These cases are discussed in the order that the various issues would be
encountered by an attorney in the course of a typical case: scope of
liability, statute of limitation, benefit calculation and exclusivity of an
employer's liability under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act
(the "Act"). 286
In order for an employer/employee relationship to come within
the purview of the Act, an express or implied contract of employment
must exist.28 ' In Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge,2 18 the court was re-
quired to determine whether the Alaska Workers' Compensation
Board (the "Board") had applied the correct legal test in deciding that
the claimant was not an employee. The ultimate decision as to
whether an employment relationship exists should be made by consid-
ering all the factors in light of the surrounding circumstances.28 9 In
reversing the Board's decision, the court found that the Board had
failed to determine whether the person who had allegedly offered the
job had authority to hire the claimant, and whether an offer and ac-
ceptance had been made.290 In addition, the court determined that the
Board had mistakenly failed to consider whether the injury occurred
282. 782 P.2d 1155 (Alaska 1989).
283. ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.089 (1986) (providing that "[a] person may not dis-
charge or discriminate against an employee because the employee has filed a com-
plaint or instituted a proceeding related to the enforcement of occupational safety and
health standards .. .)."
284. Reed, 782 P.2d at 1157. ("Courts uniformly hold that health and safety legis-
lation such as [ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.089] does not create a private cause of action in
the absence of explicit language to that effect.").
285. Id. at 1158-59 (citing Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Alaska 1983)
("every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance or enforcement")).
286. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.005-23.30.270 (1984).
287. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc. v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250, 252 (Alaska 1976).
288. 779 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1989).




during a "tryout period" of employment, which would therefore have
rendered it compensable as a matter of law.291
The Act creates a presumption that a claim for compensation
falls within its provisions in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary.292 Before this presumption attaches, however, a claimant
must establish some preliminary link between his disability and his
employment. 293 In Resler v. Universal Services, Inc.,294 the court con-
cluded that a plaintiff's mere showing that his injury occurred at work
will suffice to establish this link.295 The court held that the resulting
presumption of compensability was overcome in this case, however, by
Resler's lack of credibility coupled with the testimony of witnesses
that her injury was not work related. 296
In Pioneer Construction v. Conlon,297 another case defining the
scope of liability under the Act, the court held that an injured equip-
ment operator who still had the capacity to supervise employees at his
own business was entitled to compensation for a temporary partial dis-
ability.298 The court also concluded that the Board had mistakenly
failed to reduce the claimant's self-employment earnings to reflect the
value of his wife's services to his company, since her services were an
out-of-pocket business cost which the claimant would have had to pay
had his wife not gratuitously provided the services. 299 The court up-
held the Board's decision to include the company's depreciation de-
ductions in calculations of the claimant's self-employment wage,
however, citing the Board's broad discretion in determining a claim-
ant's wage-earning capacity30
291. Id. at 315 (citing Laeng v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 771, 494
P.2d 1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1972)).
292. Section 23.30.120(a) of the Alaska Statutes provides that "[i]n a proceeding
for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it is presumed, in
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that (1) the claim comes within the
provisions of this chapter. . . ." ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.120(a) (Supp. 1989).
293. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312, 316 (Alaska 1981).
294. 778 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1989).
295. Id. at 1148-49 (citing Smallwood, 623 P.2d at 316 n.4).
296. Id. at 1150.
297. 780 P.2d 995 (Alaska 1989).
298. Id. at 997 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.200 (Supp. 1989); London v. Fair-
banks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639, 641-42 (Alaska 1970)). The
court noted that actual post-injury earnings raise a presumption of actual earning ca-
pacity, and that this presumption may be rebutted with "evidence showing that [the
post-injury earnings] are an unreliable indicator of earnings capacity." Id. -(citing
Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182, 186 (Alaska 1978)).
299. Id. at 1000.
300. Id. at 998.
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In Moretz v. O'Neill Investigations,301 the court stated that a
worker is entitled to compensation for prejudgment interest on medi-
cal expenses that the claimant's private insurer paid on his behalf prior
to the Board's decision that the injury was compensable. 302 The court
specifically held that "workers' compensation claimants are entitled to
the time value of the compensation for their injuries" and the fact that
the claimant's expenses were paid by a private medical insurer instead
of by the claimant does not change this right to recover prejudgment
interest.30 3 The court noted that it is for the claimant and the insurer,
not the Board, to decide how the interest is divided between them.3°4
Two additional decisions considering the scope of liability in
workers' compensation cases are largely confined to their facts. In Ko-
diak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 305 the court affirmed the Board's deci-
sion that medical travel for treatment of a work-related injury is
covered under the Act.30 6 However, under the multi-part balancing
test set out in Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 307 the court affirmed
the Board's denial of benefits to an employee for injuries he sustained
while returning from a trip for medical treatment because his five-day
delay in returning home from the trip ended the compensability of
injuries incurred during the return trip.308
In Clark v. Municipality of Anchorage, 309 the court interpreted an
agreement setting forth the employer's coverage obligations. It deter-
mined that, for the employer to deny coverage of medical expenses,
there must be a finding by the Board that the treatment in question is
not reasonable, necessary or related to the employee's injury. 310 Be-
cause the Board had made no finding as to whether Clark was or was
not disabled, the court reversed the Board's denial of her claim. 311
The court also held that a compromise and release signed by the
301. 783 P.2d 764 (Alaska 1989).
302. Id. at 766.
303. Id. at 765.
304. Id.
305. 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989).
306. Id. at 1148 (citing I A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 13.13 (1986)). See also ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265 (1984).
307. 507 P.2d 501, 507 (Alaska 1973). In determining whether an employee's trip
arises out of the course of employment, the court stated that "there is the need.., to
balance a variety of factors such as the geographic and durational magnitude of the
deviation in relation to the overall trip, past authorization or toleration of similar
deviations, the general latitude afforded the employee in carrying out his job, and any
risks created by the deviation which are causally related to the accident." Id.
308. Kodiak, 777 P.2d at 1149.
309. 777 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1989).
310. Id. at 1161.
311. Id. at 1160-61.
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claimant312 covered "scheduled" injuries to her upper and lower ex-
tremities under the standard articulated in Witt v. Watkins, 3 13 and that
Clark was therefore not entitled to permanent partial disability for
these injuries.314
In Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 31 5 a case involving the statute of limita-
tions for workers' compensation claims, the court considered when the
statute of limitations begins to run for claimants suffering from work-
related nervous breakdowns. Rejecting the decision of the Board and
th~e superior court that the period begins to run when the claimant
begins to suffer from work-related stress, the court concluded that the
period commences when the claimant becomes aware of the work-re-
lated injury.316 Relying upon Alaska State Housing Authority v. Sulli-
van, 3 17 the court held that a claimant becomes aware of her injury for
purposes of the statute of limitations when she actually knows of the
injury or when a reasonably prudent claimant in her place would have
known of the injury.318
In Pan Alaska Trucking v. Crouch,319 another case involving the
statute of limitations for workers' compensation claims, the court con-
sidered whether an amended statute,3 20 requiring workers' compensa-
tion claimants to request a hearing within two years of the employer's
controversion of their claim, applied retroactively to a cause of action
arising prior to its enactment. Relying upon Matanuska Maid, Inc. v.
312. Id. at 1160 ("Under the terms of the settlement, the municipality would no
longer be liable to Clark for any disability compensation, past or future.").
313. 579 P.2d 1065, 1068-69 (Alaska 1978) (holding that the standard for setting
aside a release should be "whether, at the time of signing the release, the releasor
intended to discharge the disability which was subsequently discovered. Relevant to
the determination of this question are all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
execution of the release. Also relevant to the determination is whether a reasonable
person in the position of the releasor under the circumstances then existing would
have had such an intent.").
314. Clark, 777 P.2d at 1161.
315. 783 P.2d 1154 (Alaska 1989).
316. Id. at 1159.
317. 518 P.2d 759, 761 (Alaska 1974) (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.100-
(d)(2) (1984), the provision defining the limitations period for workers' compensation
claims, to include an implied condition tolling the time to file "until by reasonable care
and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sus-
tained"(citation omitted)).
318. Fox, 783 P.2d at 1158.
319. 773 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1989).
320. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.110(c) (Supp. 1989) (effective July 1, 1982).
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State,321 the court held that the statute should apply retroactively be-
cause the amendment was merely procedural and did not affect or di-
minish the plaintiff's substantive rights. 322 In dissent, Justice
Rabinowitz argued that the court has "unfettered discretion" to apply
a statute purely prospectively, and that such a construction was pre-
ferred because the court's retroactive application of the statute im-
posed undue hardship on the injured employee. 323
In Bailey v. Litwin Corp.,324 the first of several cases examining
benefit calculations under the Act, the court confirmed that workers'
compensation awards should equal the total payments the employee
would have received for his normal life expectancy. 325 The court's
holding admonished the Board not to consider the possibility of a
claimant's retirement when calculating a lump sum award for a per-
manent partial disability. In support of its position, the court stated
that the "right to have compensation benefits continue into retirement
years is built into the very idea of workmen's compensation as a self-
sufficient social insurance mechanism. '326
In Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Construction, Inc., 327 the
court was faced with the question of whether a claimant could recover
temporary total disability benefits for a work-related injury even
though he could no longer work as a result of non-work-related can-
cer. Relying upon its decision in Burgess Construction Co. v.
Smallwood,328 the court held that the claimant could recover employ-
ment benefits until the date his work-related injury would no longer
have prevented him from working. The loss of earning capacity due to
the non-work-related disease did not destroy the causal link between
the work injury and the claim. 329 A contrary interpretation, the court
321. 620 P.2d 182, 187 (Alaska 1980).
322. Pan Alaska Trucking, 773 P.2d at 949 ("[A] change in a procedural rule is
substantive in character where the change makes it appear to one just starting down
the road to vindication of his cause that the road has become more difficult to travel or
the goal less to be desired .... The same clearly cannot be said of the amendment in
this case. It is only in retrospect that the obstacle posed by the two-year limit appears
imposing.").
323. Id. at 949-52 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (citing Warwick v. State ex rel.
Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 393-94 (Alaska 1976); Plumley v. Hale, 594 P.2d 497, 503
(Alaska 1979)).
324. 780 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1989).
325. Id. at 1009-11.
326. Id. at 1011 (quoting 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION § 60.21(f) (1987)).
327. 773 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1989).
328. 623 P.2d 312, 317 (Alaska 1981) (holding that liability for workers' compen-
sation benefits will be imposed when employment is established as a causal factor in
the disability).
329. Estate of Ensley, 773 P.2d at 958.
[Vol. 7:87
1990] YEAR IN REVIEW
noted, would wrongfully create a windfall to employers simply be-
cause of the employee's misfortune in developing an independent med-
ical problem. 330
In a holding more closely confined to the facts of the case, Morri-
son v. Afognak Logging, Inc.,331 the court upheld a Board finding that
a claimant was entitled to disability benefits based upon a twenty-five
percent partial permanent disability rating, despite the fact that a doc-
tor who had examined the claimant had assigned a higher disability
rating.33 2 The court found the Board's decision reasonable because
the doctor had mistakenly accorded double weight to the fact that the
injury was to the dominant hand of the claimant. 333
The Morrison court also examined whether the court's holding in
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Grant,334 which eliminated
the need to multiply the maximum amount recoverable for an injury
by the percentage of impairment, should be applied retroactively to
increase the maximum amount of benefits available to Morrison.335
Relying upon the interpretation of Grant in Suh v. Pingo Corp., 336 the
court held that the claimant was entitled to apply the Grant rule to the
one-half percent difference between the rate set by the Board and the
rate which the defendant had been paying prior to the Grant decision,
because the employer bore the risk that subsequent changes in the rele-
vant law might increase its compensation liability.3 37
330. Id. at 959. The court noted, however, that coverage should be denied if the
employee's disease or condition was known at the time of the industrial accident. Id.
at 959 n.6 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 353 (5th ed. 1984)).
331. 768 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1989).
332. Id. at 1142.
333. Id. at 1141-42 (The doctor had assigned a rating suggested in the American
Medical Association Guide to Permanent Impairment, failing to note that the AMA
Guide rating added extra points for injury to the dominant hand.).
334. 693 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1985). In overruling Cesar v. Alaska Workmen's
Comp. Bd., 383 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1963), the court in Grant held that "[t]he plain
language of [section 23.30.190(a)(2) of the Alaska Statutes] does not require that the
maximum amount recoverable be multiplied by the percentage of impairment to the
body member or function. Instead, it states the maximum amount recoverable under
the subsection without referring to the percentage of impairment." Id. at 877; see
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.190 (1984).
335. Morrison, 768 P.2d at 1142-43.
336. 736 P.2d 342, 347 (Alaska 1987) ("Workers who have been forced to wait for
their PPD benefits until after the date of Grant are compensated at the higher post-
Grant level; workers who have been compensated promptly for pre-Grant permanent
disabilities are not. Employers who have begun payment before Grant are assured of
the lower liability under pre-Grant law; employers who have delayed payment are
not.").
337. Morrison, 768 P.2d at 1142-43.
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In McKean v. Municipality ofAnchorage, 338 the final case examin-
ing benefit calculations under the Act, the court held that the Board
must redetermine a claimant's benefits when the employer changes the
claimant's disability status from temporary total disability to perma-
nent total disability. The court rejected the Board's argument that
collateral estoppel bars such a redetermination, stating that the deter-
mination of compensation rates for a temporary disability is a different
issue from the determination of compensation rates for a permanent
disability. 339 Justices Burke and Moore dissented, arguing that collat-
eral estoppel properly applied to the facts of the case, and that
Alaska's statutes do not mandate a recalculation based solely on infla-
tionary increases in comparable salaries. 340
The liability of an employer under the Act is exclusive and super-
sedes all other liability of the employer to either the employee or any-
one otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer.341 In
Van Biene v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 342 the court held that such exclu-
sivity does not, however, prevent an employee from bringing a negli-
gence action against a workers' compensation insurer.343 Relying
upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Van Biene court found
that an employer's workers' compensation carrier could also be held
liable for negligence to the estates of deceased wogkers if the insurer
actually inspected and approved the working conditions of the em-
ployer prior to the accident. 344
C. Miscellaneous
The court decided a variety of additional employment law cases
which address diverse substantive areas such as vicarious liability and
the duty to bargain collectively. In Patton v. Spa Lady, Inc.,345 the
338. 783 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1989).
339. Id. at 1171-73. The court noted that "[tihe Alaska workers' compensation
statute provides the same formula to be used in determining the compensation rate for
those with temporary or permanent total disability status - average weekly wage as
calculated under former [section] 23.30.220 [of the Alaska Statutes] - however, the
actual figures to be used in making the calculation may differ according to the em-
ployee's circumstances at the time of the determination." Id. at 1173.
340. Id. at 1173 (Burke, J., dissenting) (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.220(3),
23.30.130 (1984)).
341. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (Supp. 1989); Wright v. Action Vending Co.,
544 P.2d 82, 85 (Alaska 1975).
342. 779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989).
343. Id. at 321.
344. Id. at 322. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) (imposing
liability on a defendant when the defendant negligently performs an undertaking to
render services to a third party).
345. 772 P.2d 1082 (Alaska 1989).
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court held for the first time that an employer who hires an independ-
ent contractor may be vicariously liable to a person who is injured on
the business premises by an unsafe condition resulting from the in-
dependent contractor's negligence. 346 In reaching this decision, the
court relied on section 422 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 3 4 7
which provides an exception to the general common law rule that an
employer is not vicariously liable for the torts of its independent con-
tractor.348 Justice Rabinowitz offered three policy reasons for this ex-
tension of tort law in cases where the independent contractor performs
his work on the employer's property: (1) assigning liability to the
owner of the business ensures that a financially responsible person is
available to compensate the injured victim; (2) the owner is usually in
a better position to guard against risks of injury; and (3) business own-
ers are often in a better position than the injured party to contract for
insurance or indemnification to cover any damages caused by an in-
dependent contractor's negligence. 349
In Vail v. Coffman Engineers, Inc.,350 the court interpreted an
Alaska statute which required that an employer provide "return trans-
portation" to a terminated employee if that employee was originally
recruited from out of state.351 In affirming the superior court's deci-
sion, a bare majority of the court held that this statute requires that
employers provide return transportation only to employees whom the
employer paid to relocate at the time of hire, and does not require that
the employer pay return transportation expenses for the employee's
family or belongings. 352 This holding invalidated a regulation issued
by the Alaska Department of Labor which defined "return transporta-
tion" to include "all transportation and costs as originally furnished
to, financed for, or provided to an employee by an employer. '353 In
dissent, Justice Compton argued that the Department of Labor's long-
standing definition of "return transportation" should not be overruled
because it is consistent with the legislative purpose of protecting em-
ployees' expectations that an employer will pay for the same costs
upon termination as upon hiring.354
346. Id. at 1084.
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422 (1965).
348. Patton, 772 P.2d at 1083 (citing Sievers v. McClure, 746 P.2d 885, 889 n.6
(Alaska 1987)).
349. Id. (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 70-71, at 500, 509-12 (5th ed. 1984)).
350. 778 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1989).
351. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.380(a) (1984).
352. Vail, 778 P.2d at 213-14.
353. Id. at 214 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20.030(l) (Oct. 1988)).
354. Id. 778 P.2d at 214-15 (Compton, J., dissenting).
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One of the most fundamental principles of labor law is that an
employer of unionized labor who implements unilateral changes in the
terms and conditions of employment without first consulting the union
violates the duty to bargain collectively. 355 Once an impasse has been
reached following a breakdown in good faith bargaining over proposed
changes in the conditions of employment, however, the employer may
unilaterally implement new terms of employment, provided they were
previously offered to the union in the course of the bargaining.35 6 The
court, in Alaska Public Employees Association v. State,357 applied this
principle in holding that the state's unilateral change of wage and em-
ployment conditions, after an impasse had been reached in good faith
negotiations, did not violate the Public Employee Relations Act.358
Because the affected employees had no right to be paid according to
the terms of the original contract, the court also held that the reduc-
tion in employees' compensation did not constitute deprivation of
property without just compensation under the Alaska Constitution. 35 9
In Public Employees' Local 71 v. State, 360 another case involving
the Public Employment Relations Act, the court construed section
23.40.215(a) of the Alaska Statutes as providing that the monetary
terms of a state collective bargaining agreement are not effective until
funds have been appropriated by the state legislature.361 The court
also determined that the state had not violated its duty to bargain in
good faith when the governor sought across-the-board budget cuts
that effectively eliminated the union's bargained for increase in pay,
since the proposed budget reductions did not specifically include funds
earmarked for the employees' pay raise.362
The court addressed the scope of an arbitrator's authority in Sea
Star Stevedore Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Lo-
cal 302,363 holding that an arbitrator does not have the power to reach
the merits of a grievance not submitted to him.364 The court found
that while it was proper for an arbitrator to adjudicate on remand a
question concerning the meaning of a reinstatement order he had pre-
viously issued, the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction when he
355. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 776 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Alaska 1989)
(citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981); NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962)).
356. Id.
357. 776 P.2d 1030 (Alaska 1989).
358. Id. at 1033; see ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1984); ALASKA CONST. art.
I, § 18.
359. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 776 P.2d at 1033-34.
360. 775 P.2d 1062 (Alaska 1989).
361. Id. at 1063-64. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.215(a) (1984).
362. Public Employees' Local 71, 775 P.2d at 1064.
363. 769 P.2d 428 (Alaska 1989).
364. Id. at 430-31.
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issued an additional order which reached the merits of a subsequent
economic layoff. The court concluded that the propriety of the subse-
quent economic layoff should have been submitted to a subsequent
arbitration.365
Finally, in Hatten v. Union Oil Co.,366 an action for intentional
interference with contractual rights, the court determined that a mate-
rial issue of fact existed as to the predominant motive of the defendant
in interfering with the claimant's employment with an independent
contractor.367 The court therefore held that summary judgement was
precluded, because under Alaska law it is the burden of the defendant
in such cases to show that the predominant motive was justified. 36
VIII. FAMILY LAW
The court was extremely active in the family law area in 1989,
deciding twenty-four cases. A number of these cases involve questions
arising under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3, the Child Support
Award Guidelines, 369 which became effective in 1987. The cases
presented in this section are grouped into five categories: jurisdiction,
property division, child support and custody, attorney's fees and pa-
rental rights.
A. Jurisdiction
In 1989 the court decided two cases dealing primarily with the
issue of which state has jurisdiction over a family law case. In both
cases the court demonstrated a willingness to defer jurisdiction to the
other state.
The court addressed several jurisdictional issues in Crews v.
Crews, 370 a divorce and child custody dispute. With respect to custody,
of the child, under section 3 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act,371 a state should not assume jurisdiction unless no other state
is willing or able to do so. 372 Because in the present case, Florida had
proper jurisdiction over the custody issue, "[a]ny exercise of jurisdic-
tion by Alaska would encourage the unilateral removal of children for
365. Id. (citing Detroit & Midwestern States Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America v. White Tower Laundry and Cleaners, 353 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.
Mich. 1973)).
366. 778 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1989).
367. Id. at 1153.
368. Id. at 1152-53 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service,
Inc., 604 P.2d 1090, 1093-94 (Alaska 1979)).
369. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3.
370. 769 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1989).
371. ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.020 (Supp. 1989).
372. Crews, 769 P.2d at 435 (quoting UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT,
9 U.L.A. 145 (1988)).
1990]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
the purpose of obtaining custody. '373 The court also held that because
the Alaska court was declining jurisdiction, the requirement that it
"communicate with other courts apparently exercising simultaneous
jurisdiction, that is, Florida, was not applicable. '374
f The court did find that it would have in rem jurisdiction over the
marital status of the parties, however, so long as one of the parties was
"physically present in the state with an' intent to remain indefi-
nitely. '3 75 The court remanded the case for a determination of the
issue of the party's intention to remain in Alaska.
The second jurisdictional case, Kerr v. Kerr, 376 involved a wife's
attempt to recover child support payments from her spouse, against
whom a default judgment for nonpayment had been entered in Indi-
ana. The husband denied that the Indiana court issuing the default
judgment had jurisdiction over him, claiming that his limited appear-
ance in Indiana to contest jurisdiction was insufficient for jurisdiction
to attach; and he was therefore not obligated to make the payments.
Reversing the lower court's dismissal of the wife's claim, the court
found that the Indiana court did have jurisdiction; the husband and
wife had a marital relationship in Indiana and she still resided there.377
B. Property Division
In Mann v. Mann, 378 the court held that State Supplemental Em-
ployee Benefits ("SBS benefits") are marital property subject to divi-
sion at the time of divorce. The court found that the trial court erred
in drawing an analogy between social security benefits and SBS bene-
fits and in reasoning that since social security benefits were indivisible
in divorce cases, SBS benefits should not be either. The court distin-
guished the two types of benefits on the grounds that social security, a
federal benefits program, was not divisible because of the federal pre-
emption doctrine while no such doctrine applied to SBS benefits, a
state administered program. Since the division of SBS benefits does
not conflict with federal law, and since the benefits were earned during
the course of the marriage, they "are... subject to equitable division
upon divorce. '379
373. Id. Section 25.30.010(5) of the Alaska Statutes sets forth the policy to "deter
abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody
awards." ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.010(5) (1983).
374. Crews, 769 P.2d at 435 (referring to ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.050(b) (1983)).
375. Id. at 436 (citing Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895, 897-98 (Alaska 1988)).
376. 779 P.2d 341 (Alaska 1989).
377. Id. at 343-44.
378. 778 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1989).
379. Id. at 591-92.
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In Streb v. Streb, 38 0 the court reversed a trial court decision re-
quiring a former husband to reimburse his ex-wife for half of the
money he withdrew from their joint bank account to cover living ex-
penses while the couple was temporarily separated. Emphasizing the
rule that marital property is not divisible until permanent separation
at the earliest, the court reasoned that both spouses have "the right to
manage and control marital funds" until the couple no longer operates
as a financial unit.381
In Richmond v. Richmond, 382 a divided court addressed the ques-
tion of how properly to value the goodwill component of an attorney's
law practice for the purpose of including the property in the marital
estate to be divided. The majority held that because the attorney was
the sole shareholder of his firm, the firm had no marketable profes-
sional goodwill that could be sold and, therefore, the trial court erred
by including it in the marital estate. 383
Justice Rabinowitz dissented on the issue of goodwill valua-
tion.38 4 He emphasized that the attorney was the sole shareholder of a
multi-lawyer firm, not a sole practitioner.385 While he agreed that the
firm would have no marketable goodwill if the attorney were dissolv-
ing a single-lawyer practice, in this case the firm was "multi-lawyer"
and he argued that the majority had failed to consider whether a
multi-lawyer firm has professional goodwill, the value of which should
be included in the marital estate.386
Richmond also held that the proper value of the tangible assets of
a firm is the fair market value of the equipment, not its replacement
cost.3 87 With respect to "rehabilitative alimony," the court held that
the party requesting such an award must show an intention to use the
money for the purposes of rehabilitation or training.388 The court also
380. 774 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1989). See infra notes 439-40 and accompanying text
for a discussion of child support issues in this case.
381. Id. at 802 (citing Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802, 805 (Alaska 1983)).
382. 779 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1989).
383. Id. at 1213-14. The majority recognized that the attorney's firm was "multi-
lawyer" in the sense that it employed several associates. However, the firm was not
deemed a "multi-lawyer" firm for the purposes of determining whether the firm's
goodwill was marketable because the attorney was the sole shareholder. Id. at 1214 &
n.3. The majority gave no opinion as to whether multi-shareholder firms have mar-
ketable goodwill.
The dissent uses the phrase "multi-lawyer" less restrictively than the majority.
Justice Rabinowitz suggests that the phrase means "more than one lawyer" rather
than "more than one partner." See id. at 1221 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
384. Id. at 1218 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
385. Id. at 1221 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
386. Id. (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 1214.
388. Id. at 1215 (citing Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165 (Alaska 1987)).
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held that child support awards made prior to the effective date of the
new Child Support Award Guidelines (the "Guidelines") can be rede-
termined under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3.389
Schofield v. Schofield 390 marked only the second time that the
supreme court modified a property division in a divorce or dissolution
decree pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The court
found that the four factors required to modify a property division set
forth in Foster v. Foster391 were present in this case as well, and held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the prop-
erty division in the dissolution decree.392
Hartland v. Hartland3 93 presented the court with several prop-
erty division and procedural issues. First, the court ruled that the hus-
band could not appeal the valuation of his retirement benefits on the
grounds that there was not sufficient evidence to support the valuation
when it was the husband himself who failed to provide the necessary
evidence.394 Second, the court ruled that the trial court had erred in
not discounting the future benefits of the husband's retirement pension
to present value.395 Third, the court stated that the trial court failed to
apply either of the two standard methods for dividing a pension, the
discounted lump sum method or the retained jurisdiction method. 396
Next, the court interpreted section 25.24.160(6) of the Alaska
Statutes by declaring, "[u]nder the concept of no-fault divorce, a court
cannot rely on one party's fault in ending the marriage to justifying
[sic] awarding a greater portion of the marital property to the other
spouse. ' 397 'It is permissible, however, for a court to reduce one part-
ner's share to reflect the considerable amount of marital assets that the
husband used while separated from the wife.398 While a court does
389. Id. at 1217 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.170(b) (Supp. 1989)). See ALASKA
R. Civ. P. 90.3.
390. 777 P.2d 197 (Alaska 1989).
391. 684 P.2d 869 (Alaska 1984). The four factors are:
(1) [T]he fundamental, underlying assumption of the dissolution agree-
ment had been destroyed,
(2) the parties' property division was poorly thought out,
(3) the property division was reached without the benefit of counsel,
(4) the marital residence was the parties' principal asset.
Id. at 872.
392. Schofield, 777 P.2d at 202.
393. 777 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1989).
394. Id. at 640.
395. Id. at 641. The court did not express an opinion as to which discount rate to
use and directed the trial court to determine the appropriate rate. Id. at n.4.
396. Id. at 641. (The court can award the pension benefits, to one party or both, as
a lump sum, discounted to present value. The court can also retain jurisdiction over
the payments and have them "made to the parties as retirement benefits come due.").




have the authority, therefore, to recapture dissipated marital assets, it
must take care not to double count by both recapturing the value of
property and awarding the wife a larger share because assets have been
dissipated.399 The court also concluded that vested or earned compen-
sation that has yet to be received shall be classified as divisible marital
property and that, therefore, the husband's deferred commissions
should be included in the marital estate. 40°
With respect to attorney's fees, the court remarked that under the
usual rule in divorce cases, where both parties have similar educa-
tional levels and similar financial situations, neither party will be
awarded attorney's fees. However, the divorce exception to Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 82 is inapplicable in post-judgment modifica-
tions and enforcement motions. Because the husband had unnecessa-
rily delayed the action, causing needless costs to be incurred, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the
wife.4o1
On the husband's claim that he was entitled to relief from judg-
ment under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), the court came
to the conclusion that relief under the Rule was reserved for extraordi-
nary cases, not merely cases where relief would not be granted under
the other subsections of Rule 60(b) or "when a party takes a deliberate
action they later regret as a mistake. '40 2
Finally, with respect to the contempt action for delay in transfer-
ring title to certain stock, the court held that a party shall not be ex-
cused from otherwise contemptible behavior if the party willfully
failed to follow the court's order on the advice of counsel.40 3 In ascer-
taining the amount of the decline in the stock's value caused by the
husband's delay, the court decreed that "[t]he appropriate measure of
damages is the difference in the stock's value when . . . [the wife]
would have sold it had ... [the husband] complied with the court's
order and its value when she actually sold it within a reasonable time
of receiving the certificates." 4 4
In Crafts v. Morgan,405 the court established that a spouse would
not be bound to a property division settlement that waived her rights
to the marital property if she did not understand the nature of the
399. Id. at 643.
400. Id. (citing Schober v. Schober, 692 P.2d 267 (Alaska 1984)).
401. Id. at 644. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82.
402. Hartland, 777 P.2d at 645. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b).
403. Hartland, 777 P.2d at 647 (citing McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown &
Brunner, 678 P.2d 1330, 1334 & n.2 (Alaska 1984) (Advice of counsel is not a shield
when a party ignores a court order.)).
404. Id. at 648.
405. 776 P.2d 1049 (Alaska 1989).
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dissolution agreement she had signed.4° 6 The court based its ruling on
the following findings as required by section 25.24.230(a)(1) of the
Alaska Statutes: (1) her command of the English language did not, in
itself, guarantee that she understood her marital property rights, (2)
there was no evidence that she was advised of her marital rights dur-
ing her first divorce and (3) there was no evidence that she received
advice concerning her marital rights until after she had signed the dis-
solution.40 7 The court also noted that the trial court had the discre-
tion to exclude from marital assets any property accumulated during
the marriage that had been acquired with pre-marital assets.408 On the
issue of attorney's fees, the court reversed the trial court's award to the
husband, on the grounds that the husband was no longer the prevail-
ing party. The court reiterated that "the divorce exception to Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 82 does not apply to post-judgment motions
involving only money and property division." 4° 9
C. Child Support and Custody
In Garding v. Garding,410 the court addressed the circumstances
under which the Alaska courts may modify out-of-state custody de-
crees. The court first addressed the jurisdictional issue, reiterating the
principle that an Alaska court may modify an out-of-state decree so
long as (1) Alaska has jurisdiction, 41' and (2) the state from which the
decree emanated does not.412
In order to modify any custody award, the court must find that a
change of circumstances has occurred requiring modification and that
such modification must be in the best interests of the children.4 13
However, unlike the initial custody award, modification of a pre-ex-
isting award will not be granted unless a change of circumstances can
be demonstrated. 41 4 Reversing the lower court's modification of the
award which granted custody to the father, the court held that it is not
sufficient to show merely that the moving parent's position has im-
proved, particularly when a similar improvement has occurred with
406. Id. at 1054.
407. Id. at 1053-54. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.230(a)(1) (Supp. 1989).
408. Id. (citing Rose v. Rose, 755 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Alaska 1988)). See Matson v.
Lewis, 755 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Alaska 1988).
409. Crafts, 776 P.2d at 1055.
410. 767 P.2d 183 (Alaska 1989).
411. Id. at 184 n.1 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.020(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1989)). The
Alaska court had jurisdiction because Alaska was the children's home state at the time
the modification proceeding was commenced. Id.
412. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(a) (1987)). Montana lost its modifi-
cation jurisdiction when both the parents and the children moved to Alaska. Id.
413. Id. at 184 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.110 (1983)).
414. Id. at 184-85.
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respect to the non-moving parent.415 The dissent by Justice Burke
criticized the majority for "callous indifference" to the children, stat-
ing that the majority had erroneously emphasized the changes in cir-
cumstances requirement and suggesting instead that the court's
primary focus should be promoting the best interests of the
children. 4
16
The court relied upon Garding in House v. House,4 17 finding that
a "custodial parent's decision to leave the state with the children
[while the non-custodial parent remains in Alaska] constitutes a sub-
stantial change in circumstances. '418  Having found the requisite
change in circumstances, the court upheld the trial court's denial of
the mother's modification request, on the grounds that the children's
interests would be best served by remaining with their father.419 With
respect to the mother's payment of child support, the court com-
mented that it would be proper to consider the non-custodial parent's
cost of transportation required for visitation in determining child sup-
port payments.420 Finally, the court reversed the trial court's award of
attorney's fees to the father because they were erroneously awarded
under the prevailing party standard.421
The court also upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a continu-
ance for a change of custody hearing despite the fact that the custody
investigator's report was incomplete. Although the pre-trial order
415. Id. at 186.
416. Id. (Burke, J., dissenting) (citing Poesy v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 261-62, 561
P.2d 400, 403-04 (1977)).
417. 779 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 410-416.
418. Id. at 1207-08. The court's finding that the change in circumstances was sub-
stantial bears comment. The standard for modifying a custody order requires only a
"change in circumstances," not a "substantial" one. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.110
(1983). However, in House, the court cites this statute erroneously by including the
word "substantial." 779 P.2d at 1207. The precedent for requiring a "substantial"
change is found in King v. King, 477 P.2d 356, 360 (Alaska 1970) ("The concept of
'substantial change' of circumstances ... may be considered simply a rule of judicial
economy designed to discourage discontented parents from continually renewing cus-
tody proceedings."). See supra notes 410-16 and accompanying text discussing Gard-
ing v. Garding, 767 P.2d 183 (Alaska 1989), where both the majority and dissent use
the phrases "substantial change in circumstances" and "change in' circumstances"
interchangeably.
419. House, 779 P.2d at 1208.
420. Id. at 1209.
421. Id. See L.L.M. v. P.M., 754 P.2d 262, 265 (Alaska 1988) ("attorney's fees
should only be awarded where one party acts 'willfully and without just excuse.' ").
In divorce cases, attorney's fees are awarded on the basis of the financial situations
and earning capacities of the parties involved, not the prevailing party standard. Berg-
strom v. Lindback, 779 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Alaska 1989) (citing L.L.M. v. P.M., 754
P.2d 262, 263-64 (Alaska 1988)).
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provided that the hearing would not be scheduled until the investiga-
tor's report was complete, the court held that the parent requesting the
continuance had "reasonable opportunity in court to introduce evi-
dence and contest the other side's evidence" and would not be "de-
prived of a substantial right or seriously prejudiced by the lower
court's ruling. '"422
The dissent, written by Justice Rabinowitz and joined by Chief
Justice Matthews, criticized the majority's finding that the mother was
not prejudiced by the denial of a continuance. Justice Rabinowitz rea-
soned that the mother was not able to adequately prepare her case,
particularly as a pro se litigant, because she did not have an opportu-
nity to study the investigator's report, prepare a cross-examination or
hire an expert. The dissent also noted that there had been no showing
that an emergency had occurred that warranted the trial court's
scheduling the hearing before the investigator's report was
complete. 423
In Charlesworth v. Child Support Enforcement Division,424 the
court held that, on a motion to modify child support payments, the
statutory "material change in circumstances" requirement was met by
the state's adoption of the new Child Support Award Guidelines of
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3.425 The court also held that the
new child support guidelines shall be applied retroactively in calculat-
ing awards for child support.426
The court also interpreted the Rule 90.3(f) requirement that a
child reside with a parent "for a specified period of at least 25 percent
of the year" in order for that parent to have shared custody or joint
422. House, 779 P.2d at 1206-07 (quoting Barrett v. Gagnon, 516 P.2d 1202, 1203
(Alaska 1973)) (holding that a parent must show that she has been "deprived of a
substantial right or seriously prejudiced by the lower court's ruling" before the court
will find an abuse of discretion by the trial court).
423. Id. at 1210 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
424. 779 P.2d 792 (Alaska 1989).
425. Id. at 793. In 1987 the state adopted Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3,
which superseded the previous child support guidelines. Section 25.24.170 of the
Alaska Statutes now includes a section that states: "For the purposes of a motion to
modify or terminate child support, the adoption or enactment of guidelines or a signif-
icant amendment to guidelines for determining support is a material change in cir-
cumstances, if the guidelines are relevant to the motion." ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.170(b) (Supp. 1989) (amended Aug. 25, 1988). See Patch v. Patch, 760 P.2d
526, 529 (Alaska 1988) (a party must demonstrate that "there has been a material and
substantial change in circumstances affecting the movant's ability to pay"). See also
infra notes 428-30 and accompanying text.
426. Charlesworth, 779 P.2d at 794.
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custody, holding that unless the decree actually stipulates such a pe-
riod, a parent cannot claim shared or joint custody, irrespective of
how long the child actually resides with the parent. 427
In Arndt v. Arndt,425 the court held that the combination of the
father's fifty percent decrease in income, the mother's increased in-
come and decreased cost of living and a change in the custody ar-
rangement were sufficient to constitute a "material change in
circumstances," thus supporting consideration of the father's motion
to modify the child support decree.429 The court also restated its posi-
tion that a trial court's award of an unequal distribution of marital
property simply to ease one party's responsibility to provide child sup-
port constitutes reversible error. As in this case, however, where there
is no evidence that an unequal distribution occurred, the court reaf-
firmed that the "[d]ivision of marital property by the court is separate
and distinct from questions of child support. '" 430
Under the Guidelines, child support awards are based primarily
on a parent's adjusted annual income, which is defined as total income
from all sources less mandatory deductions such as federal income
tax.431 In Bergstrom v. Lindback,432 the court held that the parent's
actual tax liability should be deducted from total income rather than
the amount withheld by the employer. The court further held that
where deferred compensation is included in the total income figure,
the amount must be reduced by the income taxes which would have
been owed had the deferred compensation been part of that year's in-
come for tax purposes. In addition, the court held that the determina-
tion of the parties' past child support, as governed by Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 90.3, "should be based on the parties' actual past
income." 433
The court decided an issue of first impression in Child Support
Enforcement Division v. Gammons.434 Section 47.23.120(a) of the
Alaska Statutes requires that a parent, owing a duty of child support
reimburse the state for any assistance granted by the state on his
child's behalf. The parent may not, however, be required to pay any
more than is provided for under a previously entered child support
427. Id. at 794-95 (quoting ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(f)).
428. 777 P.2d 668 (Alaska 1989).
429. Id. at 670.
430. Id.
431. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)(1)(A).
432. 779 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1989). See infra note 482 and accompanying text for a
discussion of an attorney's fees issue in this case.
433. Id. at 1236-37 (The parties had agreed to the application of Rule 90.3 in deter-
mining the amount of the child support award.).
434. 774 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1989).
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order.435 An order requiring no support from the non-custodial par-
ent is not a "support order" under Alaska law.436 The court, after
examining the law in other states, found that the Alaska system would
be circumvented if the court were to hold to the contrary. 437 Because
a non-custodial parent has both common law and statutory duties to
support a child regardless of a no-support order, that parent will
therefore be liable for reimbursement to the state for any assistance
provided by the Child Support Enforcement Division ("CSED") to
the child.438
Although a parent's obligation to support his children generally
terminates at the age of majority, in Streb v. Streb439 the court held
that, by reason of a child's physical or mental disability, a parent may
continue to be obligated to support the child beyond the age of major-
ity. The court found that such a determination could be made in a
divorce proceeding, and need not be sought in a separate action. Any
award should be based on the amount necessary to provide for "rea-
sonable child care expenditures" and not on the parent's total income
available.440
Another matter involving support for post-majority children was
presented in Propst v. Propst,44 1 a case that sharply divided the court
three to two. The majority held that under Alaska Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 60(b)(5) a father may seek relief from a modified support order
to pay post-majority education, provided that the motion is brought in
timely fashion and the granting of relief would not "inequitably dis-
turb an interest of reliance on the judgment."'442 This case was factu-
ally similar to Lawrence v. Lawrence,443 in that the child support order
providing post-majority education payments had been issued before
the supreme court's 1984 decision in Dowling v. Dowling,4" which
held that the court would no longer enforce post-majority child sup-
port for education.445
435. ALASKA STAT. § 47.23.120(a) (1984).
436. Gammons, 774 P.2d at 184-85.
437. Id. at 184 ("Parents could agree to no-support orders in an attempt to evade
supporting their children, knowing that the state would provide for their children and
knowing that the state would have no recourse against them.") (citing, with approval,
Department of Revenue v. Hubbard, 720 P.2d 1177 (Mont. 1986); Roberts v. Roberts,
592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979)).
438. Id.
439. 774 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1989). See supra notes 380-81 and accompanying text
for a discussion of property division issues in this case.
440. Id. at 800-01.
441. 776 P.2d 780 (Alaska 1989).
442. Id. at 783 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 74 (1982)).
443. 718 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1986).
444. 679 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1984).
445. Propst, 776 P.2d at 782 (citing Dowling, 679 P.2d at 483).
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In Propst, the court held that the father had sought relief within a
reasonable time, even though he waited five years after the modifica-
tion to file his motion. The court excused this delay for two reasons.
First, the mother agreed at the time of modification not to raise the
passage of time as a waiver to the father's right to appeal. Second, the
father had relied on the CSED's representations that, presumably in
accordance with Dowling, the CSED would not enforce the post-ma-
jority educational support award.446 When the CSED reversed its po-
sition in 1986 and sought support payments, the father filed an appeal
two months later.447 The court also held that although the children
relied on their father's support for college funding, there was insuffi-
cient evidence to show that they had relied on the 1981 support order.
The court therefore found that the superior court had abused its dis-
cretion in not granting relief from the support order.448
The dissent, authored by Justice Rabinowitz and joined by Chief
Justice Matthews, strongly disagreed with the court's holding, finding
it inexcusable that the father waited nearly two and one-half years af-
ter the court's decision in Dowling to file an appeal of the support or-
der modification. The dissent rejected both of the majority's reasons
for excusing the filing delay because they neither diminished the fa-
ther's post-majority educational support obligations nor furnished any
basis for extending the time within which he should have sought relief
under Rule 60(b)(5). 449
Although a non-custodial parent's support obligation is generally
to be calculated according to the formulae described in the Guidelines,
where "good cause" exists, courts will allow variations so as to meet
the child's reasonable needs without unduly burdening the parent.450
In 1989, the court decided two cases addressing the "good cause" ex-
ception to the child support guidelines.451 In neither case did it find
good cause.452 In Coats v. Finn,453 the court declared that "good
cause" was to be determined under the circumstances of each case
where adherence to the prescribed formula would produce an unfair
result. The court cautioned, however, that trial courts must apply
446. Id. at 783. The father stipulated to dismiss the appeal at that time to conserve
family resources. Id.
447. Id. at 782.
448. Id. at 784.
449. Id. at 786 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
450. Coats v. Finn, 779 P.2d 775, 777 (Alaska 1989).
451. A court may alter the child support award as determined under the formulae
in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 90.3 for cause. A non-exclusive list of examples of
good cause is provided in Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B) and includes especially
large family size, significant income of a child and adjusted parental income below the
federal poverty line. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(c).
452. Coats, 779 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1989); Cox v. Cox, 776 P.2d 1045 (Alaska 1989).
453. 779 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1989).
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careful scrutiny and not depart from the prescribed formula unless
clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that "manifest injustice"
would result from the rule's strict application. The court reiterated
the policy behind the support guidelines, that "the noncustodial parent
must contribute a fair share to satisfy the child's reasonable needs. 454
In the second case addressing, inter alia, the "good cause" re-
quirement, Cox v. Cox,4 5 5 the court held that its earlier decision in
Malekos v. Yin, 456 allowing a custodial parent to waive child support
payments as long as there was no finding of detriment to the child, had
been superseded by the provision of the Guidelines which requires the
non-custodial parent to provide support for the child.457 The parties'
independent agreement on a child support arrangement was not suffi-
cient to automatically constitute "good cause" for the purpose of al-
lowing an exception to the application of Rule 90.3.458 The court
further ruled that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
determine that a proper child support award should be a fixed amount
rather than a percentage of the non-custodial parent's income.459
In Nelson v. Jones, 460 the court held that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to deny a father's motion to reestablish
visitation with his minor daughter. Visitation had been contingent on
the father receiving psychological treatment from a specific doctor and
visitation rights were terminated when that psychologist refused to
keep the father as a patient because he would not admit in treatment
to having sexually abused his daughter. In light of the trial court's
finding that the father did sexually abuse the minor, the court held
that the severity of the trial court's order was justified by the overrid-
ing need to protect the child.461
The court also affirmed the trial court's decision not to grant the
father's motion to set aside the final judgment relating to a divorce
decree under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60. The father had ar-
gued that he was under duress at the time he signed the custody stipu-
lation, had ineffective assistance of counsel and that the interests of
justice required further expert testimony to be heard. The trial court
was found not to have abused its discretion in finding that the father
failed to prove duress where that court had the opportunity to observe
the father at the drafting of the stipulation that was incorporated in
454. Id. at 777-79.
455. 776 P.2d 1045 (Alaska 1989).
456. 655 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1982).
457. 776 P.2d at 1047-48.
458. Id. at 1049.
459. Id.
460. 781 P.2d 964 (Alaska 1989).
461. Id. at 969.
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the decree.462 Although the trial court did not specifically address the
father's contention of ineffective counsel, the supreme court noted that
the appellant presented no support for the proposition that ineffective
assistance of counsel is a ground for setting aside a civil judgment.463
The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the Rule 60 motion where further expert testimony probably
would not change the result in a new trial.464
The court also held that the trial court did not commit clear error
by including the fair market value rather than the book value of the
father's business interest in the marital property. 465 The court also
discussed the standard for awarding attorney's fees in an action to
modify or enforce a visitation order, holding that the appropriate stan-
dard is neither the divorce judgment standard (that considers the rela-
tive economic situations of the parties) nor the prevailing party
standard. Rather, fees are appropriate where the motion was unrea-
sonable or brought in bad faith.466
Finally, the court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court judge to deny the father's motion for disqualification
after the judge was seen socializing with the guardian ad litem in the
case. The court found the trial judge's explanation that "social meet-
ings with guardians ad litem and counsel were difficult to avoid in a
community the size of Haines" to be adequate and that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that prior adverse rulings
against the father were not the result of personal bias developed from a
nonjudicial source.467
Justices Rabinowitz and Matthews dissented in part, arguing that
the trial court did abuse its discretion in making parental visitation
contingent on an admission of sexual abuse.468 As a consequence, the
two justices also dissented with respect to the award of attorney's fees
in this case since they found the father's motion to reestablish visita-
tion not to have been brought in bad faith.469
In Carter v. Novotny,470 the court discussed the propriety of
awarding custody of a child to a non-parent, affirming the superior
court's award of physical custody to the child's maternal aunt and
shared custody to both the aunt and the child's father.471 Relying on
462. Id. at 967-68.
463. Id. at 968 n.3.
464. Id. at 968 & n.4.
465. Id. at 970.
466. Id. at 971.
467. Id. at 972.
468. Id. (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting in part).
469. Id. at n.1 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting in part).
470. 779 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1989).
471. Id. at 1198-99.
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Britt v. Britl,472 the court stated that in a custody dispute between a
parent and a non-parent, "the parent is to be preferred unless parental
custody would be 'clearly detrimental to the child.' ",473 After receiv-
ing additional information, including a psychological evaluation of the
father, the trial court found that it would be "clearly detrimental" not
to transfer physical custody from the father to the aunt.47 4 With re-
spect to the shared custody aspect of the arrangement, the court ex-
tended the "child's best interests" policy, which applies to shared
custody between parents, to apply as well in custody disputes between
a non-parent and a parent.475
In Buness v. Gillen,47 6 the court examined whether a stepparent
has standing to contest custody of a child by the child's natural parent.
The court held "that a non-parent who has a significant connection
with the child has standing to assert a claim for custody. '477 The
court based this holding on the ground that the stepparent in this case
was a parent within the meaning of section 25.20.060 of the Alaska
Statutes47 because he was the child's "psychological parent, ' 479 and
therefore had standing to contest custody. The court reversed the su-
perior court's partial summary judgment in favor of the natural parent
and remanded for a determination of whether the welfare of the child
required that the stepparent be awarded custody. 480
472. 567 P.2d 308 (Alaska 1977).
473. Carter, 779 P.2d at 1197 (quoting Britt, 567 P.2d at 310).
474. Id. at 1197 (The trial court noted that the father had "engaged in dangerous
behavior with his children, including holding a firearm during an argument with an-
other daughter.").
475. Id. at 1199 ("The court may award shared custody to both parents if shared
custody is determined by the court to be in the best interests of the child. An award of
shared custody shall assure that the child has frequent and continuing contact with
each parent to the maximum extent possible." ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(c) (1983)).
476. 781 P.2d 985 (Alaska 1989).
477- Id. at 988.
478. The statute provides:
Custody of the child. (a) If there is a dispute over child custody, either
parent may petition the superior court for resolution of the matter under
[sections] 25.20.060-25.20.130 [of the Alaska Statutes]. The court shall
award custody on the basis of the best interest of the child. In determining
the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors
including those factors enumerated in [section] 25.24.150(c).
ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(a) (1983).
479. Buness, 781 P.2d at 988. "The statutes recognize that those relationships that
affect the child which are based upon psychological rather than biological parentage
may be important enough to protect through custody and visitation, to ensure that the
child's best interests are being served." Id. at 987 (quoting Carter v. Brodrick, 644
P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982)).
480. The court reiterated the principle that preference should be given to parental
custody, unless it would be clearly detrimental to the child. The court also stated that
the superior court, when resolving a custody dispute between a non-biological parent
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D. Attorney's Fees
In divorce cases, attorney's fees are awarded on the basis of the
financial situations and earning capacities of the parties involved, not
the prevailing party standard of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.481
Since almost all family cases involve issues of attorney's fees, those
issues are discussed in the same section as the main issue of the case.
One case deserves special notice, however. Where, as in Bergstrom v.
Lindback, the parents in a child support case are unmarried parents,
the standard for awarding attorney's fees should be that of divorce
cases as well, and not the prevailing party standard mandated in Rule
82.482
E. Parental Rights
The court decided four cases involving parental rights. Two of
the cases dealt with the "child in need of aid" statute and two cases
interpreted provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
The first case involved section 25.23.050(a) of the Alaska Statutes
which waives a parent's right of consent to the adoption of a child by
another party if the parent has failed to meaningfully communicate
with the child, without justifiable cause, for a period of at least one
year.48 3 In In re B.SL.,4 84 the majority held that even though the
natural mother may have felt that any attempt to communicate with
her daughter would have been blocked by the father and his family
and therefore futile, she still was obliged to make a reasonable effort to
do so. Since the mother had failed to communicate with her child
over a three-year period, the court ruled that there was no "justifiable
cause" to prevent the waiving of her right to consent to the adoption
and thus terminated her parental rights. 48 5 The court also held that
the existence of two different statutory mechanisms for the termina-
tion of parental rights - the standard adoption proceeding and the
and a biological parent, must award custody to the biological parent unless, inter alia,
"the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive custody." Id. at 989 (cit-
ing Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975)).
481. Bergstrom v. Lindback, 779 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Alaska 1989) (citing L.L.M. v.
P.M., 754 P.2d 262, 263-64 (Alaska 1988)); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82.
482. Bergstrom, 779 P.2d at 1238. See supra notes 432-33 and accompanying text
for a discussion of child support issues in this case.
483. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050(a) (Supp. 1989).
484. 779 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1989). See Note, Abandonment v. Adoption: Termi-
nating Parental Rights and the Need for Distinct Legal Inquiries, 7 ALASKA L. REV.
247 (1990).
485. Id. at 1225-26.
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"child in need of aid" proceeding48 6 - violated neither equal protec-
tion nor substantive due process principles as there was a rational rea-
son for separate proceedings in that they served different purposes.487
Justice Rabinowitz, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Matthews,
felt that the adoptive parents had not shown by clear and convincing
evidence that no "justifiable cause" existed for the mother's failure to
communicate with her child.488 The dissent cited the following factors
in support of its position: (1) the mother's youth and indigency and
their effect upon her efforts to communicate with her daughter, partic-
ularly because she did not reside in Alaska, (2) her lack of legal sophis-
tication and (3) the "obstructive conduct of the natural father and
several members of his family. '48 9
In A.M. v. State,490 the court applied the "child in need of aid"
statute,491 upholding a superior court decision to place the children of
an Eskimo mother in a foster home. The record showed that: (1) the
children's sole legal custodian, their father, was in jail for sexually
abusing them, (2) the children would likely suffer emotional damage if
they were to be returned to their mother's home and (3) the placement
of the children in a foster home in Anchorage while their mother lived
in Juneau did not constitute a de facto termination of the mother's
visitation rights.492
The court clarified that under the "child in need of aid" statutes,
"the other parent's acquiescence or fault in allowing the abuse to oc-
cur is not required in order to find the child to be in need of aid."'493
In addition, while the court recognized that the mother could not fi-
nancially afford to visit her children regularly if they were placed in a
home in Anchorage, the situation was not as burdensome as that in
D.H. v. State, where the court ruled that placing a child in a foster
home in Alabama constituted a de facto termination of visitation
rights. The inconvenience to the mother was outweighed by the sub-
stantial evidence that the placement was in the children's best
interest.4
94
486. Id. (The mother challenged the constitutionality of sections 25.23.050,
25.23.120(c) and 25.23.130(a) of the Alaska Statutes, dealing with an adoption pro-
ceeding, and section 47. 10.080(c)(3), addressing a "child in need of aid" proceeding.).
487. Id. at 1226-27.
488. Id. at 1227 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
489. Id. at 1227, 1228-29 & n.3 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
490. ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.010-.290 (1987).
491. 779 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1989).
492. Id. at 1232-33.
493. Id. at 1232; ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(D).




Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. C.A.A. 495 presented a question of
first impression as to whether Indian tribes are entitled to notice of
proceedings in which a parent voluntarily relinquishes parental rights
to an Indian child. Citing the absence of any provision for such notice
in the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA" or "the Act") 496 the court
answered the question in the negative.
The case involved a mother who voluntarily relinquished her
child for adoption through Catholic Social Services, a private adoption
agency. The mother had experienced chronic difficulties with alcohol,
which caused her to abuse the child and to have difficulty caring for
her. In June of 1986, the mother signed a formal Relinquishment of
Parental Rights before a probate master, and her parental rights were
formally terminated by the superior court shortly thereafter.497 The
child then went to live with a non-Indian family designated by the
mother.
By the time the adoptive family petitioned formally to adopt the
child, the mother had received counseling and had contacted her tribe,
the Cook Inlet Tribal Council ("Tribe") about the possibility of
regaining her parental rights, and filed a Revocation of Relinquish-
ment.498 The Tribe moved to intervene and to set aside the termina-
tion decree pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1914.499 The superior court
granted these motions and vacated the termination, but the supreme
court reversed on appeal and remanded the case to the superior
court.500
The majority of the supreme court held, per curiam, that tribes
have no right under ICWA to intervene in voluntary termination pro-
ceedings, and therefore they are not entitled to notification of such
proceedings.501 In contrast to involuntary terminations, for which tri-
bal notice is specifically provided for,502 the Act is silent about notice
of voluntary terminations. Furthermore, the court found no legisla-
tive history supporting such a notice requirement, nor any due process
implications for failing to provide notice in this case.503
495. 783 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1989) (per curiam). For a more thorough treatment of
the central issues in this case, see Note, Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. C.A.A.: Best
Interests and Statutory Construction of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 7 ALASKA L.
REV. 203 (1990).
496. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1988).
497. 783 P.2d at 1161.
498. Id.
499. Id. (25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988) allows parents or tribes to move to set aside
adoption or termination decrees that violate provisions of the Act.)
500. Id. at 1160.
501. Id.
502. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988).
503. Catholic Social Services, 783 P.2d at 1160.
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In dissent, Justice Rabinowitz argued that the Tribe in fact has an
explicit statutory right to intervene under ICWA and that a right to
notice is implicit in this unqualified intervention right.5 4 Given the
general purpose of the Act and the interests that it seeks to protect,
Justice Rabinowitz contended that the Tribe's powers are illusory
without notification of voluntary termination proceedings and that the
majority decision too readily allowed circumvention of tribal partici-
pation in Indian child custody proceedings.505
In In re T.NF.,506 a divided court held that ICWA applied to a
non-Indian biological surrogate mother who wanted to withdraw her
consent to her child's adoption by the child's biological Indian father.
The court held that the mother could have withdrawn her consent in
accordance with the Act if she had challenged the adoption within the
time period specified in Alaska's statute of limitations.50 7
In holding that the child qualified as an Indian under ICWA, the
court declined to adopt an "Indian family" exception to the Act.50 8
Consistent with its holding in A.B.M. v. M.H.,50 9 the court refused to
adopt this exception because it focuses only on the interests of Indian
parents, and Congress intended that the Act protect the interests of
the Indian children, tribes and communities as well.510 While the
court acknowledged that Congress probably did not consider surro-
gate parent arrangements when it adopted the Act, the court declined
to utilize a judicially created exception that could potentially exclude
the types of cases that Congress intended the Act to cover.5 11
The court reasoned that "ICWA incorporates state statutes of
limitations except in challenges based on fraud or duress which are
governed by the two-year statute of limitations in [section]
1913(d)." 512 The court reached this conclusion after analyzing federal
504. Id. at 1162-63 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). The Act provides that tribes have
the right to intervene in any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child at any
point in the proceeding. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988).
505. Id. (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
506. 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989).
507. Id. at 978-81.
508. Id. at 976-77. The "Indian family" exception, as adopted by other state
courts, states that "ICWA does not apply to the adoption of an Indian child that was
never part of an Indian family." Id. See In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 302-03 (Ind.
1988) (court held that the Act did not apply because the adopted Indian child had
spent its entire life, save the first five days, in a non-Indian culture with non-Indian
adoptive parents).
509. 651 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1982).
510. In re T.NF., 781 P.2d at 977.
511. Id. at 978.
512. Id. at 981. Section 1913(d) states that "[u]pon a finding that such consent was
obtained through fraud or duress, the court shall vacate such decree and return the
child to the parent. [However, n]o adoption which has been effective for at least two
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case law, the preemption doctrine and statutory construction, as well
as other federal statutes.5 1 3 Furthermore, the court held that Alaska's
one-year limitation applied, rather than California's three-year limita-
tion, because Alaska had "sufficient contacts with and interests in...
[the] adoption to ensure that application of Alaska law was not arbi-
trary or unfair .... ,,514 Since the one-year period had expired, the
court affirmed the superior court's decision that the mother's action
was barred by Alaska's statute of limitations.
Justice Compton agreed with the court's refusal to recognize the
"Indian family" exception to the Act.5 15 He disagreed, however, with
the majority holding that the Act applied to the non-Indian biological
mother of T.N.F., noting that the mother was availing herself of the
protections of the Act "to further purposes which have nothing to do
with furtherance of Indian welfare.. .,,s6 Therefore, Justice
Compton would have affirmed solely on the basis of Alaska's statute of
limitations.
Although Justice Rabinowitz agreed with the majority's rejection
of the "Indian family" exception and with the majority holding that
the Act applied to this case, he dissented because he disagreed with the
holding that the Alaska statute of limitations barred the action to va-
cate the adoption decree.51 7 He concluded that any consent given in
violation of the procedures in section 1913(a) was invalid and without
force or effect and, therefore, the adoption was void ab initio. Justice
Rabinowitz would have reversed on the grounds that a section 1914
action based on non-compliance with section 1913(a) could be brought
at any time, and therefore an action like In re T.NF should not be
barred by the one-year statute of limitations.5 18
IX. FISH AND GAME LAW
In 1989, the court handed down three fishing cases, two of which
upheld the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission's ("CFEC") re-
fusal to reconsider awarding additional points to applicants which
years may be invalidated under the provisions of this subsection unless otherwise per-
mitted by state law." 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (Supp. 1987).
513. In re T.NF., 787 P.2d at 978-81.
514. Id. at 982. See id. at 981-82 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 821 (1985) ("[A state] must have a 'significant contact or aggregation of
contacts' to the claims . . ., contacts 'creating state interests', in order to ensure that
the choice of [state] law is not arbitrary or unfair.")).
515. Id. (Compton, J., concurring).
516. Id. (Compton, J., concurring).
517. Id. at 984 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
518. Id. at 985 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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would entitle them to receive entry permits for Cook Inlet Drift gill
net fishing. 519
The first, Wilson v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 520
held that a fisherman who did not claim Availability of Alternative
Occupations ("AAO") points, either on his original application in
1975 or at any other opportunity over the next four years when his file
was closed, was not entitled to later claim AAO points despite the
court's decision in Deubelbeiss v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commis-
sion. 521 Deubelbeiss invalidated as unconstitutional that portion of the
Alaska Administrative Code awarding AAO points based on census
districts.5 22 Because the points sought by plaintiff had not been denied
persuant to the invalid provisions, he was not affected by Deubelbeiss
and therefore not entitled to a new hearing.5 23
The plaintiff claimed Sun Valley, Nevada, as his domicile in his
original application but he neither claimed any AAO points as a Sun
Valley resident nor challenged the CFEC's AAO point allocation for
Sun Valley. 524 Seven years later, however, he claimed that he had in
fact been domiciled in Seldovia, Alaska, and he argued that
Deubelbeiss entitled him to have the CFEC re-evaluate his application
and grant him the AAO points he needed to receive his permit.5 25
The court disagreed, stating that the plaintiff could have success-
fully argued that, under Deubelbeiss, Sun Valley's census district had
been unconstitutionally deprived of its fair share of AAO points, or,
alternatively, that his domicile was in fact Seldovia while his original
application was under consideration from 1975 to 1979. Because his
claim relied on neither of these arguments, Deubelbeiss did not apply
and his request for an amendment to the original application remained
untimely.526
519. Wilson v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1126 (Alaska
1989); Sublett v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 773 P.2d 952 (Alaska 1989).
520. 770 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1989).
521. 689 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1984). "In Deubelbeiss, this court held CFEC's system
of awarding AA.O points based on census districts violative of equal protection of law
under article I, section I of the Alaska Constitution. This court reasoned that census
districts were not designed to take into account community economic opportunities."
Wilson, 770 P.2d at 1129 (citing Deubelbeiss, 689 P.2d at 489-90).
522. Wilson, 770 P.2d at 1130 (citing Deublebeiss, 689 P.2d at 489).
523. Id.
524. Id. at 1129-30.
525. Id. at 1127-28. The applicant's domicile is determinative of the CFEC alloca-
tion of AAO points. At no time, before or after Deubelbeiss, has an applicant domi-
ciled in Sun Valley, Nevada been eligible for any AAO points. Id. at 1126 n.l.
However, applicants "domiciled in Seldovia have always been eligible for at least two
of the maximum four AAO points." Id. at 1127. The potential two point differential
was critical to the applicant in Wilson, who only needed one more point to obtain an
entry permit. Id. at 1130.
526. Id. at 1129-30.
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In the second case, Sublett v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Com-
mission,527 the court held that an applicant who failed to appeal a 1978
CFEC decision denying him additional past participation points at the
time of the decision was precluded from later making a timely ap-
peal.528 Subsequent decisions by the court 29 could not revive the old
claim since the applicant could have made his appeal at the proper
time but chose not to do so. 5 30 The court also held that even if the
applicant's current appeal were considered to be part of a 1986 CFEC
decision not to reopen his previous application, rather than part of the
original decision, the appeal still would be untimely because collateral
estoppel and res judicata prevent collateral attack of a CFEC decision
made in an adjudicatory hearing.531
In the third fish and game case handed down in 1989, McDowell
v. State, the court held that the state's rural preference provision for
subsistence fishermen and hunters was unconstitutional.5 32
X. PROCEDURE
A variety of procedural challenges were presented to the court in
1989. Although some of the cases involve substantive questions in
other areas, they have been classified into five broad categories with
respect to the dominant procedural issues: discovery, preclusion, sum-
mary judgment, attorney's fees and costs and attorney disqualification
and sanctions. In addition, the several cases which fall outside the
scope of these five categories are discussed under the "miscellaneous"
heading at the end of the section.
527. 773 P.2d 952 (Alaska 1989).
528. Id. at 954-55.
529. The applicant sought to revive his application for two additional past partici-
pation points because of the court's decisions in Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n
v. Byayuk, 684 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1984), and Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v.
Templeton, 598 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1979). Sublett, 773 P.2d at 954-55. Templeton al-
lowed a person who fished as an equal partner to receive special circumstance points
for economic dependence even though the gear license was not in that person's name.
Templeton, 598 P.2d at 81. Byayuk held that the principle in Templeton should be
applied retroactively, both to applicants who have received final decisions and to those
applicants who failed to raise the issue of partnership points prior to final decision.
Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 121-22. The two additional points would have given him the 16
total points necessary to receive an entry permit. Sublett, 773 P.2d at 954 n.4.
Byayuk and Templeton were not directly on point, however, in that they dealt with
economic dependence points by partners for gear license holders, not past participa-
tion points. Id. at 955 & n.7.
530. Sublett, 773 P.2d at 955.
531. Id. at 954.
532. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989). See supra notes 215-42 and accompanying text for




One of the most significant decisions for the personal injury bar
was Langfeldt-Halland v. Saupe Enterprises, Inc. 533 The issue of first
impression before the court was whether an attorney for a party to a
civil action may be present during a physical or psychiatric examina-
tion by a physician hired by opposing counsel. 534 Reasoning by anal-
ogy, a divided court found that the plaintiff's counsel was entitled to
attend such an examination because the constitutional right to counsel
is afforded to both civil and criminal litigants and, although not coex-
tensive, the compulsory nature of the examination mandated that the
same right be afforded to both civil and criminal litigants.535 The ma-
jority specifically refrained from considering whether counsel for the
party ordering the examination should also be permitted to attend the
examination. 536
In an extensive dissent, Justice Moore, joined by Justice
Compton, stated that "this ruling threatens to turn medical exams into
mini-depositions dominated by legal theatrics rather than medical fact
finding," and the two justices chastised the majority for failing to con-
sider fully the policy and practical implications of its ruling.5 37
In Rohweder v. Fleetwood Homes, Inc., 538 the court reaffirmed its
view that trial courts must be given great flexibility in tailoring sanc-
tions under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b). The court upheld
the trial court's order precluding Rohweder from using any informa-
tion relating to documentation and interrogatories which he had failed
to produce for Fleetwood in the nine months following an initial re-
quest, reasoning that this delay, along with Rohweder's failure to heed
an order to comply, reasonably implied that he willfully intended to
impede discovery.5 39 The court found that the trial court had abused
its discretion, however, in precluding Rohweder from pursuing a re-
scission remedy. Because the defendant was cognizant of the basis for
the remedy, it could not be said that he had had no notice of
Rohweder's claim.54°
533. 768 P.2d 1144 (Alaska 1989).
534. Id. at 1144-45.
535. Id. at 1146. The court noted the example that indigent persons do not have
the right to appointed counsel in civil cases as do criminal defendants. Id. n.23. See
Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 792-96 (Alaska 1979) (according the same right to
criminal litigants).
536. Id. at 1147.
537. Id. at 1148 (Moore, J., dissenting).
538. 767 P.2d 187 (Alaska 1989).
539. Id. at 191.
540. Id. at 192. The trial court had precluded Rohweder from pursuing rescission
because he failed to mention rescission as a remedy in response to an interrogatory
requesting all damages which Rohweder would seek. Id. The court said, however,
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At issue in Superior Fire Protection Co. v. Du Alaska Co. 541 was
whether raising a new theory of recovery in interrogatories qualified as
an amended pleading by the express or implied consent of the parties
under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). Superior Fire Protection
Company ("Superior") argued that Du Alaska's failure to object to
Superior's answers to interrogatories, which raised an issue of misrep-
resentation not previously pleaded, constituted implied consent to try-
ing the issue and, accordingly, Superior should be allowed to amend
its pleadings. The court rejected this argument, noting that such a
position would be unduly burdensome as it would require counsel to
examine all discovery materials obtained from an adverse party and
make motions to strike any answers that suggested unpled theories.542
B. Preclusion
In DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage,543 the supreme court
affirmed the superior court's decision to dismiss petitioner's federal
civil rights action under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.544 The
court summarized and discussed the doctrines of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel. "Res judicata bars the relitigation of the same claim
between the same parties and their privies when (1) a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, (2) has rendered final judgment on the merits, and (3)
the same cause of action and same parties or their privies were in-
volved in both suits. ' 545 Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issues
that "'have been actually litigated and determined in the first action
by a valid and final judgment,'" in which the determination of those
issues was essential to the judgment.5 46 Collateral estoppel also bars
relitigation of issues, including those relying on the constitution, that
were decided incorrectly in the first case.547
Although inapplicable to the particular facts of the case before it,
the court stated that prior judgments could be collaterally attacked if
(1) they were ordered by a court lacking subject matter or personal
jurisdiction, (2) the judgment was not rendered by a duly constituted
court with competency to render it, (3) there was a failure to comply
that this failure to mention rescission as a damage should not prejudice Rohweder
since rescission is a remedy, not a damage. Id.
541. 772 P.2d 1088 (Alaska 1989).
542. Id. at 1089. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 15(b).
543. 775 P.2d 515 (Alaska 1989).
544. Id. at 518.
545. Id. at 517 (citing Blake v. Gilbert, 702 P.2d 631, 634-35 (Alaska 1985)).
546. Id. at 517 (quoting Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 720 P.2d 490,
494 (Alaska 1986)).
547. Id. at 517 (citing DeNardo v. State, 740 P.2d 453, 457 (Alaska), cert. denied,




with the requirements necessary for a court's valid exercise of power
or (4) the defendant was not given proper notice of the action and the
opportunity to be heard.548
The court further ruled that the superior court erred in awarding
the defending party attorney's fees under Alaska Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 82(a)(2), which generally allows fees to the prevailing party. Ap-
plication for fees in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983549
must be determined in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988550 and not
the Alaska Rules. Under the dictates of Hughes v. Rowe,551 a prevail-
ing civil rights defendant is entitled to attorney's fees only when the
plaintiff's action was found by the court to be "frivolous, unreasona-
ble, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
faith."' 552 The court held that the trial court's remark that the peti-
tioner's claim appeared to have merit provided the factual determina-
tion necessary to conclude that attorney's fees, as a matter of federal
law, were improperly granted to the defendant.5 53
The court reviewed the application of the equitable tolling doc-
trine in Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc. 554 The plaintiffs, former
employees of Temsco, claimed that they had been undercompensated
for helicopter services that they had provided to several public con-
struction projects.5 55 In October of 1983 they asked the Department
of Labor to accept an assignment of their claim, which the department
has the power to prosecute under Alaska law.556 The department
withdrew from both cases nearly two years later and the plaintiffs sub-
sequently filed complaints in superior court in January 1986, which
were then consolidated.5 57 The superior court sustained a motion for
summary judgment, reasoning that the two-year statute of limitations
had expired in 1985.558 On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the stat-
ute of limitations was equitably tolled while the Department of Labor
reviewed their claims.5 59
Under the equitable tolling doctrine, if a plaintiff has more than
one legal remedy available and pursues his initial remedy in a judicial
or quasi-judicial forum, then the statute of limitations is equitably
548. Id. at 517.
549. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
550. Id. § 1988 (1981).
551. 449 U.S. 5 (1980).
552. DeNardo, 775 P.2d 518 (citing Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15).
553. Id.
554. 772 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1989).
555. Id. at 1086.
556. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(b) (1983).
557. Dayhoff, 772 P.2d at 1086.
558. Id. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.130 (1983).
559. Dayhoff, 772 P.2d at 1087.
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tolled if. (1) the defendant is given notice of the plaintiff's claim, (2)
the delay does not prejudice the defendant's ability to gather evidence
and (3) plaintiff acted reasonably and in good faith.5 60 Since the first
two elements of this doctrine were disputed questions of fact, the sum-
mary judgment motion was improper if Department of Labor proceed-
ings were classified as quasi-judicial. The court held that since the
department has the power to conduct investigations, issue subpoenas
and hold hearings, Department of Labor proceedings were quasi-judi-
cial; therefore summary judgment was inappropriate. 561
In Alaska Foods, Inc. v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 562 the court
confronted the issue of whether a corporate shareholder who was not a
party to actions by the corporation is bound by prior litigation of the
corporation. Alaska Foods held thirty percent of the shares in Adak
Aleutian Processors ("AAP"), a closely held corporation.5 63 AAP
had filed claims against Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha ("Nichiro") in three
separate suits. In the first suit, a default judgment was entered against
AAP for failing to provide adequate answers to interrogatories. In the
second suit, summary judgment against AAP was entered based on
grounds of res judicata; the third suit was dismissed. Subsequently,
Alaska Foods brought an action against Nichiro based on issues which
had been raised previously by AAP5 64
Although the court did not determine whether res judicata would
bar Alaska Foods from pursuing its claims, 565 the case is important for
two reasons. First, the court noted for the first time that a default
judgment could have a preclusive effect on a non-party.566 More im-
portantly, the court dropped its reliance on notions of privity and in-
stead embraced the analytical framework provided by the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments concerning the application of res judicata when
the person to be precluded by a corporation's prior judgments is a
shareholder of that corporation.5 67
C. Summary Judgment
The court considered several issues relating to summary judg-
ment motions this term. In Bauman v. Alaska Division of Family &
560. Id.
561. Id. at 1087-88.
562. 768 P.2d 117 (Alaska 1989).
563. Id. at 118, 123.
564. Id. at 119-20.
565. The court remanded the case so that the trial court could evaluate the facts in
light of the new standard proposed. Id. at 123.
566. Id. at 120-21. The court explicitly recognized, for the first time, that a default
judgment, as opposed to a judgment on the issues, can have a preclusive effect. Id.
567. Id. at 121-23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 59 (1980).
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Youth Services,568 the court reiterated that a movant is not entitled to
summary judgment solely because the opponent has failed to respond.
Instead, he must first meet the initial burden of showing the absence of
genuine issues of material fact and the right to judgment as a matter of
law. 569 More importantly, however, the court ruled that a district
court is not required to instruct a pro se litigant of the necessity of
opposing a motion for summary judgment. 570 In so holding, the court
refused to extend the ruling in Breck v. Ulmer 571 that once a pro se
litigant has opposed a motion for summary judgment, a trial court
must inform the pro se litigant of the necessity of submitting affidavits
to that effect. While recognizing the difficulty and complexity for a
pro se litigant in pursuing a lawsuit, the court reasoned that ensuring
the court's impartiality outweighed these concerns. 572
Justice Rabinowitz found the majority's reasoning unpersuasive.
He believed that Breck was not distinguishable and that the minimal
effort of informing pro se litigants of the need to oppose a summary
judgment motion would not compromise a trial court's impartiality. 573
The proper use of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in situa-
tions where partial summary judgment has been granted was consid-
ered in Zeilinger v. Standard Alaska Petroleum Co.574 Rule 54(b)
allows a trial court to enter final judgment as to one or more claims in
a multi-claim action under certain circumstances; however, in Zeil-
inger, the partial summary judgment motion granted by the court dis-
posed of only some of the issues pertinent to a single claim, but not the
claim itself. The court therefore held that the trial court had errone-
ously entered the Rule 54(b) certificate because such a judgment is
interlocutory and not within the scope of Rule 54(b). 575
In Munn v. Bristol Bay Housing Authority, 576 the court considered
the granting of motions to continue or stay a summary judgment mo-
tion under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). The unanimous de-
cision held that affidavits supporting a Rule 56(f) motion need not
specify which facts are sought through further discovery, provided the
affidavits set forth adequate reasons why facts necessary to oppose the
summary judgment motion cannot be presented. The court noted that
requiring such specificity would create an "unfair hardship" in many
568. 768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989).
569. Id. at 1099 (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 56).
570. Id.
571. 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1579 (1988).
572. Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1099.
573. Id. at 1101-02 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
574. 769 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1989).
575. Id. (citing 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 2656, at 52-53 (1983)).
576. 777 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1989).
[Vol. 7:87
YEAR IN REVIEW
cases and that Rule 56(f) motions "'should be freely granted'" as
long as the party requesting the stay of summary judgment has not
demonstrated dilatory behavior.577
Another issue before the court in Munn was the scope of the at-
torney-client privilege. Munn sought to depose the defendants' attor-
ney, claiming that the attorney had advised the defendants in bad faith
to file an assault claim against Munn.578 The court declined to adopt
the Eighth Circuit rule proposed by the defendants that opposing
counsel cannot be deposed unless the information sought: (1) is cru-
cial to the preparation of the case, (2) is nonprivileged and (3) may not
be obtained by any other means.5 79 Instead, the court held that "the
filing of an assault claim against a person for the purpose of interfering
with that person's employment rights comes within the civil fraud ex-
ception to the attorney-client privilege" and that attorneys as wit-
nesses were not entitled to special treatment.5 80
D. Attorney's Fees and Costs
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 grants a trial court broad dis-
cretion in awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.
In 1989 the court decided three cases involving the application of this
rule. The first two addressed the procedure for awarding fees between
competing parties in a lawsuit while the third addressed the means of
settling the disputes between an attorney and his client. The last case
in this section deals with the scope of "court costs" under Alaska Rule
of Civil Procedure 79.
In Myers v. Snow White Cleaners and Linen Supply, Inc.,58 I the
court addressed the impact of pre-trial settlement offers which fail to
comply with Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68 on the calculation of
Rule 82 attorney's fees awards. Under Rule 68, a trial court may pe-
nalize a party for not accepting a settlement offer made prior to trial if
the jury verdict does not exceed the pre-trial offer.58 2 The court lim-
ited Rule 68's applicability, holding that a district court cannot take
into account non-complying settlement offers because such settlement
offers lack the protections afforded by Rule 68. 583 A party's settle-
ment posture, therefore, should not be considered when determining
577. Id. at 193 (quoting Jennings v. State, 566 P.2d 1304, 1313-14 (Alaska 1977)).
578. Id. at 194.
579. Id. at 195-96 (citing Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327
(8th Cir. 1986)).
580. Id.
581. 770 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1989).
582. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68.
583. The court cited the following as conditions necessary to bring a settlement
offer within the ambit of Rule 68: that the offer be definite, that it be irrevocable for
ten days and that it be made at least ten days before trial. Meyer, 770 P.2d at 752-53.
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appropriate attorney's fees and thus does not justify reducing an
award.584
In Day v. Moore, 585 the court, relying on Myers, stressed that the
use of Rule 82 to accomplish purposes other than providing just com-
pensation was improper and found the trial court's consideration of
the defendant's settlement posture to be an abuse of discretion. The
trial court had attempted to penalize the defendant for not accepting a
pre-trial offer that was virtually identical to the plaintiff's eventual
recovery.5 8 6
Day also considered the proper determination of the prevailing
party in multi-claim suits. For purposes of Rule 82, the party who has
successfully prosecuted or defended against an action and who has had
the decision or verdict rendered in his favor is considered the prevail-
ing party, even though the party may not have prevailed on every is-
sue. Whether the party has defeated a claim of great potential liability
is also relevant. Since the plaintiff prevailed in one of his three claims
and also prevailed in the defendant's counterclaim for $25,000, the
court affirmed the lower court's holding that the plaintiff was the pre-
vailing party. 587
In Breeze v. Sims, 5 88 the court addressed several issues regarding
Alaska Bar Rule 34, which generally allows a client to seek arbitration
proceedings regarding fee disputes between the client and his attor-
ney.589 The court held that the standard of review for arbitration deci-
sions made pursuant to Bar Rule 34 is the standard set forth in the
Uniform Arbitration Act, which provides that determinations of fact
are not reviewable.5 90 Furthermore, the court stated that under Bar
Rule 34(b), the client is the person legally responsible for paying the
attorney's fees, even if he is paying for the representation of
another.591
CTA Architects of Alaska, Inc. v. Active Erectors & Installers,
Inc., 592 interpreted the scope of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 79(b),
which provides that reimbursement for court costs be restricted to
those costs attendant to preserving, protecting or transporting exhibits
584. Id. at 753.
585. 771 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1989).
586. Id. at 438-39.
587. Id. at 437.
588. 778 P.2d 215 (Alaska 1989).
589. Alaska Bar Rule 34.
590. Breeze. 778 P.2d at 217. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.120 (1983).
591. Breeze. 778 P.2d at 217-18.
592. 781 P.2d 1364 (Alaska 1989).
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to court.5 93 Holding that expert's fees for the cost of preparing exhib-
its are not properly compensable as a "necessary expense of ... pro-
ducing exhibits," the court defined "producing" in the legal sense, to
mean providing a document or exhibit for discovery.5 94 The court
specifically rejected appellee's suggested definition that "producing"
means creating or composing exhibits.595 The court also held that
computer research costs and paralegal expenses are not analogous to
attorney's fees and cannot be awarded under Rule 82, but are more
appropriately characterized as costs that can be fully recovered under
Rule 79(b). 596
The concurring opinion of Justice Rabinowitz, joined by Justice
Burke,597 added that the "catch-all" phrase in Rule 79(b) referring to
the allowance of costs for "any other expenses necessarily incurred" is
limited in its scope by the application of Alaska Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 83 and Alaska Administrative Rule 7(c). 598 Expert witness fees
under Rule 7(c) are granted to the prevailing party only for the time
the expert spent testifying,599 and are generally limited to fifty dollars
per hour.600 The concurrence noted that prior case law has left open
the possibility of recovery for expert preparation costs only in cases
involving bad faith or reprehensible conduct. 60 1
E. Attorney Disqualification and Sanctioning
The disqualification of an attorney from a case under the Alaska
Code of Professional Responsibility ("the Code") Canon 9602 was dis-
cussed in Gabianelli v. Azar.60 3 Prior to the suit, Gabianelli's attorney,
Eggers, and Azar's accountant, Bowers, had lived together for nearly
twelve years. Because Bowers had advised Azar on the tax conse-
quences of the underlying transaction in the suit, the trial court
593. Id. at 1365 n.3; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 79(b).
594. CTA Architects, 781 P.2d at 1366 (quoting ALASKA R. Civ. P. 79(b)).
595. Id.
596. Id. at 1367 (citing Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 723 P.2d 1249, 1253
(Alaska 1986); Smith v. Shortall, 732 P.2d 548, 550 n.1 (Alaska 1987)).
597. Id. at 1367 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
598. Id. (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 83 and ALASKA
ADMIN. R. 7(c)).
599. Id. at 1368 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (citing Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State,
723 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Alaska 1986)).
600. Id. at 1367 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (citing ALASKA ADMIN. R. 7(c)).
601. Id. at 1368 n.2 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (citing Miller v. Sears, 636 P.2d
1183, 1195 (Alaska 1981)).
602. ALASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 9 (1988) ("A law-
yer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.").
603. 777 P.2d 1167 (Alaska 1989).
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granted Azar's motion to disqualify Eggers from further participa-
tion.6°4 In reversing the trial court's decision, the supreme court held
that under these circumstances, a party seeking to disqualify an attor-
ney under Canon 9 should demonstrate at least a reasonable possibility
that the attorney acquired privileged or confidential information from
the previous relationship. Because Alaska does not recognize an ac-
countant-client privilege, however, any information which Eggers
might have gained was discoverable and unprivileged.60 5
In Burrell v. Disciplinary Board of the Alaska Bar Association,60 6
the court faced the more difficult issue of sanctioning an attorney for
possible violations of the Code. The Disciplinary Board of the Bar
Association had suspended Burrell from practice, finding him guilty
of: (1) violating DR 7-105(A)607 by writing a letter to another attor-
ney threatening to present criminal charges so as to gain an advantage
in a civil matter and (2) violating Alaska Bar Rules 15(7) and 28(d) by
writing a letter that constituted practicing law while being sus-
pended.608 Stressing that a suspended attorney "must be particularly
prudent to avoid even the appearance of practicing law, '' 609 the court
rejected Burrell's claim that the letters were protected free speech,
holding that persons who consented to be bound by a code of profes-
sional responsibility had, to some extent, limited their right to free
speech.610
In Keen v. Ruddy, 611 which arose when judgment debtors filed an
abuse of process claim against an attorney who had commenced a col-
lection action against them on behalf of an estate, the court addressed
two important procedural issues. First, the court held that a suit initi-
ated by the administrator of an estate to collect debts owed to the
estate, and continued by the estate's attorney after the administrator's
resignation, does not constitute an abuse of process. 612 Citing Kol-
lodge v. State,613 the court concluded that even if the suit were im-
proper in the sense that the attorney continued the suit without a
client, there was no abuse of process because the suit did not constitute
604. Id. at 1166-68.
605. Id. at 1169.
606. 777 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1989) (per curiam).
607. DR 7-105(A) prohibits attorneys from threatening to present criminal charges
solely to obtain an advantage in a civil proceeding.
608. Burrell, 777 P.2d at 1141. Burrell wrote the second letter while he was under
a 90-day suspension. Id. at 1141 n.1.
609. Id. at 1143 (citing In re Robson, 575 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1978)).
610. Id. at 1142. The court noted that it had previously rejected such an argument
in In re Vollintine, 673 P.2d 755, 757 (Alaska 1983).
611. 784 P.2d 653 (Alaska 1989).
612. Id. at 655-56.
613. 757 P.2d 1024 (Alaska 1989).
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"'a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular con-
duct of the proceeding.' "614
Second, the court affirmed the trial court's imposition of Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against the attorney who had
filed the abuse of process claim. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs
had acted in bad faith in bringing their suit and that the attorney
therefore could not have signed the pleadings with a reasonable belief
that the pleadings were supported by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for its extension. 615 In reaching this decision the court applied
the Seventh Circuit's standard of review of Rule 11 sanctions, under
which the appellate court "reviews all factors relevant to the issue of
whether the attorney's inquiry into facts and law was reasonable under
an abuse of discretion standard. ' 616 The court rejected the argument
that the trial court's sanction of $100.00 for the Rule 11 violation was
too low, arguing that Rule 11 sanctions carry with them a stigma and
a message of disapproval, and that the trial court could reasonably
have considered this penalty sufficient to punish the attorney for his
conduct. 61 7
F. Miscellaneous
In Korean Air Lines v. State,6 18 the court held that the trial court
did not err in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
("j.n.o.v.") on the issue of legal causation in an airplane crash where
the jury had already established willful misconduct on the part of the
appellant, Korean Air Lines ("KAL"). 619 The case arose from the
1983 crash between a KAL DC-10 and a Southcentral Airways Piper
Navajo at Anchorage International Airport. 620 The crash occurred in
foggy weather, with reported visibility below the quarter-mile legal
limit.621 Crew errors, such as failing to verify the runway heading
with either the cockpit compasses or the Jeppesen charts and taking
off without legal visibility, were determined to be the cause of the acci-
dent.622 Two issues were presented to the jury pursuant to the War-
saw Treaty: (1) Did the KAL crew's mistakes constitute willful
misconduct as defined within article 25 of the Warsaw Convention
614. 784 P.2d at 655 (citing Kollodge, 757 P.2d at 1026 (quoting Jenkins v. Dan-
iels, 751 P.2d 19, 22 (Alaska 1988))).
615. Id. at 656-57.
616. Id. at 659 (citing R.K. Harp Inc. Corp. v. McQuade, 825 F.2d 1101, 1103
(7th Cir. 1987)).
617. Id.
618. 779 P.2d 333 (Alaska 1989).
619. Id. at 335.
620. Id. at 334-35.
621. Id. at 336.
622. Id. at 339.
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and, if so, (2) was that willful misconduct the legal cause of the
accident?623
The jury found that the crew's errors did constitute willful mis-
conduct, "but that the wilful misconduct was not the legal cause of the
crash." 624 The trial court granted a j.n.o.v. motion, holding that once
the jury established that KAL had engaged in willful misconduct,
"fair-minded people exercising reasonable judgment could not differ in
concluding that KAL's wilful misconduct was a legal cause of the
crash. '625 The court found that j.n.o.v. was properly granted because
the crash would not have occurred but for the crew's mistakes, and
therefore, as a matter of law, the willful misconduct was the legal
cause of the accident. 626 The court also held that the trial court, under
Alaska Rule of Evidence 403, correctly excluded evidence pertaining
to the state's efforts to install ground radar because it would "have
confused the jury. ' 6 2 7 The court upheld the trial court's award of at-
torney's fees, saying that such an award will only be disturbed if
"manifestly unreasonable." 628
The issue before the court in Smith v. Lee 62 9 was how explicit an
indispensible party's assent to be bound by the outcome of litigation
must be, so as to defeat a motion for dismissal under Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(a). 630 The defendant, Lee, had moved for a dismis-
sal pursuant to Rule 17(a) because Smith had not joined Union Bank,
a party that. Lee claimed was indispensable to the action. The trial
court granted the motion but stayed the order to allow Union Bank to
ratify the commencement of the action. Final judgment was later en-
tered in favor of the defendant because the Union Bank assent was not
a proper ratification of the action.6 31
623. Id. at 336. See Warsaw Convention of 1929, art. 25, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
624. Korean Air Lines v. State, 779 P.2d at 337.
625. Id.
626. Id. at 339. The court stated that "[w]hile these actions may not have been the
sole cause of the accident, we conclude that reasonable persons would regard this
conduct as a cause and attach responsibility to it." Id.
627. Id. at 339-40. The court also ruled that this exclusion did not prejudice KAL
since KAL was allowed to introduce other evidence showing the confusing taxiway
conditions at the airport on the day of the crash. Id. at 340.
628. Id. at 341 (citing Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487, 495 (Alaska 1976); Alaska
Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 63 (Alaska 1976); Oake v. Greater Anchorage Area
Borough, 439 P.2d 790, 793 (Alaska 1968)).
629. 770 P.2d 754 (Alaska 1989).
630. Id. at 755-56. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) requires that every action
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
631. Smith v. Lee, 770 P.2d at 755-56.
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The court, reversing the trial court, explained that under
Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. 6 32
and Municipality of Anchorage v. Baugh Construction & Engineering
Co.,633 a party need agree only to be bound by the court proceedings
generally. The party need not specifically agree to be bound by judg-
ments regarding costs and attorney's fees.634
In Buoy v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 635 the court addressed several
discrete procedural issues pertaining to the superior court's denial of
the plaintiff's motion for a third trial. Plaintiffs brought the original
suit to recover damages for injuries sustained in a crash of defendant's
helicopter. 636
Reaffirming the principle that it will not reverse a trial court's
decision on a motion for a new trial except when "exceptional circum-
stances exist to prevent a miscarriage of justice, ' 637 the court held first
that the defendant's attorney was permitted to cross-examine plain-
tiff's witness, a psychologist, as to whether the jury award in the previ-
ous trial had affected plaintiff's depression. This inquiry did not
constitute abuse because: (1) the plaintiff's attorney had opened the
line of questioning, (2) the jury was instructed to consider the evidence
of the first trial for the limited purpose of determining its effect on
plaintiff and (3) the legal cause of plaintiff's depression was in
dispute.638
Second, the court ruled that, while it is preferable for a trial court
to specifically instruct the jury that "there could be more than one
legal (or proximate) cause of an injury," a "but for" causation instruc-
tion is permissible because it does not suggest that "there could only
be one legal (or proximate) cause of an injury or mental condition. ' 639
The court also held that motions for a new trial based on alleged inter-
nal inconsistency in the jury verdict must be preserved through post-
trial motions made prior to the jury's discharge.640
Finally, with respect to determining the "prevailing party" for an
award of attorney's fees under Rule 82 in this case, the significant issue
632. 649 P.2d 234 (Alaska 1982).
633. 722 P.2d 919 (Alaska 1986).
634. Smith v. Lee, 770 P.2d at 756.
635. 711 P.2d 439 (Alaska 1989).
636. Id. at 441.
637. Id. at 442 (citing Montgomery Ward v. Thomas, 394 P.2d 774, 774-75
(Alaska 1964)).
638. Id. at 444-45.
639. Id. at 445.
640. Id. at 446 n.7, 447 (citing City of Homer v. Land's End Marine, 459 P.2d 475,
480 (Alaska 1969)). Buoy's statement before the jury's discharge appeared to raise
only the grounds of a verdict unsupported by the evidence, but did not raise the issue
of the verdict's alleged internal inconsistency. Id. at 446 n.7.
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was the amount of damages assessed against defendant after deducting
the amount plaintiffs received from third parties in a settlement, and
not merely the liability of defendant.64 1
Dalkovski v. Glad 642 determined the proper standard under
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 47(c) for excusing a juror who has
personal knowledge of the facts of the case. The court ruled that a
juror's personal knowledge of the facts of a case is grounds for excus-
ing the juror for cause, even though it is not one of the grounds deline-
ated in Rule 47(c). 64 3 The court further stated that a "juror with
personal knowledge ... presents a greater threat to the litigants' right
to a fair trial" than does a juror with a bias or prejudice, and thus a
higher standard prevails for retaining the former. 64 4 Unless it is be-
yond question that the challenged juror can reach a verdict without
use of his personal knowledge, he must not be retained. Affirming the
jury verdict, the court provided that the retaining of such a juror is
reversible error only if "the error would have had a substantial influ-
ence on the verdict of a jury of reasonable men." 64 5
In Gudenau v. Bang,646 the court held that where a confession of
judgment provides that breach of the judgment may be established
only by plaintiff's filing of an affidavit from a specified independent
contractor, the party allegedly in breach may contest the veracity of
the affidavit by submitting affidavits that tend to impeach the contrac-
tor's original affidavit. By submitting impeaching affidavits the de-
fendant here raised genuine issues of material fact, causing the court to
remand for determination of whether the defendant had actually
breached the judgment of confession. 647
The issue before the court in Gregg v. Gregg648 was whether,
under former Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 99, a judge may admin-
ister the witness oath over the telephone to a witness who is not physi-
cally present in Alaska.64 9 In upholding the admissibility of
telephonic testimony irrespective of the witness' location, the court
ruled that it was not necessary for the witness to take the oath in the
641. Id. at 448. See Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C.R. Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312,
313-14 (Alaska 1972) ("it is not an immutable rule that the party who obtains an
affirmative recovery must be considered the prevailing party").
642. 774 P.2d 202 (Alaska 1989).
643. Id. at 205. The court stated that the grounds for juror dismissal listed in Rule
47(c) are not exclusive. Id. at 204-05.
644. Id. at 206.
645. Id. at 206-07.
646. 781 P.2d 1357 (Alaska 1989).
647. Id. at 1362-63.
648. 776 P.2d 1041 (Alaska 1989).
649. Id. at 1041-42.
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presence of the officer authorized to administer oaths, nor was it neces-
sary for the witness to be within Alaska's boundaries. Because Rule
99 was intended to facilitate judicial proceedings, a witness who testi-
fies telephonically is physically absent "to the same extent whether
across the street or on the far side of the globe."'650
Two issues concerning Alaska Rule of Evidence 801, the hearsay
rule, were addressed in Klawock Heenya Corp. v. Dawson Construc-
tion/Hank's Excavation. 651 Klawock Heenya Corporation
("Klawock") argued that the trial court had improperly excluded the
testimony of one witness and had allowed the introduction of im-
proper hearsay evidence. 652 The court agreed that the testimony of
the defendant's employee concerning matters within the scope of his
employment was not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and its exclu-
sion was reversible error since it would have "considerable persuasive
value. '653 The court also held that an exhibit offered to prove the
extent of damages and prepared by a party not testifying at trial was
hearsay as defined in Rule 801(c) and thus inadmissible under Rule
802.654
In McCall v. Coats, 655 the court reviewed whether the failure to
disclose a prior assignment of claims to a non-party was proper
grounds for an order to set aside a judgment under Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(3). 656 The petitioners were Lund-
gren Pacific Construction Company, Inc. ("Lundgren"), J. McCall,
Incorporated ("McCall, Inc.") and John R. McCall ("McCall"). Mc-
Call was president of and owned stock in both Lundgren and McCall,
Inc. and was also president of J. McCall, Ltd. ("McCall, Ltd."). Mc-
Call, Ltd. was not a party to the suit.657 The defendant, Coats, served
on the board of directors of Lundgren and McCall, Inc. and was em-
ployed by both as general manager and vice-president. Coats was re-
leased from his positions when he allegedly assisted competitors. 658
Petitioners succeeded in obtaining a judgment against Coats for
breach of his employment contract. 659 It was later discovered that the
650. Id. at 1043-44.
651. 778 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1989).
652. Id. at 220.
653. Id. at 220-21. See ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
654. Klawock 778 P.2d at 221. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." ALASKA R. EVID. 801(c).
655. 777 P.2d 655 (Alaska 1989).
656. Rules 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3) provide for relief from final judgment because of
newly discovered evidence and fraud, respectively. Id. at 657; see ALASKA R. CIV. P.
60(b)(2), (b)(3).
657. McCall, 777 P.2d at 655-56.




petitioners had assigned all of their claims against Coats to McCall,
Ltd. prior to the commencement of the suit.660 Coats moved to set
aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(2) and Rule 60(b)(3), among
others, arguing that the petitioners intentionally had attempted to cir-
cumvent Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), which requires that all
actions be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 66' The
trial court set aside the judgment and ordered a new trial pursuant to
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). 662
Rule 60(b)(2) requires, inter alia, that the newly discovered evi-
dence "be such as would probably change the result on a new trial [and
that it] not be merely cumulative or impeaching. ' 663 The court found
the disclosu:re of the assignment to McCall, Ltd. to be merely im-
peaching and further recognized that the superior court had failed to
find a "probable change" in result.664
Under Rule 60(b)(3), a losing party must demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that an adverse party has obtained a verdict
through fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct such that the
losing party was prevented "'from fully and fairly presenting his case
or defense.' '"665 Unlike the "probable change" requirement of Rule
60(b)(2), the party need not demonstrate that the information with-
held would alter the result of the case. Although the court held that
Coats had not met this test, it provided little justification for the hold-
ing. The court proffered as one of its reasons, however, that the dis-
closure of the assignment "would not have probably changed the
result on a new trial. ' 666 The court thus failed to address the fraud
component of Rule 60(b)(3) and instead substituted the Rule 60(b)(2)
analysis.
Several issues were addressed in Kenai Peninsula Borough, Inc. v.
English Bay Village Corp. 667 English Bay Village Corporation ("Eng-
lish Bay") filed suit against Kenai Peninsula Borough (the "Borough")
seeking, inter alia, to enjoin the Borough from enforcing a foreclosure
660. Id. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 17(a), 60(b)(2), 60(b)(3).
661. McCall, 777 P.2d at 656. Rule 59(e) permits the court to order a new trial
within ten days after judgment sua sponte, on any grounds for which it might have
done so upon request of either party. Id. at 657 n.2. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 59(e).
662. McCall. 777 P.2d at 657 (emphasis added) (quoting Montgomery Ward v.
Thomas, 394 P.2d 774, 776 (Alaska 1964)). See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
663. McCall. 777 P.2d at 657-58 & n.5 (citing Montgomery Ward, 489 P.2d at
776).
664. Id. at 658 (quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978)).
See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
665. McCall, 777 P.2d at 658 (quoting Rozier, 573 F.2d at 1339).
666. Id.
667. 781 P.2d 6 (Alaska 1989).
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judgment previously granted to them and seeking to set aside the judg-
ment. The Borough never filed an answer.668 The trial court granted
a preliminary injunction and English Bay subsequently applied for an
entry of default. 669 After seventeen months, the court clerk sent the
parties notice that the case would be dismissed for want of prosecution
in thirty-three days absent a showing of good cause. 670 Thirty-six days
later, English Bay filed an application for default judgment. 671 The
Borough, believing that the case had been dismissed, moved to dis-
solve the preliminary injunction but did not preserve its defense of
lack of proper service.672 The trial court entered a default judgment
against the Borough, which the Borough failed to appeal within the
thirty-day appeal period.673 Finally, three weeks after the appeal pe-
riod expired, the Borough moved to set aside the default judgment
pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 6 7 4
The main issue before the court was whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default
judgment. 675 The Borough argued that the judgment was void be-
cause the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over the Bor-
ough.676  The court rejected this argument because personal
jurisdiction attached when the Borough voluntarily appeared seeking
to dissolve the preliminary injunction and failed to challenge the
court's jurisdiction.677
Justice Moore, in a lengthy dissent, argued that the default judg-
ment was invalid under the "plain usurpation of power standard,"
668. Id. at 7. The Borough claimed that it had never received a copy of the com-
plaint that had been filed with the court, although it had received an unfiled copy
without a court caption or a signature, which it assumed was a negotiating ploy. Id.
at 7-8.
669. Id. The Borough also denied being served with the entry of default. Id. at 8.
670. Id. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 41(e).
671. English Bay, 781 P.2d at 8. English Bay may have waited because it knew the
time limitation would not be strictly enforced. Id. at 13 (Moore, J., dissenting).
672. Id. at 8.
673. Id. (The thirty-day appeal period is provided by Alaska Rule of Appellate
Procedure 204(a)).
674. Id.
675. Id. at 7. The court held that the Borough's contentions as to the entry of the
default judgment and the actions taken before it was entered should have been taken
up earlier on appeal and, therefore, the court refused to consider the merits of the
superior court's underlying decision. Id.
676. Id. at 8. This contention was based on the Borough's claim that service was
defective. Id.
677. Id. at 8-9; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.010 (1983) ("The voluntary appearance
of the defendant is equivalent to personal service of a copy of the summons and com-
plaint upon the defendant."). The court noted that any issues regarding lack of ser-
vice or improper service were thus rendered irrelevant. English Bay, 781 P.2d at 9.
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claiming that the court had clearly acted beyond the scope of its pow-
ers.678 This issue had never been raised in the court below nor was it
briefed on appeal; and therefore the majority would not consider it
unless a miscarriage of justice would result. 679 Justice did not so re-
quire because the Borough provided no credible reason for failing to
act for two years. 6 0
There were two issues before the court in Evron v. G1. 681 The
first was whether a trial court's premature transfer of a case to the
inactive calendar, and the subsequent dismissal pursuant to Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1(g), 682 was plain error, thus allowing an
appellate court to consider issues not raised before the trial court.68 3
The second issue, which is substantively an insurance question, was
whether a passenger injured in an automobile accident may maintain a
direct action against the tortfeasor's insurance company. 684
The court first held that the 270-day period under Rule 16.1(g)
does not commence until the service of the summons and the com-
plaint. Because the court clerk transferred the case to the inactive cal-
endar prior to service, the trial court erred in dismissing the case. The
court found this error prejudicial to Evron because the dismissal oc-
curred more than two years after the automobile accident, thus raising
potential statute of limitation problems.6 85
With respect to the question of whether an injured party may
bring a claim against the tortfeasor's insurer, the court reaffirmed its
holding in Severson v. Estate of Severson that injured parties cannot
sue insurance companies directly.686 Evron had argued that under
New Mexico and Oklahoma law, a direct action may be maintained
when legislation forces the purchase of insurance.6 87 Because a
678. English Bay, 781 P.2d at 22 (Moore, J., dissenting). See ALASKA R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4).
679. English Bay, 781 P.2d at 9.
680. Id. The majority opinion discussed at length its reasons for rejecting the plain
usurpation of power standard. Id. at 9-11.
681. 777 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1989).
682. Alaska Rule Civil Procedure section 16.1(g) provides that if a motion to set
trial is not filed within 270 days after the service of the summons and complaint, the
case will be transferred to the inactive calendar and if the case remains on the inactive
calendar for more than 60 days, it will be dismissed.
683. Evron, 777 P.2d at 184-87.
684. Id. at 187-88.
685. Id. at 186-87. The statute of limitations for personal injury suits is two years.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
686. Evron, 777 P.2d at 187; Severson v. Estate of Severson, 627 P.2d 649, 651
(Alaska 1981).
687. Id. at 187 (citing Anchor Equities, Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Am., 105 N.M. 751,
737 P.2d 532 (1987); England v. New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 91 N.M. 406, 575
P.2d 96 (1978); Breeden v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 376 (1954); Tidmore v.
Fullman, 646 P.2d 1278 (Okla. 1982)).
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mandatory liability insurance law now exists in Alaska,68s he urged
that the issue be reconsidered. 6 9 The court found his argument un-
persuasive, stating, "[w]e see no reason to change our adherence to
[our] well-settled rule... merely because the legislature has changed
Alaska's automobile insurance law from a system which encourages
the acquisition of liability insurance to one which requires such
insurance." 690
XI. PROPERTY
In 1989, the court handed down fourteen property decisions.
These cases are grouped in the following six sections: eminent do-
main, title, liens, probate and estates, and miscellaneous.
A. Eminent Domain
The court reheard a 1988 case, 0.958 Acres, More or Less v.
State,691 and amended its opinion to preclude expert testimony on
overly speculative matters. The amendment provided that experts
may not testify as to the likely effects of speculative plans for subdivi-
sions when the planning authority has not yet considered the plans or
when the valuation experts cannot determine with any degree of cer-
tainty how the land would be subdivided. 692
B. Title
In Smith v. Krebs, 693 the court addressed the standard for grant-
ing a motion for summary judgment in a claim to quiet title based on
adverse possession. The court determined that a question of material
fact existed, specifically whether the hostility requirement was satis-
fied, 69 4 and ruled that the trial court had incorrectly granted summary
judgment, remanding the case for trial.
688. ALASKA STAT. § 28.22.011 (1989). This legislation was passed in 1984 and
did not exist at the time of the Severson decision. Evron, 777 P.2d at 187.
689. Evron, 777 P.2d at 187.
690. Id.
691. 762 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1988), amended, 769 P.2d.990 (Alaska 1989).
692. 0.958 Acres, More or Less v. State, 769 P.2d 990, 990 (Alaska 1989).
693. 768 P.2d 124 (Alaska 1989).
694. Id. at 126. "'In order to acquire title to land by adverse possession, the pos-
sessor must show that his use of the land was continuous, open and notorious, exclu-
sive and hostile to the true owner.'" Id. at 125 n.3 (quoting Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684
P.2d 842, 848 (Alaska 1984)). The court declared that the test for determining
whether the hostility requirement has been satisfied is "whether or not claimant acted
toward the land as if he owned it." Id. at 126 (citing Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl
Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 832 (Alaska 1974)). The court added that this condition
would not be met if the claimant had "the record owner's permission to use the prop-
erty." Id. (citing Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1980)).
1990]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW[
In Dressel v. Weeks, 695 the court illustrated the differences be-
tween the doctrines of quasi estoppel and equitable estoppel, holding
that "the doctrine of quasi estoppel may be applied to divest legal title
to real property from the title holder of record where the title holder
knowingly benefitted from a transaction involving the property which
runs counter to the interest sought to be asserted. '696
Dressel, the title holder of real property, had orally agreed to
transfer title to Kuhns, the decedent who had originally owned the
property, in exchange for Kuhns' promise to bequeath him a different
piece of property. Title was never officially transferred to Kuhns,
however, although Dressel believed that he no longer had an interest
in the property. In Dressel's presence, Kuhns sold the property to a
third party, 'Weeks, whose title search failed to detect Kuhns' original
transfer to Dressel and therefore erroneously showed that Kuhns still
owned the property. When Kuhns died, she left the bargained-for par-
cel to Dressel. Weeks sued Dressel to quiet title to the property and
Dressel counterclaimed by asserting his legal title.697
Weeks atttempted to invoke the doctrine of quasi estoppel to
divest Dressel of his record title to the first property. 698 After finding
that none of the requirements for equitable estoppel were present, 699
the court analyzed the case under the doctrine of quasi estoppel. The
doctrine of quasi estoppel provides that a party may not take "a posi-
tion inconsistent with one he has previously taken where circum-
stances render assertion of the second position unconscionable. '70 0
695. 779 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1989).
696. Id. at 333.
697. Id. at 326-27.
698. Id. at 329. Weeks believed that equitable estoppel was inapplicable because of
Dressel's record title. Id.
699. Id. at 331. To preclude the title holder of real property from asserting that
title, equitable estoppel requires:
first, that the party making the admission by his declaration or conduct, was
apprised of the true state of his own title; second, that he made the admis-
sion with the express intention to deceive, or with such careless and culpable
negligence as to amount to constructive fraud; third, that the other party
was not only destitute of all knowledge of the true state of the title, but of the
means of acquiring such knowledge; and fourth, that he relied directly upon
such admission, and will be injured by allowing its truth to be disproved.
Id. at 329 (citing Biddle Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 367-68 (1859), as
quoted in City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 490, 476 P.2d 423, 443, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23, 43 (1970)).
The court found that: (1) the title holder did not know of his rights in the first prop-
erty, (2) he did not intentionally deceive the third party, (3) the third party had con-
structive notice of title holder's legal title since his title was properly recorded, even if
third party's search failed to discover it and (4) the third party did not rely on title
holder's silence. Id.




Ordinarily, the statute of frauds would void the oral agreement
between Dressel and Kuhns to switch properties, because Dressel
never transferred title to Kuhns.70' However, because Kuhns had ac-
tually kept her part of the bargain by bequeathing the second property
to Dressel, who accepted the bequest, the court found that Dressel
received the benefits of a bargain while rejecting the burden, to the
detriment of the party from whom he had derived the benefit,
Kuhns. 702 Holding that "[o]ne who knowingly accepts the sale pro-
ceeds or other benefits from a transaction involving property to which
he or she holds legal title is no longer deserving of the protection the
recording act was intended to provide, ' 70 3 the court applied the doc-
trine of quasi estoppel to divest Dressel of legal title to the first
property.70
In Dressel, the court also addressed the burden of proof necessary
to establish an award for damages in a conversion action when the
actual extent of the conversion is impossible to determine.70 5 The
court adopted the holding of Newman v. Basin Motor Co.,706 which
provided that when there is "some uncertainty regarding the amount
of damages sustained, it is enough if the evidence presented is suffi-
cient to enable the court to make a fair and reasonable
approximation." 707
In Welcome v. Jennings,70 8 the court held that an individual need
not meet the annual labor requirements of section 38.05.210 of the
Alaska Statutes in order to bring an action to quiet title of a mining
claim located on state-selected federal land.70 9 Although the plaintiff
did not perform annual assessment work on the land, his compliance
with the statutory requirements under section 38.05.195 of the Alaska
Statutes constituted constructive possession of the claims sufficient to
permit him to maintain his claim to quiet title.710 The court based its
holding on title 11 of the Alaska Administrative Code section
701. Id. at 331.
702. Id. at 332. The court commented that the oral agreement would have been
unenforceable during the period between making the agreement and receiving the ben-
efits of the bargain, that is, accepting Kuhns' bequest of the second property. Id.
703. Id. at 332-33, 333 n.12.
704. Id. at 333.
705. Id. at 326.
706. 98 N.M. 39, 644 P.2d 553 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
707. Id. at 45, 644 P.2d at 559 (quoted in Dressel, 779 P.2d at 328).
708. 780 P.2d 1039 (Alaska 1989).
709. Welcome, 780 P.2d at 1042-43. See ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.210 (1989).
710. Welcome, 780 P.2d at 1043. The applicable statute provides in relevant part:
"Rights to deposits of minerals... on state land that is open to claim staking may be




86.115(c), which suspends the annual labor requirements pending fed-
eral approval of the state land selection.71' The court also noted that
the award of attorney's fees to plaintiff was reasonable in light of the
pre-trial warning to defendant that his case was weak and that he
might have to pay a large award of attorney's fees if his position was
found to be frivolous.712
C. Liens
In Nystrom v. "Buckhorn Homes, Inc., 713 the court held that a cor-
porate contractor is not an "individual" for the purposes of section
34.35.060 of the Alaska Statutes relating to the priority of mechanics'
liens.714 The court was required to determine whether a lender's lien,
which would have had priority based on Alaska's first-in-time priority
rule,715 should be subrogated to a contractor's lien, which would have
preferential status under the exception as a mechanics' lien.71 6 Under
section 34.35.060(c) of the Alaska Statutes, "'a lien.., in favor of an
individual actually performing labor upon a building or other im-
provement in its original construction... is preferred to a prior en-
cumbrance upon the land.' "717 The court interpreted the term
"individual" to mean "a natural person who is not acting as a contrac-
tor and who is employed by the owner of real property or employed by
the contractor. '718
711. Welcome, 780 P.2d at 1042 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 86.115(c)
(1988) (provides in part that the provisions of section 38.05.210-.240 of the Alaska
Statutes "do not apply to locations made on state-selected land until the state receives
tentative approval of the selection from the federal government")).
712. Id. at 1043.
713. 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989).
714. Id. at 1120.
715. The applicable statute provides in relevant part: "[Ain encumbrance which is
properly recorded shall be preferred to a lien.., unless the claim of lien ... or notice
of right of lien . . . has been recorded before the encumbrance." ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.35.060(a) (1985).
716. The supreme court's holding on questions of law in this case were issued as
guidance for the trial court when that court addressed this case on remand. Nystrom,
778 P.2d at 1119. The supreme court remanded the issue of whether the contractor's
lien had been filed in time. A question of fact existed as to when the construction was
actually completed. Since the ninety-day filing period begins upon completion of con-
struction pursuant to section 34.35.068(a) of the Alaska Statutes, it was impossible for
the court to determine when the period expired and thus whether the mechanics' lien
was filed in time. If it was not, the mechanics' lien would be invalid, requiring the
court to uphold the priority of the lender's lien as a matter of law. Nystrom, 778 P.2d
at 1119.
717. Id. at 1120 (emphasis in original) (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.060(c)
(1985)).
718. Id. at 1124.
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In the same case, the court addressed another issue of first im-
pression, holding that "a foreclosure sale, without notice to unre-
corded lien claimants," does not extinguish a then unrecorded
mechanic's lien that was subsequently perfected. 719 The court found
that the trustee had a duty to check the record and physically inspect
the property before a foreclosure sale, in order to protect "all inter-
ested parties, including those without recorded interests," by insuring
that they have notice of the foreclosure sale.720 The court therefore
ruled that the contractor's lien survived the foreclosure sale because
the contractor did not have notice of the sale. The court also noted
that the lender could extinguish the contractor's lien by conducting a
second foreclosure sale if proper notice was given to the contractor.72'
Finally, the court also held that the trial court erred in holding
that the lender was personally liable to the contractor for the sum
owed by the owner under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 722 The
court applied the reasoning of Frontier Rock & Sand v. Heritage Ven-
tures,723 in holding that without proof that the lender ordered or au-
thorized the work, he may not be held responsible to the contractor
for the work done for the owner, even though he knew of the work and
ultimately benefitted from it.724
Unpaid construction contractors may seek either of two remedies
under Alaska's mechanics' lien statute: (1) the stop-payment rem-
edy725 and (2) the mechanics' lien.726 In 1987, the court stated in Don-
nybrook Building Supply Co. v. Alaska National Bank 727 that this
"statutory mechanics' lien scheme.., constitutes a complete remedy
that preempts common law and equitable remedies. ' 728 The court
adopted a much narrower interpretation of this statutory scheme in
1989, however, holding in Great Western Savings Bank v. George W.
Easley Co. 729 that the statute does not preempt actions by construction
719. Id. at 1124-25.
720. Id. at 1125. The court reasoned that a trustee, by physically inspecting the
property, can determine whether another party is in possession of the property. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id. at 1126.
723. 607 P.2d 364, 368 (Alaska 1980) (discussing landlord's lack of obligation to a
contractor for work done for tenant).
724. Nystrom, 778 P.2d at 1126.
725. ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.062 (1985).
726. ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.050 (1985); Great Western Say. Bank v. George W.
Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 575 (Alaska 1989). For the complete text of the mechanics'
lien statute, see ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.35.050-.120 (1985).
727. 736 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1987).
728. Id. at 1148-49.
729. 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989).
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contractors against construction lenders for breach of contract or tor-
tious conduct. 730 The court reasoned that this holding was compelled
by the fact that the mechanics' lien statute did not specifically address
those particular situations.731
D. Probate and Estates
Section 13.16.505 of the Alaska Statutes generally provides that
no levy shall be made against a decedent's estate in respect of any
judgment prior to probate. 732 Section 09.35.060 of the Alaska Stat-
utes, however, provides that a judgment may be levied as if the dece-
dent were still living.733 In Lundgren v. Gaudiane,734 the court held
that the superior court erred in enforcing a judgment against a dece-
dent's funds, which were held in a federal court registry, before dece-
dent's estate could be probated. The court ruled that to the extent that
there is a conflict between the two statutory provisions, the more re-
cent shall be treated as repealing the older.735 The court also found
that while the decedent's deposit of the funds in federal court deprived
Gaudiane of the use of the money for a period of time, the decedent
did not act unreasonably in doing so; and the superior court therefore
acted unjustly in ordering the decedent's estate to pay interest on the
funds while they were deposited with the federal court.736
730. Id. at 577.
731. Id. (citing Gutierrez, California Civil Code Section 3264 and the Ghost of the
Equitable Lien, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 493, 516-17 (1979) ("[S]tatutes precluding actions
against a construction lender must be limited to those situations specifically addressed
by the particular statute.")).
732. The statute provides in part:
No execution may issue upon nor may any levy be made against any prop-
erty of the estate under any judgment against a decedent or a personal repre-
sentative, but this section shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement
of mortgages, pledges or liens upon real or personal property in an appropri-
ate proceeding.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.505 (1985).
733. Section 09.35.060 provides in part:
If the judgment debtor dies after judgment, execution may be issued on the
judgment in the manner and with the effect as if the debtor were still living,
except that no action may be taken within six months from the granting of
letters testamentary or of administration upon the estate of the deceased
without leave of the court having jurisdiction over the probate of the estate.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.060 (1983).
734. 782 P.2d 285 (Alaska 1989).
735. Id. at 288 (Since section 13.16.505 of the Alaska Statutes was originally en-
acted in 1972 and section 09.35.060 was originally enacted in 1962, section 13.16.505
is determinative when the two conflict "[b]ecause the latest declaration of the legisla-
ture prevails." (citing 1A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 22.22 (3d ed. rev. 1973))).
736. Id. at 289.
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Estate of Rhyner v. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane737 interpreted
the jurisdictional aspects of the Ship Mortgage Act,738 finding that
while federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over in rem proceedings
to foreclose on a ship mortgage, state courts can retain concurrent
jurisdiction over in personam claims for any deficiency. 739 The court
also held that a creditor is not entitled to summary judgment on a
deficiency claim where a genuine issue of material fact still exists.74°
The claims arose out of the creditor bank's foreclosure on the
debtor's preferred ship mortgage. The bank, whose claim was unsatis-
fied after a forced public sale of one of two mortgaged vessels, obtained
a final default judgment in rem against the other ship in federal court
on an admiralty claim. The state court, hearing the separate claim
against the estate for the unpaid loan balance plus interest, entered
summary judgment against the debtor's estate, granting the bank the
difference between the outstanding balance and the proceeds from the
sale of the second vessel.741
The estate claimed that the decedent was a member of a partner-
ship and it could therefore neither sell the ship nor protect itself from
claims of the decedent's former partners. In response, the court stated
that the estate had sufficient statutory protection to guard against the
claims of the surviving partners by either demanding an accounting or
paying the claim and becoming subrogated to the rights of the bank
and foreclosing and selling that part of the security that the bank did
not exhaust. 742
The estate's claim that the bank had waived its right to recover a
deficiency by failing to tender its security to the estate was also with-
out merit. The estate had never tendered title nor properly tendered
payment to the bank.743 The court further held that a creditor is not
obliged to foreclose on all of its collateral before seeking a deficiency
judgment, since his interest in the remaining security would revert to
the debtor upon satisfaction of the judgment.74
737. 780 P.2d 1001 (Alaska 1989).
738. 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1982 & Supp. V) (repealed 1988).
739. Estate of Rhyner, 780 P.2d at 1004.
740. Id. at 1004-05. The court determined that a question existed as to whether
the bank received fair value in the forced sale of the petitioner's mortgaged property
since the estate offered "a preliminary showing of a probable significant disparity be-
tween the sales price [of the security] and its fair value." Id. at 1005. Citing Zeman v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1985), the court noted that
"[a]ll reasonable inferences of fact are drawn against the moving party and in favor of
the non-moving party." Estate of Rhyner, 780 P.2d at 1004-05 n.5.
741. Id. at 1003.
742. Id. at 1005-06; see ALASKA STAT. §§ 32.05.200(a), 32.05.200(b)(4),
32.05.260(4), 32.05.380 (1986).
743. Estate of Rhyner, 780 P.2d at 1006.
744. Id. at 1007.
1990]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Finally, the court determined that the estate was not entitled to
an adjustment for the value of the equipment and licenses aboard the
ship because a preferred ship mortgage attaches to the vessel and to all
of the equipment and appurtenances on board. Absent any credible
evidence as to the value of the equipment, the lower court was not
required to adjust the deficiency amount.745
E. Miscellaneous
In Doyle v. Peabody, 746 the court considered whether a landowner
who supplies water to his neighbor may terminate the arrangement
without paying damages. Doyle and Peabody had entered into an
agreement whereby Doyle had permission to tap Peabody's well in ex-
change for monetary compensation. 747 Peabody subsequently in-
formed Doyle that the access to the well would be terminated so that
Peabody could obtain a permit for an improvement to his septic sys-
tem.748 When Peabody refused to partially compensate Doyle for the
cost of a new well, Doyle filed a complaint for damages and injunctive
relief under provisions of Alaska's environmental conservation stat-
utes, 749 the Alaska Water Use Act 750 and common law in an action
based on an irrevocable license.75'
The court held that Doyle could not recover for the cost of the
well under any of these theories. First, neither Alaska's environmental
conservation statutes nor the Alaska Water Use Act creates a private
cause of action.752 Second, licenses for the use of land are revocable,
both at law and in equity, and compensation can be recovered only for
expenditures made in reliance on the license. 75 3 The well was con-
structed not in reliance on the license, but because the license had been
revoked. 754
In J.P. Enterprises v. Ursin Seafoods, Inc.,755 the court, in an issue
of first impression, addressed the distinction between a bailment and a
lease of space, ruling that a bailment exists where" 'the person leaving
the property made such a delivery of the property as to amount to a
745. Id. at 1005.
746. 781 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1989).
747. Id. at 958. The agreement had no specific duration and appeared to be on a
yearly basis. Id.
748. Id.
749. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.790 (1987).
750. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.010-.270 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
751. Doyle, 781 P.2d at 958-59.
752. Id. at 959-60.
753. Id. at 961.
754. Id. The court remanded to the superior court to determine if Doyle's expend-
itures for a new pump and pressure tank for the well were compensable. Id. at 961-62.
755. 777 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1989).
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relinquishment of exclusive possession, control, and dominion over the
property.' "756 Because the owner of fishing gear stored in plaintiff's
yard was required to notify plaintiff in writing before he removed any
gear after it was sold, the court held that a bailment relationship ex-
isted rather than one of lessor and lessee. 757
Dunlap v. Bavarian Village Condominium Association 758
presented a challenge to rules restricting condominium owners from
parking "junk" cars in their carports. For the purpose of improving
aesthetics and marketability, the Bavarian Village Condominium As-
sociation ("Association") adopted a rule that prohibited the parking of
stored vehicles by owners in their carports. 759 By contract, these car-
ports were reserved for the owner's exclusive use, but were subject to
regulation by the Association. 760 Dunlap argued that his 1968 Mus-
tang was a classic and not a junk car, and claimed that the regulation
was not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose.761 The court up-
held the rule, noting that although the rule eliminates only those cars
which are unlicensed and uninsured, it was sufficiently tailored to the
legitimate objectives of appearance and marketability to withstand
equal protection scrutiny.762
In foreclosure proceedings, it is generally within the court's equi-
table powers to govern the process as it sees fit. Hayes v. Alaska USA
Federal Credit Union763 addressed for the first time the issue of
whether a court has the authority to set an "upset price," or minimum
bid, at a judicial foreclosure sale. Holding that section 09.35.180(a) of
the Alaska Statutes does not limit the court's traditional equitable
powers to govern the foreclosure process, 76 the court ruled that a
lower court has the discretion to declare an upset price. The court,
however, cautioned that "[i]t may be preferable for the court to allow
bidding to proceed and then, in ruling on a motion to confirm the sale,
756. Id. at 1166 (quoting 8 C.J.S. Bailments, § 8, at 232 (1988) (footnotes
omitted)).
757. Id.
758. 780 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1989).
759. Id. at 1013-14. The Association's rule defined "stored vehicle" as one which
is not licensed, not insured and not driven at least once every sixty days. Id.
760. Id. at 1031 & n.1.
761. Id. at 1016.
762. Id. at 1017 (The holding did not rely on a classification of Dunlap's Mustang
as either a classic or junk car.).
763. 767 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1989).
764. Id. at 1160. The statute provides in part:
[w]here real property executed upon has been sold, the judgment creditor
may, upon motion, apply for an order confirming the sale. The judgment
debtor may object to the confirmation of the sale on the grounds that there
were substantial irregularities in the proceedings of sale which caused prob-
able loss or injury to the judgment creditor.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.180(a) (1983).
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determine whether confirmation should be granted or a resale or-
dered. '765 Because the parties in Hayes agreed to the setting of a pre-
sale upset price, it was not error for the trial court to establish one.766
Affirming the upset price, the court also established the "gross inade-
quacy" standard for confirming the adequacy of the upset price.
Under this standard a court would refuse to withhold confirmation of
a judicial sale only if the inadequacy "shocked the conscience" of the
court.767 Finally, the court ruled that the failure of the trial court to
appoint a master to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the upset
price did not deprive the complainant of due process rights.768
When a lessee remains in possession of property after the lessor
has lost his title through a foreclosure sale, the lessee's status becomes
that of tenant by sufferance. 769 Absent any agreement between the
foreclosure purchaser and the lessee, the rent liability of a tenant by
sufferance, therefore, is no longer the stated contract rent, but rather
the fair rental value of the premises.770 In Interior Energy Corp. v.
Alaska Statebank,771 however, the court found an implied agreement
between the foreclosure purchaser and the lessee to the effect that the
correct rental amount owed to purchaser was based on the contract
rent.
772
On a separate issue raised in another appeal that was consolidated
for this case, the court reiterated the analysis of ownership under trade
fixture law that a tenant is entitled to the trade fixture if the tenant can
show that he or she "installed it, did not intend to donate it to the
landlord, and could now remove it and restore the premises to their
former condition. '773 The lessee was barred by equitable estoppel,
however, from contesting the ownership of most fixtures on the prem-
ises because he knew of the lessor's material representations of owner-
ship of the fixtures to the bank.77 4
765. Id. at 1161.
766. Id.
767. Id.
768. Id. at 1163.
769. Interior Energy Corp. v. Alaska Statebank, 771 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Alaska
1989).
770. Id. (citing Legler v. Legler, 149 Ind. App. 447, 273 N.E.2d 303 (Ct. App.
1971)).
771. 771 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1989).
772. Id. at 1358. The court found an agreement based on a letter sent from the
purchaser to the lessee stating the amount of rent owed to purchaser, a figure clearly
based on the contract rent. The court found that lessee had implied its acceptance by
not protesting the rental amount. Also, the court stated that the record showed that
lessee had argued, albeit on another issue, that the terms of the lease were still valid.
Id.
773. Id. at 1356.
774. Id. at 1354-55.
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The court addressed the issue of discrimination in renting based
on marital status in Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commis-
sion, 775 ruling that a landlord may not discriminate by refusing to rent
to unmarried couples when the landlord does rent to single persons,
married persons and married persons with children. 776 Interpreting
both the state statute's and the municipal code's ban of discrimination
on the basis of marital status to "protect the rights of unmarried
couples," the court ruled that the exception in section 18.80.240(2) of
the Alaska Statutes allowing "singles" or "married couples" only does
not apply when a landlord rents to more than one class of persons. 777
With respect to the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission's
("AERC") delay in releasing its findings, the court found that the
landlord had not been prejudiced by the AERC's failure to meet its
deadline, and thus, the AERC did not lose its jurisdiction over the
matter.778
XII. TAx LAW
The court decided five tax cases in 1989. They ranged in subject
matter from the applicability of a state tax on an interest in federally
leased land to whether a taxpayer had exhausted all administrative
remedies available before bringing suit. In addition, one of the court's
most significant constitutional holdings came in the area of tax law. In
Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Division of Insurance, 779 the
court invalidated a state statute that imposed higher premium taxes on
foreign insurance companies than on domestic ones, finding that it vio-
lated the equal protection clauses of both the Alaska and federal Con-
stitutions.780 In addition, the court overruled a portion of State v.
Wakefield Fisheries, Inc.,781 holding that a formal protest is required
at the time of payment in order to preserve the right to bring a com-
mon law action in assumpsit for refund of an illegal tax.782
In Principal Mutual, the plaintiff, an Iowa insurance company,
sought a refund for taxes paid from 1980 to 1985 for which it was
assessed the tax rate for foreign insurers, a rate double that charged to
775. 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989).
776. Id. at 1203.
777. Id. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1986); ANCHORAGE MUN. CODE
§ 05.20.020.
778. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1204.
779. 780 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1989).
780. Id. at 1025-28. The court invalidated former ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.210(b)
(1984) (amended 1986). Id.
781. 495 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1972) (finding no requirement that a taxpayer formally
protest an illegal tax at the time of payment in order to receive a refund).
782. Principal Mutual Life In., 780 P.2d at 1030-3 1.
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domestic insurers. 783 The plaintiff relied on Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Ward,784 a 1985 United States Supreme Court case that
invalidated Alabama's differential premium tax law on the grounds
that it violated the equal protection provision of the federal
Constitution.7s5
The court held that section 21.09.210(b) of the Alaska Statutes
was unconstitutional under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions
because it discriminated between domestic and foreign insurers with-
out a legitimate state purpose.78 6 Even if the three purposes advocated
by the state were considered legitimate, the court found no rational
relation connecting these purposes to the differential tax rates found in
the statute.787 The court used the federal "rational relation" test in
reaching its conclusion, noting that a statute that could not pass mus-
ter under this test would afortiori fail under Alaska's more demanding
equal protection analysis.78 8
The court remanded the case for the superior court to determine
whether the state waived its right to require a protest at the time of
payment in order to sustain a tax refund claim,789 noting that the ap-
plicable statute liberalized the common law rule that no recovery
783. Id. at 1024.
784. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
785. Id. at 883.
786. Principal Mutual Life Ins., 780 P.2d at 1025. The court held that subsections
(b)(1) and (b)(3) were both unconstitutional because they provide different tax rates
for foreign and domestic insurers but that subsection (b)(2) was not unconstitutional
provided it may be "interpreted to include domestic, as well as foreign, hospital and
medical service companies." Id. at 1025 n.7. The Alaska Legislature amended section
21.09.210(b) of the Alaska Statutes in 1986 to equalize the tax rate applied to both
domestic and foreign insurers. Id. at 1024.
787. Id. at 1026. The state advanced arguments to the effect that the tax
differential
(1) enables domestic insurers, burdened by Alaska's higher cost of doing
business, to maintain competitive equality with foreign insurers[;] (2) en-
sures a more stable insurance market in Alaska because domestic insurers
cannot leave the state if they perceive the risks to be too high[; and] (3)
increases the availability of insurance in Alaska because domestic insurers
are more familiar with the state and will write coverage for risks which for-
eign companies will not insure.
Id.
788. Id. at 1028 n.15. The court did not determine what level of scrutiny is re-
quired under the Alaska equal protection analysis, but did comment that the Alaska
test is even more demanding than the federal rational basis test. Id. at 1025-26 & n.9
(citing Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976), criticized on other grounds,
Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Alaska
1980)).
789. Id. at 1030. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.15.010 (1983).
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could be made at law for illegal taxes paid voluntarily "without
compulsion." 790
In response to the majority's overruling of Wakefield, Justice
Compton filed a dissent criticizing the court's remanding of the case to
resolve an issue that was raised neither in the parties' briefs nor in
their arguments. The dissent suggested that the majority reached this
result by interpreting both a statute, section 43.15.010(a) of the Alaska
Statutes, and a case that neither party had cited.791
In National Bank of Alaska v. Department of Revenue,792 the
court held that income earned by a bank from certain federal obliga-
tions, such as Treasury Bills, Treasury Notes and Federal Farm Credit
Bank Bonds, falls within the exception to the federal law exempting
such income from state taxation.793
The Alaska Business License ("ABL") Act imposes a license fee,
which effectively amounts to a tax, on each person doing business in
the state.794 Under the pertinent Alaska statute, which has since been
repealed, the license fee for each national bank was seven percent of its
net income, including interest from federal obligations. 795 The federal
statute, however, exempted all income derived from federal obligations"
from inclusion in net income for purposes of state taxation "except
nondiscriminatory franchise or other nonproperty taxes in lieu thereof
imposed on corporations. '796 The court decided that the ABL's li-
cense fee is correctly classified as a " 'nonproperty' tax in lieu of a
franchise tax allowable under 31 U.S.C. § 742,''797 following the rea-
soning of New Jersey,798 Florida799 and Montana. 8° The court fur-
ther found the tax in question to be nondiscriminatory because its
790. Principal Mutual Life Ins., 720 P.2d at 1030.
791. Id. at 1031 (Compton, J., dissenting).
792. 769 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1989).
793. Id. at 991.
794. ALASKA STAT. § 43.70.020-.120 (1983).
795. National Bank of Alaska, 769 P.2d at 993 (citing ALASKA STAT.
§ 43.70.030(b) (repealed 1984)).
796. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976) (recodified at 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a) (1982)). A common
example of a nonproperty tax is a tax on the privilege of operating a business within
the state. See infra note 799.
797. National Bank of Alaska, 769 P.2d at 995-96. The court recognized that, in
categorizing a tax, it must base its determination on the operation of the tax, and not
the terms used to name it. Id. at 994 n.18 (citing Educational Films Corp. v. Ward,
282 U.S. 379 (1931)).
798. Id. at 994 (citing Garfield Trust Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 102
N.J. 420, 428, 508 A.2d 1104, 1109 appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 925 (1986)
("[I]nclusion of the face value and interest income of federal obligations in the bases
for calculating the ... [tax] does not by its own force violate [31 U.S.C. § 742]."
(emphasis in original))).
799. Id. at 995 (citing Department of Revenue v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Flor-
ida, 513 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1987), appeal dismissed, 485 U.S. 949 (1988)). The Supreme
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application did not discriminate between income generated from fed-
eral obligations and income derived from state obligations. 80'
Finally, the court held that the income from certain federal obli-
gations was not independently exempt from taxation by virtue of other
federal statutes limiting its taxability.8 02 The court adopted Mary-
land's reasoning that the state had taxed neither the instruments nor
the interest thereon, but rather "the privilege of doing business as a
financial institution in corporate form in [the] state," using the income
generated from federal obligations merely as a measuring stick to de-
termine the appropriate amount of the franchise tax.80 3
In North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. Fairbanks North Star Bor-
ough Board of Equalization,80 4 the court discussed whether the Bor-
ough could tax the developer's interest in land leased from the federal
government, and if so, which valuation methods were appropriate. 805
Relying on its decision in Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star
Borough Board of Equalization, 806 the court stated that the taxing au-
thority may examine the underlying "substance of a transaction to de-
termine whether there exists a taxable interest. ' 80 7 Since the
developer's lease granted him an interest in the federal land permitting
him to build and rent housing units for valuable consideration, the
developer's interest may be taxed as real property. 808
The court also determined that the choice of the valuation
method was within the Borough's discretion provided that the method
Court of Florida found that the tax in question was a "nonproperty excise tax on the
privilege of operating a bank... within the state" and was therefore a franchise tax
for the purposes of the exception in 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a)(1). First Natl Bank, 513 So.
2d at 118.
800. National Bank of Alaska, 769 P.2d at 995 (citing Schwinder v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 213 Mont. 382, 393-94, 691 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1984), clarified, 224
Mont. 500, 73(0 P.2d 422 (Mont. 1986) ("Congress, in 31 U.S.C. § 3124 provided a
distinction between nondiscriminatory franchise taxes measured by tax exempt obliga-
tions on the one hand, and property taxes otherwise levied directly or indirectly by
states on such federal items on the other." (emphasis in original))).
801. National Bank ofAlaska, 769 P.2d at 996 (citing National Bank of Alaska v.
Department of Revenue, 642 P.2d 811, 818 (Alaska 1982)).
802. Id. at 996-97. The bank argued that "its Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB)
obligations are exempt under 12 U.S.C. § 1433, and that its Federal Farm Credit Bank
(FFCB) obligations are exempt under 12 U.S.C. § 2079." Id.
803. Id. at 997 (citing Department of Assessments and Taxation v. Maryland Nat'l
Bank, 310 Md. 664, 531 A.2d 294 (1987), appeal dismissed, 486 U.S. 1048 (1988)).
804. 778 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1989).
805. Id. at 1140.
806. 760 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1988).




chosen generates a value that represents a "full and true value"80 9 of
the property and that it has been selected in the absence of fraudulent
behavior on the part of the tax authority.810 The court upheld the
Board's choice of the reversionary method s l over the rent savings
method8 12 as its choice was neither fundamentally wrong nor
fraudulent.813
Finally, the court noted that although the government did not
own a reversionary interest in the developer's buildings, there was a
possibility that at the end of the lease term, the developer might be
unable to sell the structures and leave them for the government's bene-
fit. In this situation, the developer's buildings would be worthless at
the end of the outlease, a fact which should be reflected in the Board's
valuation and tax assessment.814
Two additional tax cases decided by the court this past year ad-
dress the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, which re-
quires a potential litigant to exhaust all available administrative
remedies before pursuing his claim against an administrative body in a
judicial forum. Standard Alaska Production Co. v. Department of Rev-
enue815 provided that a taxpayer who disputed an assessment increase
could not bring an action to invalidate the increase in the superior
court, even if disguised in the form of a declaratory judgment, until he
had exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to him.8 16
Specifically, the court ruled that cases of mixed questions of facts and
law, such as this one, are especially appropriate for administrative res-
olution prior to judicial review. 1 7 The court declined to apply either
the "futility" exception to the administrative exhaustion doctrine,818
809. This is defined as "the estimated price that the property would bring in the
open market and under the then prevailing maiket conditions in a sale between" the
parties. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.110(a) (1986)).
810. Id. at 1144 (citing Twentieth Century Inv. Co. v. City of Juneau, 359 P.2d
783, 788 (Alaska 1961)).
811. "The reversionary method values property based upon its fee simple value,
discounted by a factor representing the fact that the property will revert to the owner
in the future." Id. at 1143.
812. "The rent savings method arrives at a value based upon the market rental
value of the leasehold minus the amount of rent actually paid by the lessee." Id.
813. Id. at 1145.
814. Id. at 1146. The court remanded this case to reconsider its valuation in light
of this finding. Id.
815. 773 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1989).
816. Id. at 203-04.
817. Id. at 207-08.
818. Id. at 209. Under the "futility" exception, a claimant need not pursue all
administrative remedies if a formal hearing on the matter would be "futile" or would
certainly result in an adverse decision. Id.
1990]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
or the "irreparable harm" exception, 81 9 holding that the plaintiff was
required to exhaust all of his administrative remedies and was not enti-
tled to declaratory relief.820
In the second case addressing the exhaustion of remedies doc-
trine, Bethel Utilities Corp. v. City of Bethel, 821 the court similarly held
that the appellant, a privately owned utility, could not sue the city for
a tax refund in the superior court as an original action because the
ordinances involved prescribed an administrative procedure for re-
lief.8 22 Following the reasoning of FedPac International Inc. v. De-
partment of Revenue, 823 the court held that when a specific procedural
remedy exists and a common law remedy does not, the court should
interpret the intent of the ordinance or statute to preclude original
civil actions. Because no original right of action existed in the supe-
rior court, that court was correct in summarily finding for the city on
this issue.824
The court acknowledged that the taxpayer was not foreclosed
from obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision, however,
noting that such review can be obtained only after an administrative
decision has been issued and the plaintiff has followed the appropriate
appeals procedure.8 25 The court further held that where the plaintiff
has properly appealed an administrative decision, that is, where he has
pursued the specific procedural remedy and received an adverse ad-
ministrative decision, he may appeal directly to the superior court.
Here, the city conceded that, with respect to the plaintiff's claims after
April 1986, the time at which he had exhausted his administrative
remedies, the trial court should consider this case a permissible appeal
of that decision. 826
819. Plaintiff proposed that its business would suffer "irreparable harm" because
the further delay caused by the administrative process would make the company's
financial status uncertain (due to the unknown status of the tax assessment), which
would adversely affect plaintiff's relations with its current and potential creditors. Id.
at 209-10. The court rejected this line of reasoning, as it could arguably apply in all
tax cases, destroying the efficacy of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doc-
trine. Id. at 210.
820. Id.
821. 780 P.2d 1018 (Alaska 1989).
822. Id. at 1021.
823. 646 P.2d 240, 241 (Alaska 1982).
824. Bethel Utilities, 780 P.2d at 1021.





The court handed down three tort cases in 1989. The first case
concerned the ripeness of a professional malpractice claim. The sec-
ond discussed statutory liability for alcohol vendors. The third case
established the six elements of the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage.
The question of when a professional malpractice claim is ripe for
adjudication divided the court, three to two, in Thomas v. Cleary.8 27
In this case, plaintiffs sued their accountants for damages resulting
from faulty tax advice regarding the sale of their business and the sub-
sequent tax liability assessed against them. The majority held that
plaintiffs may not establish a cause of action in tort until "actual loss
or damage resulting from the professional's negligence" has oc-
curred.8 28 Until a tax deficiency has been assessed against the plain-
tiffs, 8 29 the plaintiffs' claim against their accountant cannot be said to
be ripe for adjudication. The court remanded this case with instruc-
tions to vacate the judgment without prejudice.8 30
The dissent, authored by Chief Justice Matthews and joined by
Justice Rabinowitz, disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
plaintiffs had not yet suffered any damage because they had not yet
received a notice of tax deficiency from the IRS. According to the
dissent, the incurrence of a tax liability, rather than the actual assess-
ment by the IRS, is sufficient to constitute damage. The dissent also
cited evidence in the record that the defendant had advised plaintiffs to
make a sale of assets, and that plaintiffs had been harmed by accepting
this advice.8 31
The court addressed the standards of liability for selling alcohol
to an intoxicated individual in Williford v. L.J. Carr Investments,
Inc., s32 holding that in a wrongful death action, a vendor may be held
827. 768 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1989).
828. Id. at 1092 (citing Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173 n.4 (Alaska
1983)). The other three elements of a professional negligence cause of action are: "(1)
a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, [and] (3) a proximate causal connection between the
negligent conduct and the resulting injury." Id.
829. The IRS had not assessed any tax deficiency against plaintiffs because no cor-
porate tax return was filed in 1977, the year of plaintiffs' business liquidation. Id. at
1093. As a result, the court noted that the IRS could now try to collect taxes from
plaintiffs for that year, as well as additional penalties and interest. Id. at 1093 n.7.
The court was not asked to decide the issue of whose responsibility it was to file this
return. Id. at 1091 n.4.
830. Id. at 1094.
831. Id. at 1094-96 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting). The record showed that plaintiffs
incurred an additional $207,459 in tax liability because they structured the sale of
their business as a sale of assets, upon defendant's recommendation, rather than as a
stock sale. Id.
832. 783 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1989).
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liable for providing alcohol unwittingly to third parties where the ven-
dor's direct actions violated statutory requirements.8 33 In this case,
the vendor sold alcohol to the deceased's intoxicated nephew, possibly
in violation of both sections 04.16.030 and 04.21.020 of the Alaska
Statutes. Section 04.16.030 forbids a state licensee from selling alco-
holic beverages to a drunken person, and section 04.21.020 imposes
civil liability on a person who violates section 04.16.030 for the inju-
ries resulting from the intoxication of the drunken person served. 834
The court noted, however, that "a vendor who furnishes alcohol to
sober persons will not be held liable under ... section 04.21.020, re-
gardless [of] whether the vendor thereby indirectly provides the alco-
hol to an intoxicated third person. 8 35 In addition, the court stated
that common law negligence actions for the sale of liquor to intoxi-
cated persons are limited to cases that arose prior to the enactment of
section 04.21.020 in 1982.836
The court also held that the liability of a negligent actor can be
relieved through the doctrine of intervening superseding cause only in
exceptional cases where the harm done was so unforeseeable to the
negligent actor that, in retrospect, it appears to have been highly ex-
traordinary..3 37 In this case, the court thought that it was not highly
extraordinary that the intoxicated decedent, allegedly provided with
alcohol by the defendant, might be struck "by a speeding car on a dark
road, driven by [the intervening] drunken driver. ' 838 The court fur-
ther held that the question of whether an intervening act was highly
extraordinary was an issue for the jury and should not be decided in a
motion for summary judgment.8 39
The most significant holding in Oaksmith v. Brusich 8 40 was the
court's adoption of a test requiring that a party must show six ele-
ments in order to sustain an action in tort for intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage. The elements are that: (1) a
prospective business relationship existed between the parties, (2) the
alleged tortfeasor knew of the prospective business relationship and
intended to prevent the relationship from developing, (3) the prospec-
tive business relationship did not result in financial benefit to the plain-
tiff, (4) the alleged tortfeasor's conduct "interfered with the
prospective relationship," (5) the interference caused the plaintiff's
833. Id. at 239.
834. Id. at 238-39. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 04.16.030 (Supp. 1989), 04.21.020
(1986).
835. Williford, 783 P.2d at 239 n. 11 (citation omitted).
836. Id. at 238 n.10 (citing Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1981)).
837. Id. at 237.
838. Id. at 238 & n.9.
839. Id. at 238.
840. 774 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1989).
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damages and (6) the alleged tortfeasor's conduct was not privileged or
justified. 841 The court reversed the trial court's finding of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, stating that there
was insufficient evidence to prove whether the alleged tortfeasor's con-
duct was wrongful or whether the conduct actually induced the failure




841. Id. at 198. This test is very similar to that used to sustain a tort claim for
intentional interference with contractual relations, as the two torts are closely related.
Id.
842. Id.
1990]

